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Statement	of	Disclaimer		This	project	report	is	a	result	of	a	class	assignment;	it	has	been	graded	and	accepted	as	fulfillment	of	the	course	requirements.	Acceptance	of	this	report	in	fulfillment	of	the	course	requirements	does	not	imply	technical	accuracy	or	reliability.	Any	use	of	information	in	this	report	is	done	at	the	risk	of	the	user.	These	risks	may	include,	but	may	not	be	limited	to,	catastrophic	failure	of	the	device	or	infringement	of	patent	or	copyright	laws.	California	Polytechnic	State	University	at	San	Luis	Obispo	and	its	staff	cannot	be	held	liable	for	any	use	or	misuse	of	the	project.	
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Executive	Summary	
	A	Fire	Protection	&	Life	Safety	Analysis	was	conducted	in	order	to	fulfill	the	requirements	for	the	degree	of	Master	of	Science	in	Fire	Protection	Engineering.	The	Fire	Protection	&	Life	Safety	Analysis	consisted	of	a	prescriptive	and	performance-based	analysis	of	the	Eric	W.	Rood	Administration	Center	(Rood	Center).			The	prescriptive	based	analysis	was	conducted	to	determine	if	the	Rood	Center	adhered	to	the	applicable	codes	and	standards.	It	utilized	the	2013	California	Building	and	Fire	Codes	and	the	2012	Life	Safety	Code	(NFPA	101).	Other	NFPA	codes	that	were	referenced	included	the	2013	edition	of	NFPA	13,	Standard	for	the	Installation	of	Sprinkler	Systems,	the	2013	edition	of	NFPA	72,	National	Fire	Alarm	Signaling	Code,	and	the	2015	edition	of	NFPA	2001,	Standard	on	Clean	Agent	Fire	Extinguishing	systems.		The	prescriptive	based	analysis	examined	four	portions	of	the	building’s	fire	protection	system:	
• Egress	Analysis	&	Design	
• Fire	Detection	&	Alarm	Notification	
• Water-based	Fire	Suppression	
• Structural	Fire	Protection		Deficiencies	were	found	in	the	building’s	fire	detection	and	notification	systems,	as	well	as	the	inspection,	testing,	and	maintenance	of	said	systems.	The	building’s	primary	fire	alarm	
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system	has	photoelectric	smoke	detectors	installed	in	only	portions	of	the	building.		The	bulk	of	the	detectors	are	installed	in	the	exit	corridors	with	typically	only	one	detector	per	department.	While	the	number	of	smoke	detectors	in	most	departments	is	lacking,	some	departments	don’t	have	any	at	all.	The	first	floor	has	only	23	smoke	detectors,	while	the	second	floor	has	only	16.	Based	on	coverage-area-per-detector	calculations	alone,	the	first	floor	should	have	a	minimum	of	56	detectors	and	the	second	floor	should	have	a	minimum	of	58.	One	of	the	departments	in	the	building	that	does	have	smoke	detectors,	has	only	local	detectors	(they	are	not	connected	to	the	building’s	fire	alarm	control	panel	(FACP)).	Two	of	the	fire	scenarios	in	the	performance	based	analysis	indicated	the	fires	were	detected	within	10	seconds	of	ignition.	In	the	other	two	fire	scenarios,	the	fires	were	not	detected	until	73	seconds	and	107	seconds	into	the	simulations	respectively.	Examining	the	building’s	notification	systems	revealed	several	issues	as	well.	Three	of	the	notification	devices	types	currently	in	use	in	the	building	are	listed	in	the	FACP’s	manual	as	not	compatible.	Similar	to	the	detection	system,	there	are	not	enough	notification	appliances	(audio	or	visual)	throughout	the	building	to	ensure	proper	coverage.	Inspections	and	tests	are	not	done	to	confirm	proper	audible	and/or	visual	levels	in	the	building	during	an	active	alarm.			The	performance	based	analysis	examined	how	the	building’s	fire	protection	system	would	react	to	a	fire,	and	whether	occupants	would	have	enough	time	to	escape	to	safety.	A	computational	fluid	dynamics	modeling	program,	Fire	Dynamics	Simulator	(FDS),	was	used	to	estimate	the	available	safe	egress	times	(ASET)	for	four	different	fire	scenarios	throughout	the	building.		Those	values	were	then	compared	with	the	required	safe	egress	times	(RSET)	calculated	in	the	prescriptive	based	analysis	for	each	fire	scenario.			The	original	RSET	values	were	calculated	for	the	departments	affected	by	the	fire	scenarios.	The	fire	models	were	analyzed	and	the	ASET	values	were	determined	when	conditions	either	first	became	untenable,	or	when	all	the	occupants	had	exited	the	building;	whichever	came	first.	The	conditions	in	the	building	became	untenable	before	people	could	evacuate	the	building	in	all	four	fire	scenarios	(RSET	>	ASET).	In	some	situations,	conditions	became	untenable	seconds	after	the	fire	alarm	was	activated,	and	several	minutes	before	evacuations	were	complete.			The	performance	based	analysis	determine	that	the	arrangement	of	the	dead	end	hallway	off	the	second	floor	lobby	was	especially	problematic	as	it	could	cause	the	occupants	to	be	trapped	in	the	event	of	a	fire.	Two	fire	scenarios	were	examined,	one	with	the	fire	in	the	dead	end	hallway,	and	another	with	the	fire	in	the	main	lobby.	In	both	cases,	the	conditions	in	the	building	became	untenable	long	before	the	occupants	would	have	been	able	to	escape	the	hallway,	let	alone	the	building.			
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Codes	&	Standards	Referenced	in	Prescriptive	Analysis	
	 2013	California	Building	Code	2013	California	Fire	Code	2012	NFPA	101	–	Life	Safety	Code	2013	NFPA	72	–	National	Fire	Alarm	and	Signaling	Code	2013	NFPA	13	–	Standard	for	the	Installation	of	Sprinkler	Systems	2015	NFPA	2001–	Standard	on	Clean	Agent	Fire	Extinguishing	Systems	
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  10 
Original	Applicable	Codes	&	Standards	
	 1979	Uniform	Building	Code	1979	Uniform	Fire	Code	1985	NFPA	101	–	Code	for	Safety	to	Life	from	Fire	in	Buildings	and	Structures	2002	NFPA	72	–	National	Fire	Alarm	and	Signaling	Code	1983	NFPA	13	–	Standard	for	the	Installation	of	Sprinkler	Systems	2000	NFPA	2001	–	Standard	on	Clean	Agent	Fire	Extinguishing	Systems	
	
	
Building	Information		The	Eric	W.	Rood	Administration	Center	(Rood	Center)	has	been	operated	and	maintained	by	the	government	of	Nevada	County	since	it	was	built	in	1985-86.	It	is	a	two	story	building	with	both	stories	above	grade.	The	building	faces	south-by-southeast	and	is	rectangular	in	shape,	360	feet	wide	by	144	feet	long.	Due	to	the	presence	of	chamfered	corners	on	the	first	story	(as	seen	in	Figure	1),	the	perimeter	of	the	second	story	is	slightly	larger	than	that	of	the	first.	However,	the	square	footage	of	the	second	story	is	smaller	due	to	a	two-story	lobby	and	a	one-and-a-half	story	Board	of	Supervisors	chambers.	The	first	floor	is	52,138	square	feet	while	the	second	story	is	51,262	square	feet	for	a	total	of	103,400	square	feet.																										
Figure	1:	Chamfered	corner	at	the	southwest	corner	of	the	building	
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	The	exterior	walls	are	filled-concrete	while	the	interior	walls	consist	primarily	of	gypsum	wall	board	over	metal	studs.	The	building	has	a	flat	roof	and	a	parapet	wall	encircling	the	top	of	the	second	story.	Each	floor	has	9-foot-tall	T-bar	drop	ceilings.	Most	of	the	main	hallways	and	corridors	vary	in	width	along	their	lengths,	from	8	feet	to	16	feet	wide.			There	are	three	exit	stairwells	from	the	second	floor;	one	open-air	stairwell	in	the	lobby,	and	two	enclosed	cement-lined	stairwells	at	the	west	and	east	ends	of	the	building.	The	tops	of	the	stairwells	at	either	end	of	the	building	were	designed	as	areas	of	refuge.	Building	staff	enter	the	building	through	the	west	and	east	stairwells.	Electronic	locks	on	the	doors	provide	a	log	of	entry.	Near	the	stairwell	in	the	lobby	is	the	only	elevator	in	the	building	providing	handicap	access	to	the	second	floor.	At	the	front	of	the	building	is	a	two-story	wall	constructed	of	tempered	glass	inside	of	a	metal	framework	with	an	atrium-style	lobby	directly	behind	it.	Located	on	either	side	of	the	glass	wall	are	glass	double-doors	which	are	the	main	public	entry	points	into	the	building.			The	building	is	classified	as	mixed	occupancy	per	the	2012	Life	Safety	Code	(6.1.14.3),	and	a	light-hazard	occupancy	by	the	Authority	Having	Jurisdiction	(AHJ).	The	AHJ	is	the	Nevada	City	Fire	Department.	The	Rood	Center	is	primarily	a	Group-B	Business	occupancy	with	some	areas	classified	as	a	Group-A	Assembly	occupancy	(with	both	A-2	and	A-3	subclasses).	It	contains	many	of	the	county	government’s	offices,	as	well	as	a	number	of	conference	rooms,	a	computer	data	center,	a	Board	of	Supervisors	meeting	chamber	(with	fixed	seating),	and	a	small	cafeteria.	The	building’s	hours	of	operation	are	Monday	through	Friday,	8:00am	–	5:00pm	for	both	general	staff	and	public	access.		The	building	is	protected	by	two	types	of	sprinkler	systems.	The	lobby	and	the	exterior	parapet	walls	are	protected	by	a	dry-pipe	system.	The	internal	occupied	space	of	the	building	and	the	attic	are	protected	by	a	wet-pipe	system.			
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Figure	2:	Google	Maps	view	of	Eric	W.	Rood	Administration	Center	(Top	of	the	page	is	north)															
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Prescriptive	Based	Analysis		
Structural	
	
Type	of	Construction	When	the	building	was	built,	all	design	requirements	were	based	upon	the	1979	Uniform	Building	Code	(UBC).	The	building	was	originally	classified	as	type	V-N	construction,	which	is	the	equivalent	of	type	V-B	construction	today;	however,	the	building	today	would	actually	be	classified	as	type	III-B	construction	(non-combustible	walls	with	an	unprotected	wooden	roof	structure).	The	building	has	two	stories	above	grade,	and	is	approximately	35-40	feet	tall.			
Building	Heights	&	Allowable	Areas		Table	503	lists	the	allowable	building	heights	and	areas	per	floor	(see	Table	1).	According	to	the	table,	under	type	III-B	construction,	Group	B	occupancies	are	allowed	to	be	a	maximum	of	55	feet	tall.	According	to	this	table,	the	building	can	have	a	maximum	of	three-stories	with	an	area	per	floor	of	19,000	ft2.			
Table	1:	Allowable	Building	Height	and	Areas													
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Exceptions		Several	sections	in	Chapter	5	of	the	2013	CBC	provide	general	exceptions	for	the	data	in	
Table	1.	The	first	is	section	504.2	which	states	that	if	a	building	is	equipped	throughout	with	an	approved	automatic	sprinkler	system,	then	the	values	for	maximum	building	height	can	be	increased	by	20	feet,	and	the	maximum	number	of	stories	can	be	increased	by	one,	to	new	values	of	75	feet	tall	and	4	stories.			Section	506.3	includes	an	exception	for	the	allowable	area	per	floor	if	the	building	is	equipped	throughout	with	an	approved	automatic	sprinkler	system.	The	maximum	area	per	floor	is	permitted	to	be	increased	by	an	additional	200%	for	buildings	with	more	than	one	story	above	grade	plane.	This	increase	brings	the	maximum	area	per	floor	of	the	building	to	57,000	ft2,	which	is	above	the	actual	square	footage	of	either	floor.			Section	507.4	states	that	the	area	of	a	Group	B	building	no	more	than	two	stories	above	grade	plane	shall	not	be	limited	where	the	building	is	equipped	throughout	with	an	approved	automatic	sprinkler	system	and	is	surrounded	by	public	ways	not	less	than	60	feet	in	width.	As	the	building	is	surrounded	on	all	four	sides	by	parking	lots	over	60	feet	in	length,	is	only	two	stories	tall,	and	is	fully	sprinklered,	the	maximum	area	per	floor	would	be	unlimited.	However,	the	AHJ	would	have	to	agree	to	classify	the	building	throughout	as	Group	B	and	not	Mixed	Occupancy.		
Table	2:	Actual	vs.	Allowed	Values	for	Building	Height	and	Floor	Areas		 Maximum	Allowed	 Actual	Stories	Above	Grade	Plane	 3	 2	Building	Height	 75	 35-40	Area	Per	Floor	 57,000	ft2	 52,138	ft2		There	are	additional	allowances	for	area	per	floor	based	on	frontage	(CBC	–	Section	506.2),	but	as	the	allowances	have	already	exceeded	the	actual	size,	those	increases	were	not	needed	and	therefore	won’t	be	discussed	further	in	this	report.		
	
	
Fire	Resistance	Ratings	
	Table	601	of	the	2013	CBC	lists	the	minimum	fire	resistance	rating	requirements	for	building	elements	(see	Table	3).	As	shown	in	Table	3	below,	for	type	III-B	construction,	the	only	minimum	fire	resistance	rating	requirements	for	the	building	is	exterior	load	bearing	walls.					
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  15 
Table	3:	Fire-Resistance	Rating	Requirements	for	Building	Elements	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		
Table	4	below	lists	a	comparison	of	the	interior	finish	requirements	of	exit	corridors	and	stairways	between	the	Life	Safety	Code	and	the	California	Building	Code.		
	
Table	4:	Fire-Resistance	Rating	Requirements	for	Interior	Finishes	
Occupancies	 LSC	(Table	A.10.2.2)	 CBC	(Table	803.9	–	Sprinklered)	Exits	 Corridors	 Exits	 Corridors	
Assembly	
(>300	existing)	 A	 A	or	B	 B	 B	
Business	
(existing)	 A	or	B	 A	or	B	 B	 C		 Class	A	interior	wall	and	ceiling	finish	—	flame	spread	index,	0–25	Class	B	interior	wall	and	ceiling	finish	—	flame	spread	index,	26–75	Class	C	interior	wall	and	ceiling	finish	—	flame	spread	index,	76–200		As	the	LSC	doesn’t	list	values	for	a	sprinklered	building,	a	note	is	included	at	the	bottom	of	the	table	and	it	reads:		
“Automatic	sprinklers	—	where	a	complete	standard	system	of	automatic	sprinklers	is	
installed,	interior	wall	and	ceiling	finish	with	a	flame	spread	rating	not	exceeding	
Class	C	is	permitted	to	be	used	in	any	location	where	Class	B	is	required,	and	Class	B	
interior	wall	and	ceiling	finish	is	permitted	to	be	used	in	any	location	where	Class	A	is	
required.”	
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The	second	floor	main	corridors	of	the	building	have	a	small,	dense	pile	carpet	with	acoustic	ceiling	tiles	in	the	drop	ceiling	above	(see	Figure	3	below).	The	walls	are	metal	stud	with	gypsum	wall	board.	The	wall	coverings	consist	of	two	types	of	decorative	wall	paper.	At	the	time	of	this	report,	the	flammability	of	these	types	of	wall	paper	is	unknown.	With	a	sprinklered	building,	finish	rating	requirement	of	Class	C	or	below,	the	wall	paper	would	most	likely	be	approved	under	the	code.																						
Figure	3:	Second	Floor	East	Corridor	looking	west		The	main	lobby	and	CDA	waiting	areas	have	tile	floors.	The	ceiling	in	the	main	lobby	is	composed	of	gypsum	wall	board,	acoustic	ceiling	tiles,	and	T-111	tongue-and-groove	siding.	The	wall	materials	in	the	main	lobby	are	primarily	gypsum	wall	board,	with	T-111	tongue-and-groove	siding	in	the	front	seating	area	near	the	windows.	The	CDA	waiting	areas	has	acoustic	ceiling	tiles	and	the	same	type	of	wall	paper	as	the	previously	mentioned	corridors.													
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Figure	4:	Main	lobby	looking	east		The	two	stairwells	at	either	end	of	the	building	are	cement-lined	with	cement	floors	and	steps.	The	ceiling	and	walls	of	the	stairwell	are	cement	with	gypsum	wall	board	coverings.				
Exterior	Walls:		The	exterior	walls	of	the	building	have	concrete	columns	stretching	from	ground	level	to	the	underside	of	the	mansard	roof.	The	columns	are	spaced	approximately	18	feet	apart.	The	beams	and	bracing	for	the	floors	attach	to	the	interior	side	of	the	columns.			The	sections	of	the	first	floor	exterior	walls	in	between	the	concrete	columns	are	9	feet	tall	and	made	of	3’x3’	glass	sections	in	metal	frames.	The	second	floor	walls	have	a	solid	section	at	the	base,	with	two	rows	of	3’x3’	glass	sections	in	metal	frames	at	the	top.	The	wall	between	the	first	and	second	floors	is	concrete.	The	fascia	around	the	front	of	the	building,	the	exterior	of	the	stairwells,	and	the	mansard	is	T-111	tongue-and-groove	wood	siding.				The	only	portion	of	the	exterior	walls	that	could	potentially	fail	the	2-hour	require	fire	resistance	rating	would	be	the	windows.	The	windows	are	not	protected	by	glazing	or	by	an	automatic	sprinkler	water	curtain.	However,	Table	705.8	of	the	CBC	states	that	if	the	building’s	fire	separation	distance	is	greater	than	30	feet,	and	the	building	is	protected	by	an	automatic	sprinkler	system,	then	there	is	no	requirement	for	opening	protection.			
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Figure	5:	South	exterior	wall,	west	side	of	the	building		
	
Interior	Walls:	
	The	interior	walls	are	constructed	with	steel	studs	spaced	16”	on	center,	with	the	cavities	filled	with	batts	of	fiberglass	insulation.	The	walls	are	covered	on	both	sides	with	5/8”	gypsum	wallboard.	While	the	building’s	primary	interior	wall	furnishings	appeared	to	meet	the	code	requirements,	some	of	the	decorations	that	are	displayed	in	the	exit	corridors	do	not.	That	would	include	paper	art	projects	by	local	students,	and	large	8’x8’	quilts	hung	on	the	walls.	
	
	
Floors:	
	The	floors	are	constructed	with	2-1/2”	of	poured	hardrock	concrete	over	ASC	Pacific	Type	“B”	hi-form	composite	20	gage	galvanized	steel	decking	over	engineered	metal	trusses.	The	concrete	is	reinforced	with	welded	wire	fabric	(WWF).	The	second	story	floor	used	the	same	construction	but	used	1-1/2”	of	lightweight	concrete,	reinforced	in	the	same	manner.		
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Roof:		The	building	has	a	roof	that	is	flat	in	the	center	with	a	mansard	encircling	the	top	of	the	second	story.	The	roof	material	at	the	front	of	the	building	is	26	gage	galvanized	steel	metal	which	slopes	up	from	the	exterior	of	the	mansard	towards	the	center	of	the	building	creating	a	parapet	wall	around	the	flat	roof	(see	Figure	6	below).	The	roof	structure	is	supported	by	wooden	glulam	beams	(~36	inches	tall)	which	attach	to	metal	columns.	Wooden	trusses	attach	to	the	glulam	beams	and	occupy	the	upper	1/3	of	the	attic.		The	bottom	2/3	of	this	attic	space	is	occupied	HVAC	lines,	sprinkler	lines,	power,	phone	and	cable	lines	(see	Figure	7	below).	Metal	cross	bars	are	mounted	between	the	T-bar	ceilings	and	the	wooden	trusses	above.	The	wooden	trusses	vary	in	both	size	and	width.	They’re	built	with	either	2”x6”	or	2”x8”	boards,	and	have	two	to	three	wood	members	sistered	together.	There	are	fire	walls	in	place	in	the	attic	that	separate	the	open	spaces	above	the	offices	from	the	spaces	above	the	fire	rated	corridors.	The	fire	walls	are	built	with	5/8”	gypsum	wallboard	and	metal	stud	framing.	These	fire	walls	are	supposed	to	have	their	openings	sealed	but	several	large	openings	around	pass-throughs	were	noted.	Draft	stops	are	per	the	1982	Uniform	Building	Code	(UBC),	Section	3205,	and	are	spaced	100	feet	on	center.		The	construction,	layout	of	the	building	(including	the	surrounding	public	ways	and	the	automatic	sprinkler	system)	exceed	the	structural	fire	protection	requirements	set	forth	in	the	2013	CBC.																			
Figure	6:	South	portion	of	the	roof	at	the	front	of	the	building		
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Figure	7:	Second	floor	attic,	north	side	of	the	building,	looking	west		An	inspection	of	the	second	floor’s	attic	revealed	fiberglass	insulation	batts	installed	on	the	underside	of	the	roof	with	the	Kraft	paper	side	exposed	(see	Figure	7	above).	Section	720.3	of	the	2013	CBC	states	that	exposed	insulating	materials	shall	have	a	flame	spread	index	of	not	more	than	25.	The	Kraft	paper’s	flame	spread	index	is	greater	than	25.	This	material	is	easily	ignited	and	could	allow	very	rapid	fire	spread	across	the	underside	of	the	roof	above	the	sprinklers.		
Summary:		The	Rood	Center’s	structural	fire	protection	analysis	determined	that	the	building’s	height	and	allowable	areas	per	floor	are	acceptable	under	the	code	with	the	use	of	a	couple	exceptions	granted	because	of	the	presence	of	an	automatic	sprinkler	system.	Because	the	building	is	type	III-B	construction,	the	only	requirements	for	fire	resistance	ratings	concern	load-bearing	exterior	walls.	As	mentioned	above,	the	building’s	separation	distance	is	greater	than	30	feet	so	there	is	no	opening	protection	required	for	the	glass	windows.	The	primary	coverings	on	the	interior	walls	appears	to	meet	the	code’s	requirements,	but	the	decorations	that	are	hung	in	the	corridors	do	not.	Issues	in	the	attic	consist	of	penetrations	in	the	fire	wall,	and	the	Kraft	paper	side	of	the	insulation	batts	exposed.	The	structural	fire	protection	system	is	designed	to	help	contain	the	spread	of	fire	and	provide	the	occupants	more	time	to	escape.	An	analysis	of	the	egress	systems	in	the	next	section	shows	how	much	the	issues	with	the	structural	fire	protection	system	would	impact	evacuation	times.		
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Egress		
Building	Occupant	Load	 	As	the	Rood	Center	is	a	mixed	occupancy	building,	the	occupant	load	was	calculated	based	on	the	individual	departments/spaces	within	the	building.	To	complete	these	calculations,	the	2012	version	of	the	LSC	and	the	2013	version	of	the	CBC	were	used.	Color-coded	diagrams	(Figure	2	&	Figure	3)	are	included	at	the	end	of	this	section	which	illustrate	the	occupancy	classification	of	each	department/space.	A	spreadsheet	was	used	to	track	and	calculate	the	occupant	loads	of	each	space	within	the	building.	It	is	included	in	APPENDIX	B.	
Table	5:	Occupant	Load	Totals		 Based	on	the	2013	CBC	 Based	on	the	2012	LSC	First	Floor	 706	 707	Second	Floor	 651	 656	
Total	Occupancy	 1,357	 1,363		While	these	occupancy	values	represent	maximum	occupancy,	the	actual	occupancy	during	normal	day-to-day	operations	is	approximately	500	people	(35-40%	of	maximum	values).	If	a	meeting	is	occurring	in	the	BOS	chambers,	the	occupancy	would	increase	to	approximately	550-600	people.			
First	Floor:		The	first	floor	was	divided	into	its	various	departments	and	common	areas.	The	departments	are	Social	Services,	Child	Support	Services,	Public	Works,	Planning,	EH,	CDA,	Building,	I&G,	Sheriff’s,	and	the	Mail	Room.	All	of	these	departments	have	Group	B	–	Business	(Office)	occupancies.	Within	each	of	these	areas	are	various	conference	rooms	and	storage	areas.			Some	conference	rooms	are	simply	labeled	“Conference	Room”,	and	are	not	accessible	by	the	general	public,	while	other	conference	rooms	have	official	names	like	“Reward	Room”,	“Coyote	Room”,	or	“Omega	Room”;	all	of	which	are	accessible	to	the	public.			Under	both	the	CBC	(303.1.2)	and	the	LSC	(6.1.2.1),	if	a	space	has	an	occupancy	of	less	than	50	people	(or	is	smaller	than	750	ft2	per	the	CBC),	then	the	space	is	not	an	Assembly	occupancy,	but	instead	changes	to	a	Business	occupancy	or	the	occupancy	classification	of	the	space	around	it	(which	in	this	case,	is	still	Business).			The	AHJ	classified	the	generic	conference	rooms	not	available	to	the	public	as	Business	occupancies,	but	classified	the	occupancies	of	the	named	conference	rooms	as	Assembly	(A-
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3).	Therefore,	the	named	conference	rooms	have	an	OLF	of	15	ft2/person,	while	the	generic	ones	have	with	an	OLF	of	100	ft2/person.			Each	department	also	had	storage	areas	within,	both	as	closed	rooms	(with	a	door)	and	as	open	areas.	According	to	the	AHJ,	the	only	areas	that	could	be	classified	as	storage	areas	were	those	in	closed	rooms.	If	the	storage	areas	were	open,	it	would	fall	under	the	occupancy	of	the	space	around	it.	Many	of	these	closed	rooms	had	paper	and	files	stored	in	them,	so	they	were	classified	as	S-1	Storage	occupancies	which	had	an	OLF	of	300	ft2/person.	As	most	of	these	storage	spaces	were	quite	small	(less	than	300	ft2),	it	was	assumed	that	each	space	could	have	1	person	occupying	it.			The	cafeteria	(903	ft2)	is	more	of	a	lunchroom	or	eating	area,	as	it	doesn’t	have	cooking	equipment.	It	has	a	salad	bar,	a	sandwich	prep	area,	racks	of	small	food	items,	several	vending	machines,	and	tables	and	chairs.	As	the	room	was	above	the	“small	assembly”	rule,	it	was	classified	as	an	Assembly	(A-2)	occupancy	with	an	OLF	of	15	ft2/person.	The	Board	of	Supervisors	(BOS)	Chambers	is	a	large	room	with	fixed	theater-like	seating	in	the	center,	and	standing	space	at	the	rear.	The	floor	slopes	gradually	downwards	towards	the	front	of	the	room.	The	grade	drops	15	inches	in	a	span	of	22	feet.	At	the	front	of	the	fixed	seats	are	two	desks	which	face	the	supervisors.	The	supervisors	sit	on	a	raised	area	in	an	arc	around	the	northwest	corner	(front)	of	the	room.	There	are	121	fixed	seats,	and	then	an	area	of	~70	ft2	at	the	rear	of	the	room	for	standing	room.	According	to	the	CBC,	this	standing	area	has	an	OLF	of	5	ft2/person	while	the	LSC	lists	an	OLF	of	7	ft2/person.			The	CDA	waiting	area	in	front	of	the	Public	Works,	Planning,	Building,	CDA	&	EH	departments,	has	several	chairs,	and	a	small	4’x4’	kids	play	area.	This	area	as	well	as	the	Main	Lobby	at	the	front	of	the	building	are	classified	as	a	Business	(Group	B)	with	an	OLF	of	100	ft2/person.			The	first	floor	contained	four	sets	of	public	restrooms	scattered	throughout	the	building.	One	pair	is	located	off	the	main	lobby,	another	off	the	exit	corridor	on	the	east	end	of	the	building,	another	off	the	exit	corridor	on	the	west	end	of	the	building,	and	the	last	set	inside	the	department	of	Social	Services.	As	these	spaces	were	not	listed	in	either	code,	they	were	classified	as	“Utility”	(CBC)	with	an	OLF	of	300	ft2/person,	or	“Industrial”	(LSC),	which	has	an	OLF	of	100	ft2/person.	The	largest	pair	of	restrooms	was	only	409	ft2.	With	an	OLF	of	300	ft2/person,	that	would	only	allow	for	1	occupant	total	to	be	present	in	the	men	and	women’s	rooms	at	any	given	time.	As	that	was	not	realistic,	the	occupancy	values	were	increased	to	1	person	in	each	restroom,	giving	a	total	of	2	per	pair	of	restrooms.	With	an	OLF	of	100	ft2/person	(LSC)	some	of	the	restrooms	had	an	occupancy	value	of	4	people.			
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Throughout	the	first	floor,	there	were	four	mechanical	rooms	that	were	classified	at	Utility	(CBC)	or	Industrial	(LSC).	Again	the	Utility	classification	has	an	OLF	of	300	ft2/person	and	the	Industrial	classification	has	an	OLF	of	100	ft2/person.	However,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	two	closets	labeled	“Fire	Alarm”	and	“Intergen	Fire	System	for	IS”	were	of	such	a	small	area	and	contained	large	amounts	of	equipment,	there	wasn’t	any	space	viable	for	occupancy.	Therefore,	neither	of	these	closets	were	given	an	occupancy	value.			The	corridors	and	exit	stairwells	were	treated	as	areas	where	people	would	only	occupy	them	for	the	amount	of	time	that	it	would	take	to	travel	through	them.	Therefore,	they	weren’t	given	an	occupancy	value.			
Second	Floor:		As	with	the	first	floor,	the	second	floor	was	divided	up	into	various	departments	with	storage	and	conference	rooms	inside.	These	departments	are	Assessor,	Auditor-Controller,	Board	of	Supervisors,	Clerk	Recorder,	CEO,	County	Counsel,	HR,	LAFCo,	Sheriff’s,	Tax	Collector-Treasurer,	OES,	and	Elections.	These	departments	all	had	a	Group	B	–	Business	occupancy	classification	with	an	OLF	of	100	ft2/person.	Each	department	had	conference	rooms	that	were	for	office	staff	only,	and	others	that	were	named	and	were	accessible	for	the	public.	The	“small	assembly”	rule	applies	to	most	of	these	named	conference	rooms,	but	after	checking	with	the	AHJ,	they	were	all	classified	as	Assembly	(A-3)	occupancy	with	an	OLF	of	15	ft2/person.	The	storage	rooms	are	classified	as	S-1	Storage	with	an	OLF	of	300	ft2/person	(CBC)	or	500	ft2/person	(LSC).	Each	room	was	assumed	to	have	at	least	1	person	occupying	it.			The	Grand	Jury	room	is	small	enough	where	it	could	fall	under	the	“Small	assembly	spaces”	section	of	the	code	(CBC	-	303.1.2	and	LSC	-	6.1.2.1)	but	was	classified	as	Assembly	(A-3)	by	the	AHJ	with	an	OLF	of	15	ft2/person.			The	Sheriff’s	office	has	its	own	locker	room	with	men	and	women’s	restrooms	attached.	These	restrooms	were	not	open	to	the	public	so	they	were	treated	as	part	of	the	locker	room.	In	the	2013	CBC	and	the	2012	LSC	there	was	no	mention	of	Locker	Room	spaces.	However,	in	the	2010	CBC	and	the	2009	LSC,	there	was	a	section	devoted	to	Locker	Rooms	which	had	an	OLF	of	50	ft2/person.			The	two	sets	of	restrooms	available	to	the	public	were	located	in	the	main	corridors	at	the	west	and	east	ends	of	the	building.	Like	mentioned	above,	as	the	CBC	has	an	OLF	of	300	ft2/person,	each	restroom	was	assumed	to	have	1	person	occupying	it.	With	an	OLF	of	100	ft2/person	from	the	LSC,	more	people	were	able	to	occupy	the	spaces.			
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Two	rooms	used	for	Utility/Industrial	purposes	could	potentially	have	1	person	occupying	each	space	so	they	were	given	an	occupancy	value	of	1	person	each.			The	space	above	the	BOS	Chambers	(indicated	on	Figure	3)	was	unusable	as	it	was	interstitial	attic	space	and	therefore	didn’t	receive	an	occupancy	value.			Like	the	first	floor,	the	corridors	and	exit	stairwells	were	treated	as	areas	where	people	would	only	occupy	them	for	the	amount	of	time	that	it	would	take	to	travel	through	them.	Therefore,	they	weren’t	assigned	occupancy	values.			
Table	6:	Building	Use	Color	Chart		 Business	(Office	Space)		 Assembly	(A-3)	(Tables/Chairs)		 	 Assembly	(A-3)	(Standing)	-	BOS		 Assembly	(A-2)	(Cafeteria	Seating)		 Storage	(S-1)		 Restrooms		 Utility		 Exits		 Exit	Corridors		 Exit	Stairs		 Stairwell	space		 Interstitial	space			Regarding	the	building	floorplans	seen	below	in	Figure	8	and	Figure	9,	large	departments	that	were	connected	to	each	other	and	of	the	same	occupancy	classification	had	the	walls	that	separated	departments	colored	red.	If	the	department	separation	crossed	an	area	where	there	were	no	walls,	a	wall	was	drawn	in	and	colored	
yellow	to	indicate	the	separation.	
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Figure	8:	First	Floor	diagram	with	building	use	colors	
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Figure	9:	Second	Floor	diagram	with	building	use	colors	
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Required	Number	of	Exits:		The	building	has	a	total	occupancy	of	1,363	(assuming	the	higher	value).	According	to	both	the	CBC	(Section	1021,	Table	1021.3(1))	and	the	LSC	(Section	7.4.1.2),	the	building	has	a	requirement	of	4	exits.	The	first	floor	has	6	exits	and	the	second	story	had	access	to	3	of	those	exits.	Therefore,	there	are	an	adequate	number	of	exits	in	the	building.			
Arrangement	of	Exits	&	Exit	Access:		Section	7.5.1.2	of	the	LSC	states,	“7.5.1.2	Corridors	shall	provide	exit	access	without	passing	
through	any	intervening	rooms	other	than	corridors,	lobbies,	and	other	spaces	permitted	to	
be	open	to	the	corridor...”.	Section	1014	of	the	CBC	states	a	similar	concept.			One	location	where	this	might	be	an	issue	is	on	the	first	floor	in	the	cafeteria.	A	small,	hallway	that	is	not	marked	as	an	exit,	leads	from	the	west	corridor,	south	into	the	northeast	corner	of	the	cafeteria.	Both	ends	of	the	hallway	are	serviced	via	a	single-doorway.	Once	in	the	cafeteria,	the	path	of	egress	would	then	lead	south	through	the	east	end	of	the	cafeteria	and	out	into	the	lobby,	again,	through	a	single-doorway.	This	hallway	is	frequented	by	staff	during	day-to-day	operations,	but	it	isn’t	marked	as	an	exit,	therefore	it	is	not	clear	if	this	arrangement	is	against	the	code.			Located	on	the	second	floor	of	each	exit	stairwell	at	either	end	of	the	building	are	areas	of	“rescue	assistance”	for	handicap	people.	The	areas	are	approximately	40-50	ft2	and	have	an	evacuation	stair-chair	mounted	in	a	holder	on	the	wall,	along	with	an	intercom/paging	system	with	instructions	for	use	(in	English	and	Brail).	The	instructions	say	to	press	a	large	red	button	which	notifies	a	dispatch	center	of	the	occupant’s	location	(who	in	turn	notifies	the	fire	department),	and	continuously	pages	an	intercom	located	in	the	west	end	of	the	main	lobby	near	the	cafeteria	until	someone	answers.	
	
Remoteness	of	Exits:		By	taking	into	account	the	occupancy	values	of	each	space	and	the	floors	as	a	whole;	then	taking	into	account	the	required	number	of	exits	of	each	space,	it	appears	as	if	the	requirements	in	Sections	7.5.1.3.1	and	7.5.1.3.3	of	the	LSC	are	met	throughout	the	building.			
7.5.1.3.1	Where	more	than	one	exit…is	required	from	a	building	or	portion	thereof,	
such	exits…shall	be	remotely	located	from	each	other	and	be	arranged	to	minimize	the	
possibility	that	more	than	one	has	the	potential	to	be	blocked	by	any	one	fire	or	other	
emergency	condition.		
	
7.5.1.3.3	In	buildings	protected	throughout	by	an	approved,	supervised	automatic	
sprinkler	system	in	accordance	with	Section	9.7,	the	minimum	separation	distance	
between	two	exits,	exit	accesses,	or	exit	discharges,	measured	in	accordance	with	
7.5.1.3.2,	shall	be	not	less	than	one-third	the	length	of	the	maximum	overall	diagonal	
dimension	of	the	building	or	area	to	be	served.		
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Figure	10:	First	floor	diagram	showing	locations	and	remoteness	of	the	exits			
Dead	Ends:		Section	1018.4	(2)	of	the	CBC	and	Table	A.7.6	of	the	LSC	state	that	in	a	building	that	is	sprinklered	with	a	Business	occupancy,	the	length	of	dead	end	hallways/corridors	has	to	be	less	than	50	feet	in	length.	As	this	building	is	classified	as	Mixed	Occupancy,	to	obtain	that	exception	would	require	the	AHJ	to	again	classify	the	building	as	Group	B	–	Business.	If	not,	the	maximum	length	of	the	dead	end	corridor	shall	not	exceed	more	than	20	feet.			There	is	only	one	“dead	end”	in	the	building.	It	is	a	corridor	located	on	the	second	story	leading	north	out	of	the	open-air	walkway	towards	the	Grand	Jury,	two	named	conference	rooms	and	the	LAFCo	offices.	This	corridor	was	measured	and	found	to	be	48	feet	in	length	which	is	compliant	with	the	code	assuming	a	Group	B	occupancy.									
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Figure	11:	Close-up	view	of	the	dead	end	hallway	on	the	second	floor				
Travel	Distances:		Table	1016.2	in	the	CBC	and	Table	A.7.6	in	the	LSC	give	values	for	exit	travel	distance	limits.	Both	tables	state	that	for	Assembly	occupancies,	the	maximum	travel	distance	in	a	sprinklered	building	is	250	feet,	and	for	Business	occupancies,	the	maximum	travel	distance	in	a	sprinklered	building	is	300	feet.			The	longest	distance	anyone	would	have	to	travel	in	a	single	corridor	(assuming	other	exits	were	blocked)	is	only	198	feet,	which	is	well	below	the	two	limits.							
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Exit	Discharge:		All	exits	on	the	first	floor	discharge	directly	out	of	the	building	into	public	areas.	These	public	areas	are	all	handicap	accessible	and	provide	people	with	means	to	move	away	from	the	building	safely.	The	building	is	surrounded	by	parking	lots	on	all	sides	allowing	for	ample	space	for	people	to	fill	as	they	exit	the	building.			
Exit	Signs:		Every	exit	within	the	building	has	an	illuminated	exit	sign	posted	above	the	doorway	with	the	exception	of	the	two	front	exits	in	the	lobby	(which	are	exceptions	according	to	Section	1011.1	of	the	CBC	and	section	7.10.2.1	of	the	LSC).	The	signs	are	white	with	the	letters	“EXIT”	illuminated	in	neon	green	color.	The	signs	have	a	battery	backup	installed	within.		Throughout	the	corridors,	exit	signs	are	posted	so	that	no	sign	is	further	than	100	feet	from	another,	complying	with	Section	1011.1	of	the	CBC	and	section	7.10.1.5.2	of	the	LSC.			In	some	instances,	the	exit	signs	would	have	a	directional	indicator	on	them	that	would	also	be	illuminated.	The	directional	indicator	looked	like	“>”	or	“<”.	In	one	location,	the	directional	arrow	did	in	fact	point	to	an	exit,	but	did	not	point	to	the	nearest	exit.	This	could	potentially	be	a	problem	for	those	not	familiar	with	the	building	and	would	rely	on	the	signs	for	direction.	The	sign	is	posted	on	the	first	floor	just	outside	of	the	“File	Storage”	room	in	the	Community	Development	Agency	(CDA);	just	west	of	the	eastern	exit	corridor.	The	sign’s	directional	indicator	pointed	to	the	waiting	area	of	the	CDA	(west)	where	someone	could	then	exit	via	the	west	corridor	(then	through	the	north	corridor)	or	through	the	main	lobby.	The	shortest	path	of	travel	to	an	exit	in	that	direction	was	~200	feet.	However,	the	nearest	exit	(80	feet	away)	was	in	the	opposite	direction	via	the	eastern	stairwell.	An	image	of	the	sign	can	be	seen	in	Figure	12	below.											
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Figure	12:	The	exit	sign’s	directional	arrow	in	the	CDA	pointing	away	from	the	nearest	exit			
Occupants	and	Pre-Movement	Times	
	
	
Types	of	Occupants:		This	building	is	a	government	building	with	public	access	during	normal	business	hours	(M-F,	8am	–	5pm).	The	building	can	only	be	accessed	by	the	public	via	the	two	double-doorways	at	the	front	of	the	building.	The	staff	of	the	building	carry	identification	cards	on	them	at	all	times	which	act	as	their	electronic	key	cards	(with	exceptions	of	the	Sheriff’s	department,	who	know	the	electronic	lock	codes	for	the	exterior	stairwell	doors).	The	staff	are	asked	to	enter	the	building	via	the	two	exit	stairwell	doors,	or	the	exit	on	the	north	side	of	the	building	so	the	electronic	lock	system	can	track	who	is	in	the	building.	This	also	leaves	the	main	entrance	more	available	for	the	public.			The	temporary	occupants	or	guests	in	the	building	could	range	in	age	from	young	kids	(with	their	parents)	to	senior	citizens.	Most	of	the	people	visiting	the	building	are	there	with	a	purpose.	They	head	directly	to	the	department	they	need	to	visit,	conduct	their	business	and	then	leave	the	building.	Not	many	people	hang	out	in	the	building	for	extended	periods	of	time.	
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	The	staff	of	the	building	range	in	age	from	mid-to-late	twenties,	to	seventies/eighties.	The	types	of	mobility	could	range	from	complete	mobility	to	handicapped.	In	case	of	the	latter,	handicap	access	to	each	exit	on	the	first	floor	is	provided.	On	the	second	floor	(accessed	by	an	elevator	which	shuts	down	in	an	emergency	and	returns	to	ground),	areas	of	rescue	assistance	(mentioned	above)	are	present	in	the	two	exit	stairwells.																				
	
	
Figure	13:	Staff’s	cubicle	workspaces		
Pre-Movement	Times/Activities:		The	building	has	its	own	risk	management	department	which	creates	emergency	evacuation	plans.	An	incident	commander	(IC)	and	an	alternate	are	chosen	to	represent	the	entire	building.	Each	department	has	a	safety	officer	and	an	alternate	to	represent	the	staff	in	the	department.	Each	department	has	a	checklist	to	follow	regarding	their	procedures	in	an	emergency.			For	example,	the	following	is	from	a	checklist	in	Child	Support	Services	that	the	safety	officer	for	that	department	will	use	to	train	the	other	staff	in	the	department:		 Emergency	Evacuation	Checklist	1. Grab	cell,	glasses,	wallet/purse	and	clip	board.	(which	this	checklist	is	posted	on)	2. Grab	bullhorn	and	briefcase	on	cabinet	behind	Ryan.	
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3. Knock	and	notify	investigators	across	the	hall	(who	may	have	head	phones	on	for	
interviews)	during	the	evacuation	process.	4. Evacuate	to	the	Demonstration	Garden	and	take	roll	call.	5. Report	team	roll	call	to	safety	officer.	6. Stay	and	wait	with	team	(do	not	leave	the	campus	or	return	to	the	building	unless	notified	to	do	so).	You	may	be	directed	to	do	other	duties.			**Remember	the	safety	officer	(or	other	designated	individual)	is	reporting	to	the	Emergency	Facilitator.	DO	NOT	take	action	until	the	safety	officer	returns	with	further	instructions.			Each	department	is	trained	to	grab	their	personal	belongings	(cell/purse/glasses,	etc.)	off	their	desks	and	then	head	out	their	designated	evacuation	route.	If	that	route	is	blocked	they	use	a	secondary,	then	a	tertiary	route.	The	safety	officer	grabs	a	bright	vest,	a	flag	color-coded	to	their	department,	a	bullhorn	and	the	clipboard.	Each	clipboard	has	a	full	roster	of	every	person	in	that	department,	along	with	two	phone	numbers	for	each	person,	email	address,	and	vehicle	information.	Once	out	of	the	building,	the	safety	officers	conduct	a	roll	call,	then	report	to	the	IC	who	would	be	at	the	front	of	the	building.	The	IC	can	assign	people	to	direct	traffic	and	prevent	the	public	from	entering	the	building	at	the	time	of	the	emergency.	Once	the	IC	has	all	of	the	role	calls,	they	report	to	the	fire	department	personnel	on	site.																								
Figure	14:	Safety	Officer’s	Gear	&	Checklist	
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  34 
While	everyone	is	exiting	the	building,	someone	from	Facilities	Maintenance	(usually	the	supervisor)	has	the	responsibility	to	check	the	restrooms,	ramps	and	stairwells.	This	person	is	often	in	the	building,	as	they’re	in	charge	of	all	maintenance	in	the	building.	But	if	they’re	off-site	in	their	office,	they	are	located	in	the	next	building	down	the	street	(half	a	block	away)	and	they’re	notified	immediately	by	any	alarms	that	are	triggered	in	the	building	and	respond	immediately.			Full-occupancy	fire	drills	are	conducted	twice	a	year.	Additional	tests	of	the	fire	alarm	systems	are	performed	by	Facilities	Maintenance	Staff	4-5	times	a	year,	after	hours	when	the	building	is	empty.			This	level	of	training	suggests	that	the	pre-movement	time	of	the	employees	would	be	fairly	low	for	those	people	who	work	daily	in	an	office	environment.	Once	an	alarm	sounds,	occupants	would	take	some	time	to	determine	what	was	happening,	then	time	to	grab	their	belongings,	and	then	to	begin	evacuation.			As	the	public	are	generally	in	contact	with	building	staff	while	inside	the	building,	it	is	assumed	that	they’d	be	notified	by	the	staff	(who	are	familiar	with	the	alarms)	what	the	alarm	means	and	be	instructed	where	to	exit.	That	would	help	lower	their	pre-movement	times.			In	the	BOS	chambers,	the	majority	of	the	people	in	the	room	would	most	likely	be	guests	(the	public).	There	would	also	be	building	staff	present	which	could	announce	to	people	once	they	hear	an	alarm	that	they	all	need	to	leave.	People	in	this	room	who	aren’t	standing,	are	in	a	row	of	fixed	chairs	similar	to	a	theater	with	row-exits	on	each	side	of	the	row	(10	rows	total,	5	deep).	In	an	emergency,	they’d	have	to	grab	their	personal	belongings	from	around	their	chairs,	then	wait	in	a	queue	to	get	out	of	their	rows	before	exiting	through	one	of	the	two	main	exits	provided	with	double-doors	at	the	back	of	the	room	(or	the	single	door	exit	at	the	front	of	the	room).		Overall,	the	pre-movement	times	for	the	building’s	occupants	would	be	fairly	low	due	to	training	of	the	staff	and	constant	interactions	of	the	public	with	the	staff	whenever	they’re	in	the	building.			 		
Required	Safe	Egress	Times	(RSET)		The	Required	Safe	Egress	Time	(RSET)	is	a	measurement	of	how	long	it	will	take	the	building’s	occupants	to	evacuate.	To	determine	the	RSET	values,	the	occupancies	were	divided	into	departments.	The	highest	occupancy	load	for	each	department	was	used.	Table	
7	and	Table	8	below	list	the	movement	times	calculated	from	each	department,	assuming	usage	of	the	primary	evacuation	route.	These	hand	calculations	can	be	seen	in	APPENDIX	C.	These	values	do	not	include	detection	or	pre-movement	delays:		
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Table	7:	First	Floor	Movement	Times		
First	Floor	Location	 Time	(seconds)	Main	Lobby	 34	BOS	Chambers	 62	Cafeteria	 122	Waiting	Area	(CDA)	 51	Public	Works	 115	Planning	 148	Environmental	Health	 145	Community	Development	Agency	 114	Building	 80	Child	Support	Services	 170	Dept.	of	Social	Services	 147	Information	&	General	Services	 204	Sheriff’s	 60	Mail	Room	&	Offices	in	North	Corridor	 88			
Table	8:	Second	Floor	Movement	Times		
Second	Floor	Location	 Time	(seconds)	BOS	Offices	 109	CEO	Offices	 146	Clerk	Recorder	 69	Auditor/Controller	 89	Elections	 192	Human	Resources	 174	County	Counsel	 137	LAFCo,	Grand	Jury	&	Conference	Rooms	 293	Office	of	Emergency	Services	 271	Tax	Collector	–	Treasurer	 169	Sheriff’s	 182	Assessor’s	 137		 	Located	throughout	every	main	exit	corridor	in	the	building	are	trash	cans,	recycle	containers,	vending	machines,	and	miscellaneous	temporary	storage	items	(benches,	racks	of	computer	towers,	etc.).	These	items	are	most	likely	placed	in	the	hallways	to	provide	people	convenient	locations	for	disposing	of	their	trash	and	remembering	to	recycle.	These	
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items	pose	a	fire	hazard	which	could	potentially	block	the	main	exit	corridors,	and	they	reduce	the	width	of	the	corridors	which	could	also	cause	egress	issues.			
Summary:		In	general,	the	egress	system	met	code	requirements	with	regards	to	how	many	exits	the	building	has,	where	those	exits	are	located,	how	far	people	have	to	travel	to	get	to	them	and	exit	discharge,	but	it	still	has	some	issues	with	dead	ends	and	exit	signs.	The	exit	sign	issue	is	easily	fixed	by	swapping	the	indicator	on	a	sign	to	point	in	a	different	direction.			While	the	dead	end	hallway	on	the	second	floor	is	acceptable	to	the	requirements	of	the	code	(assuming	a	Group	B	building),	the	arrangement	of	the	hallway	and	exit	did	have	issues	in	the	performance	based	analysis	in	multiple	fire	scenarios.	These	issues	are	discussed	in	more	depth	in	Scenarios	#2	and	#4	as	well	as	in	the	Comments	&	Recommendations	section.			Overall,	there	are	several	different	components	that	make	up	the	building’s	egress	system	and	ultimately	determine	what	the	RSET	values	will	be.	One	item	outside	of	the	egress	system	that	could	potentially	further	lower	the	RSET	values	would	be	the	building’s	alarm	system.	If	the	alarm	system’s	detection	times	can	be	improved	upon,	then	that	would	provide	the	occupants	even	more	time	to	evacuate	as	they’ll	be	notified	of	the	fire	earlier.	The	alarm	system	is	discussed	thoroughly	in	the	next	section.				
Alarms	
	
Requirements	for	the	Fire	Alarm	System:		The	2013	version	of	NFPA	72	–	National	Fire	Alarm	and	Signaling	Code	doesn’t	have	any	requirements	regarding	whether	or	not	a	fire	alarm	system	is	required.		The	2013	California	Building	Code	requires	a	Group-B	Business	occupancy	to	have	a	manual	fire	alarm	system	installed	only	if	certain	conditions	exist.			
2013	CBC	–	Chapter	9	–	Fire	Protection	Systems	
907.2.2	Group	B.	A	manual	fire	alarm	system	shall	be	installed	in	Group	B	occupancies	where	one	of	the	following	conditions	exists:	1. The	combined	Group	B	occupant	load	of	all	floors	is	500	or	more.	2. The	Group	B	occupant	load	is	more	than	100	persons	above	or	below	the	lowest	level	of	exit	discharge.	
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  37 
3. The	fire	area	contains	an	ambulatory	care	facility.	4. Group	B	occupancies	containing	educational	facilities,	see	Section	907.2.2.2.		The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	building	(~1360	people)	was	calculated	regarding	the	egress	analysis	of	the	building.	While	this	value	is	considered	the	maximum	occupancy,	the	actual	occupancy	is	much	lower	on	a	day-to-day	basis.		Therefore,	the	first	condition	might	be	met,	but	the	second	condition	would	certainly	be	met,	thereby	making	a	manual	fire	alarm	system	a	requirement	in	the	building.			The	2012	Life	Safety	Code	(NFPA	101)	requires	a	fire	alarm	system	to	be	installed	if	conditions,	similar	to	what	was	listed	in	the	CBC,	exist.	However,	unlike	the	CBC,	in	the	LSC,	there	is	no	indication	of	what	type	of	fire	alarm	system	is	to	be	installed.			
2012	Life	Safety	Code	–	NFPA	101	
39.3.4.1	General.	A	fire	alarm	system	in	accordance	with	Section	9.6	shall	be	provided	in	all	business	occupancies	where	any	one	of	the	following	conditions	exists:	(1)	The	building	is	three	or	more	stories	in	height.	(2)	The	occupancy	is	subject	to	100	or	more	occupants	above	or	below	the	level	of	exit	discharge.	(3)	The	occupancy	is	subject	to	1000	or	more	total	occupants.		“A	 required	 fire	 alarm	 system	must	 have	 initiation	means	 per	 38/39.3.4.2.”	 –	NFPA	 101	Handbook	
	Since	the	building	is	only	two	stories,	the	first	condition	does	not	apply.	However,	like	mentioned	above,	on	a	day-to-day	basis,	the	occupancy	of	the	second	floor	is	subject	to	100	or	more	occupants.		Therefore,	the	second	condition	does	apply	which	makes	the	fire	alarm	system	a	requirement.	Since	the	system	in	place	was	upgraded	to	a	fire	alarm	system	in	2002,	the	2000	version	of	NFPA	101	states	roughly	the	same	thing	with	a	change	to	the	first	condition	stating,	“The	building	is	two	or	more	stories	in	height	above	the	level	of	exit	discharge.”	So	before	the	system	was	installed,	the	first	two	conditions	would	have	required	the	installation	of	a	fire	alarm	system.			According	to	the	NFPA	101	Handbook,	if	the	fire	alarm	system	is	required,	then	the	fire	alarm	system	must	be	initiated	in	accordance	with	section	39.3.4.2.		
	
39.3.4.2	Initiation.	Initiation	of	the	required	fire	alarm	system	shall	be	by	one	of	the	following	means:		 (1)	Manual	means	in	accordance	with	9.6.2.1(1)	(2)	Means	of	an	approved	automatic	fire	detection	system	that	complies	with	9.6.2.1(2)	and	provides	protection	throughout	the	building	(3)	Means	of	an	approved	automatic	sprinkler	system	that	complies	with	9.6.2.1(3)	and	provides	protection	throughout	the	building	
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9.6.2.1	Where	required	by	other	sections	of	this	Code,	actuation	of	the	complete	fire	alarm	system	shall	be	initiated	by,	but	shall	not	be	limited	to,	any	or	all	of	the	following	means:	(1)	Manual	fire	alarm	initiation	(2)	Automatic	detection	(3)	Extinguishing	system	operation		According	to	the	NFPA	101	Handbook,	“When	the	required	fire	alarm	system	is	initiated	by	one	of	the	means	specified	in	38/39.3.4.2,	the	system	must	automatically	sound	a	general	alarm	throughout	the	building.”	Therefore,	audible	notification	appliances	are	required	throughout	the	building	and	must	be	installed	in	accordance	with	NFPA	72	–	Chapter	18.4.			While	NFPA	72	does	not	require	visible	notification	appliances,	NFPA	101	does	for	new	systems	(not	existing	systems).	Section	9.6.3.6	of	the	2000	version	of	NFPA	101	states,	“Notification	signals	for	occupants	to	evacuate	shall	be	by	audible	and	visible	signals	in	accordance	with	NFPA	72,	National	Fire	Alarm	Code,	and	CABO/ANSI	A117.1,	American	
National	Standard	for	Accessible	and	Usable	Buildings	and	Facilities,	or	other	means	of	notification	acceptable	to	the	authority	having	jurisdiction	shall	be	provided.”	Therefore,	when	the	fire	alarm	system	was	installed	sometime	in	2002,	it	would	have	been	required	to	install	visible	notification	appliances	in	accordance	with	Chapter	18.5	of	NFPA	72.			
Overview	of	Fire	Alarm	Systems:		When	the	building	was	originally	built,	there	wasn’t	a	fire	alarm	system	installed.	Without	the	proper	records	or	documentation	available,	the	exact	dates	of	when	the	first	system	was	installed	are	unknown.	Through	interviews	of	the	Facilities	Management	staff,	it	was	discovered	that	sometime	before	1996	a	manually	activated	system	was	installed	in	the	building	with	the	intent	of	only	being	an	“evacuation	system.”	The	system	had	a	few	pull	stations	installed	in	various	office	departments	(near	the	corridors),	and	some	horns	spread	throughout	the	building	to	notify	the	occupants	of	the	need	to	evacuate.			Sometime	after	the	current	Facilities	Manager	started	working	for	the	county	in	1996,	they	began	to	make	upgrades	to	the	fire	alarm	system	and	contracted	with	Gray	Electric.	Again,	due	to	a	lack	of	records	or	documentation,	it’s	not	clear	exactly	when	the	items	were	installed	but	it	is	believed	to	have	occurred	in	March/April	of	2002.	During	the	upgrade	process,	pull	stations	were	added	at	the	exits,	additional	horns	were	added	along	with	strobes,	horn	strobes,	photoelectric	smoke	detectors,	and	self-closers	on	the	hallway	corridor	doors.		A	secondary	system	was	installed	in	April/May	of	2002	to	protect	the	buildings’	servers	located	in	the	data	center	on	the	first	floor.			Currently	the	building	is	protected	by	two	fire	detection	and	notification	alarm	systems.	The	main	fire	alarm	system	covers	all	of	the	second	floor	and	a	majority	of	the	first	floor;	while	a	secondary	system	covers	only	the	data	rooms	on	the	first	floor.			
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Both	fire	alarm	systems	have	their	own	Fire	Alarm	Control	Panels	(FACP).	The	FACP	for	the	main	fire	alarm	system	is	located	in	a	locked	closet	on	the	first	floor,	along	the	south	side	of	the	west	corridor.		A	remote	annunciator	panel	for	the	main	system	is	located	on	the	first	floor	in	the	lobby,	near	the	entrance	to	the	cafeteria.																			
Figure	15:	The	main	FACP,	the	remote	annunciator,	and	the	building’s	intercom	system		The	Secondary	FACP	is	located	inside	one	of	the	server	rooms	on	the	first	floor.	The	Secondary	FACP	reports	directly	to	the	Main	FACP.	The	second	fire	alarm	system	is	linked	to	an	ANSUL/Inergen	clean	agent	dispersal	system	in	the	data	center	and	has	a	completely	separate	automatic	and	manual	detection	system.																		
Figure	16:	The	secondary	FACP	located	inside	on	of	the	server	rooms		
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The	main	fire	alarm	system	is	a	Supervising	Station	Alarm	that	is	connected	by	two	dedicated	phone	lines	to	a	monitoring	company’s	central	station	(located	in	Cypress,	CA).	The	company	that	monitors	this	alarm	system	is	Criticom	Monitoring	Services	(CMS).	CMS	was	contracted	to	monitor	the	fire	alarm	system	by	Gray	Electric,	the	company	that	inspects,	tests,	and	maintains	the	system.			For	further	detail	regarding	the	layout	of	the	alarm	system,	please	see	APPENDIX	D.			
Fire	Alarm	System	Components:		The	FACP	connected	to	the	main	fire	alarm	system	is	an	IntelliKnight	Model	5820XL	Addressable	Fire	Alarm	Control	System	by	Silent	Knight	(see	Figure	15	above).	The	previous	panel	(unknown	make/model)	was	upgraded	in	December	of	2008	after	there	were	communication	errors	between	the	previous	Main	and	Secondary	FACP’s.	Inside	the	Main	FACP	cabinet	are	two	FIAMM	FG20722	12V	7.2Ah	back-up	batteries	and	two	dedicated	phone	lines.	The	panel	receives	all	of	the	alarm,	supervisory,	and	trouble	signals	from	throughout	the	building	and	notifies	the	monitoring	company	(CMS)	via	the	two	dedicated	phone	lines.			The	main	fire	alarm	system	also	has	a	Silent	Knight	5860	Remote	Annunciator	connected	in	the	lobby	for	remote	access	to	the	system	(see	Figure	15	above).		The	FACP	connected	to	the	secondary	fire	alarm	system	in	the	data	center	is	an	Autopulse	ANSUL	IQ-301R	Analog	Addressable	Control	Unit	installed	in	2002	(see	Figure	16	above).	Inside	the	panel	are	two	National	(SigmasTek)	NB-12	12V	7.5Ah	back-up	batteries.	This	FACP	has	a	disable	switch	located	next	to	it	with	a	key	lock	designed	to	temporarily	disable	the	system	(for	maintenance	purposes).	The	disable	switch	is	monitored	by	a	module	connected	to	the	Secondary	FACP	which	will	send	a	trouble	alarm	to	the	Main	FACP	when	the	switch	is	turned	and	the	system	is	disabled.			
Fire	Alarm	Detection	Devices:	 	Main	System	The	building’s	main	fire	alarm	system	utilizes	two	different	types	of	automatic	fire	detection.			The	first	type	of	automatic	detection	that	is	used	is	smoke	detection.	On	the	first	floor	of	the	building	there	are	16	ceiling-mounted	addressable	photoelectric	smoke	detectors	(Silent	Knight	SD	505-APS)	tied	into	the	main	system	(see	Figure	17	below).	Nine	of	the	smoke	detectors	are	in	the	two	main	corridors,	with	two	additional	detectors	located	in	the	CDA	waiting	area.	The	remaining	five	smoke	detectors	are	located	in	five	different	departments	(Building,	Community	Development	Agency,	Environmental	Health,	Planning,	and	Public	Works).	That	leaves	three	other	departments	(Child	Support	Services,	Social	Services,	and	Information	&	General	Services)	and	the	Board	of	Supervisors	Chambers	with	no	smoke	detectors.		
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Figure	17:	Photoelectric	smoke	detector	connected	to	the	main	fire	alarm	system		On	the	second	floor	of	the	building	there	are	23	ceiling-mounted	addressable	photoelectric	smoke	detectors	(Silent	Knight	SD	505-APS)	(see	Figure	17	above).	Twelve	of	the	smoke	detectors	are	in	the	three	main	corridors.	The	remaining	eleven	detectors	are	in	most	of	the	office	departments,	just	inside	the	doors	from	the	corridor.	Though,	the	Elections	and	Tax-Collector/Treasurer	departments	do	not	have	any	smoke	detectors	installed.	Two	of	the	previously	mentioned	smoke	detectors	are	in	the	public	area	entrance	and	small	waiting	area	at	the	front	of	the	Sheriff’s	department.	The	rear	of	the	Sheriff’s	department	is	monitored	by	4	older	smoke	detectors.	It	is	unclear	what	make/model/type	of	smoke	detectors	these	are,	but	they	are	local	detectors,	and	are	not	monitored	by	or	connected	to	the	FACP.	When	asked,	nobody	had	an	answer	as	to	why	these	smoke	detectors	were	present,	weren’t	monitored,	and	were	different	from	the	detectors	in	the	rest	of	the	building.	One	possibility	was	that	they	were	installed	for	additional	protection	at	a	lower	cost,	but	that	was	not	confirmed.			The	second	type	of	automatic	detection	that	is	used	in	the	building	is	heat	detection.	While	there	aren’t	any	actual	heat	detectors	in	the	building,	the	building	is	fully	sprinklered	and	the	sprinkler	heads	act	as	heat	detectors	in	a	way.	There	are	three	types	of	pendant	sprinkler	heads	installed	covering	the	occupied	spaces,	and	one	type	of	upright	sprinkler	head	that	is	used	in	the	attic	spaces.	For	details	on	the	sprinkler	heads,	please	see	the	sprinkler	section	of	the	report	below.		The	wet-pipe	system	has	a	Notifier	WFD-3	water-flow	detection	alarm	installed.	The	dry-pipe	system	has	two	alarms	installed;	a	Potter	PS40-2A	High/Low	pressure	switch	to	monitor	the	water	pressure,	and	a	Potter	PS10-2	pressure	switch	to	monitor	the	air	pressure.	The	water	pressure	switch	trips	when	there	is	a	rise	or	decrease	in	water	pressure	of	10psi.	The	air	pressure	switch	trips	when	the	air	pressure	drops	below	25	psig.	All	three	alarms	are	connected	to	the	Main	FACP	and	will	trigger	the	building’s	alarm	system.			
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Secondary	System		The	building’s	secondary	fire	alarm	system	utilizes	only	one	type	of	automatic	fire	detection,	smoke	detection.		While	there	are	no	heat	detectors	in	the	data	center,	there	are	two	types	of	smoke	detectors.	The	rest	of	the	building	used	primarily	photoelectric	detectors,	but	this	system	includes	both	photoelectric	(Autopulse	SDX-551	Analog	Addressable	Photoelectric	Detector)	and	ionization	(Autopulse	CPX-551	Analog	Addressable	Ionization	Detector)	smoke	detectors	(see	Figure	18	below).	They’re	located	on	the	ceiling,	and	underneath	the	raised	floor.	Unfortunately,	cut	sheets	for	these	exact	smoke	detectors	weren’t	found,	however	cut	sheets	for	newer	models	(SDX-751	&	CPX-751)	were	found	and	included	in	APPENDIX	H.		In	order	for	the	clean	agent	system	to	be	activated	by	automatic	detection,	at	least	two	detectors	in	the	data	center	need	to	activate,	then	a	30	second	delay	will	follow	before	the	clean	agent	will	be	released	into	the	room.	During	the	30	second	delay,	the	dispersal	can	be	aborted	by	pressing	an	abort	button/switch	(Autopulse	Abort	Switch)	located	near	the	data	center’s	entry	door	(see	Figure	19	below).	If	need	be,	the	system	can	be	manually	activated	by	using	a	pull	station	(Autopulse	Electric	Manual	Standard	Pull	Station	IQ-318),	located	near	the	data	center’s	entry	door	(see	Figure	19	below).	The	manual	activation	of	the	system	will	bypass	any	delay	and	immediately	disperse	the	fire	suppressant.															
Figure	18:	Photoelectric	smoke	detector	on	the	left,	Ionization	smoke	detector	on	the	right	
connected	to	the	secondary	fire	alarm	system	
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Figure	19:	Emergency	intercom	system,	manual	pull	station,	abort	switch	in	server	room		For	the	layout	of	the	secondary	alarm	system,	see	APPENDIX	D.	For	the	catalog	cut	sheets,	see	APPENDIX	H.		
Location,	Spacing,	&	Placement	of	Fire	Alarm	Detection	Devices:		In	the	previous	section	it	was	noted	that	the	detection	devices	installed	in	the	building	are	sprinkler	heads	and	smoke	detectors	(photoelectric	and	ionization).	The	requirements	regarding	the	sprinkler	heads	are	listed	in	NFPA	13	and	are	covered	in	the	section	regarding	the	building’s	sprinkler	system.			While	both	the	2013	CBC	and	the	2012	LSC	require	a	fire	alarm	system	to	be	installed	in	the	building,	both	state	that	a	manually-activated	system	is	sufficient.	The	LSC	goes	further	and	states	that	the	fire	alarm	system	can	be	activated	automatically	(separately	from	the	sprinkler	system)	but	is	not	required.	Therefore,	neither	the	CBC,	nor	the	LSC	require	smoke	detectors	to	be	installed	throughout	the	building	in	Group-B	occupancies.			In	the	2013	version	of	NFPA	72,	there	is	no	general	requirement	for	smoke	detectors	in	the	building.	Although	there	is	a	section	that	indicates	that	automatic	smoke	detection	is	required	at	the	location	of	the	FACP.			
10.4.4*	In	areas	that	are	not	continuously	occupied,	automatic	smoke	detection	shall	be	provided	at	the	location	of	each	fire	alarm	control	unit(s),	notification	appliance	circuit	power	extenders,	and	supervising	station	transmitting	equipment	to	provide	notification	of	fire	at	that	location.	
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	This	requirement	was	also	present	in	earlier	versions	of	NFPA	72	with	the	exception	of	the	2007	version.	That	version	of	the	code	stated	there	was	an	exception	if	the	building	was	fully	sprinklered	as	seen	below:		
4.4.5*	Protection	of	Fire	Alarm	System.	In	areas	that	are	not	continuously	occupied,	automatic	smoke	detection	shall	be	provided	at	the	location	of	each	fire	alarm	control	unit(s),	notification	appliance	circuit	power	extenders,	and	supervising	station	transmitting	equipment	to	provide	notification	of	fire	at	that	location.			
Exception	No.	1:	Where	ambient	conditions	prohibit	installation	of	automatic	smoke	
detection,	automatic	heat	detection	shall	be	permitted.	
	
Exception	No.	2:	Fully	sprinklered	buildings	shall	not	require	protection	in	accordance	
with	4.4.5.		When	the	Main	FACP	was	originally	installed	in	2002,	a	smoke	detector	would	have	been	required	in	the	same	room.	However,	when	the	panel	was	updated	in	2008,	a	smoke	detector	would	not	have	been	required	in	the	same	room.	After	checking	with	the	AHJ,	they	did	not	have	any	records	of	inspecting	the	installation	or	update	of	the	FACP	in	2008,	nor	any	indication	as	to	whether	or	not	they	would	have	required	the	smoke	detector	near	the	FACP.			With	regards	to	the	spacing	of	the	smoke	detectors,	in	Chapter	17.5.3.3	of	NFPA	72	(2013)	regarding	“Nonrequired	Coverage”,	there	is	a	section	that	states:	
	
17.5.3.3.1	Detection	installed	for	reasons	of	achieving	specific	fire	safety	objectives,	but	not	required	by	any	laws,	codes,	or	standards,	shall	meet	all	of	the	requirements	of	this	Code,	with	the	exception	of	the	prescriptive	spacing	criteria	of	Chapter	17.		This	section	was	interpreted	to	mean	there	wasn’t	a	smoke	detector	spacing	(or	quantity)	requirement	because	smoke	detectors	weren’t	required	throughout	the	building.	However,	directly	above	that	section	in	the	NFPA	72	Handbook	is	a	commentary	section	that	states:		“Where	the	building	owner	or	system	designer	elects	to	install	fire	detection	systems	or	components	that	are	not	required	by	the	relevant	building	codes,	the	systems	still	must	be	installed	in	accordance	with	the	minimum-compliance	criteria	of	this	Code.”		That	statement	appears	to	indicate	that	because	the	smoke	detectors	were	installed,	they	need	to	be	installed	properly	and	need	to	meet	all	the	requirements	of	NFPA	72.			As	mentioned	in	a	previous	section,	on	the	first	floor	(not	counting	the	data	center)	there	are	only	16	smoke	detectors	protecting	~52,000	ft2	of	office	space.	That	leaves	a	coverage	area	of	~3,250ft2	per	detector.		
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17.7.3.2.3.1*	In	the	absence	of	specific	performance-based	design	criteria,	one	of	the	following	requirements	shall	apply:	(1)	The	distance	between	smoke	detectors	shall	not	exceed	a	nominal	spacing	of	30	ft.	(9.1	m)	and	there	shall	be	detectors	within	a	distance	of	one-half	the	nominal	spacing,	measured	at	right	angles	from	all	walls	or	partitions	extending	upward	to	within	the	top	15	percent	of	the	ceiling	height.	(2)	All	points	on	the	ceiling	shall	have	a	detector	within	a	distance	equal	to	or	less	than	0.7	times	the	nominal	30	ft.	(9.1m)	spacing	(0.7S).		If	the	maximum	distance	between	smoke	detectors	is	30	feet,	that	would	be	a	maximum	coverage	area	of	900ft2	per	detector,	much	lower	than	the	3,250ft2	previously	calculated.			Without	taking	into	consideration	the	requirements	of	having	to	verify	that	each	spot	on	the	ceiling	has	a	detector	within	21	feet	of	it,	that	would	mean	that	the	52,000ft2	first	floor,	divided	by	900ft2	coverage	area	per	detector,	would	need	at	least	58	smoke	detectors	for	adequate	coverage.	Since	we	didn’t	take	into	consideration	the	rule	of	having	a	detector	within	21	feet	of	every	spot	on	the	ceiling,	58	smoke	detectors	would	be	a	low	estimate.		The	second	floor	is	about	the	same	size	(~51,000ft2)	as	the	first	but	has	23	smoke	detectors	spread	throughout	it	(not	counting	the	4	local	smoke	detectors).	That	means	each	detector	has	a	coverage	area	of	~2,200ft2.	Like	above,	if	we	calculate	how	many	smoke	detectors	we	need	base	on	the	maximum	coverage	area	per	detector	of	900ft2,	then	we	would	need	at	least	56	smoke	detectors	for	adequate	coverage	on	the	second	floor.			
Analysis	of	Fire	Detector	Response:		To	determine	the	expected	response	characteristics	of	the	fire	detection	devices,	a	fire	scenario	was	designed.			Throughout	the	building,	the	corridors	vary	in	width	from	8	feet	wide	in	the	narrower	sections,	to	16	feet	wide	in	the	wider	sections	(see	Figure	3	above).	In	a	majority	of	these	wider	sections,	there	are	several	large	(~64	gallon)	trash	and	recycling	cans	for	the	building	occupants/office	staff	to	use.		Sometimes	as	many	as	7-8	cans	are	side-by-side	(see	
Figure	20	below).	One	of	the	cans	is	usually	a	plastic	lined	trash	can	without	a	lid,	with	light	combustible	material	inside.	The	growth	rate	of	the	fire	was	estimated	to	be	similar	to	that	of	a	fast	t2	growth	rate.	For	comparison	purposes,	calculations	were	also	done	for	a	medium	t2	growth	rate.										
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Figure	20:	Trash	and	recycle	containers	in	the	second	floor	west	corridor		The	smoke	detectors	were	treated	as	quick	response	detectors	to	negate	any	delay	travel	lag	of	the	smoke	particles	entering	the	detector.	To	do	so,	a	RTI	value	of	2	was	assumed.		The	ceiling	height	is	9	feet	(108	inches).	The	height	of	the	top	of	the	trash	cans	is	42	inches.	The	detector	would	be	66	inches	above	the	fire.			Table	B.4.7.5.3	from	NFPA	72	(2013)	was	used	to	estimate	the	average	temperature	rise	before	detection.	As	the	trash	cans	are	plastic,	both	the	value	of	PVC	and	Polyurethane	were	used.	The	temperature	rise	for	both	was	7.2°C.	With	an	ambient	temperature	of	25°C,	that	would	mean	the	detectors	should	activate	around	32.2°C.			The	medium	fire	growth	coefficient	is	α=0.012	kW/s2	The	fast	fire	growth	coefficient	is	α=0.047	kW/s2		A	DETACT	spreadsheet	was	used	to	do	the	calculations.	Those	calculations	can	be	seen	in	APPENDIX	F.		
Table	9:	DETACT	spreadsheet	results						Elsewhere	in	the	building	(where	smoke	detectors	are	lacking),	the	first	automatic	detection	might	come	from	the	sprinkler	system	rather	than	a	smoke	detector.	
	
	
	
Fire	Growth	Rate	 Time	to	Detector	Activation	 Heat	Release	Rate	Medium		 38	seconds	 17.3	kW	Fast		 20	seconds	 18.8	kW	
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Fire	Alarm	Notification	Appliances:		Main	System	The	building’s	main	fire	alarm	system	utilizes	various	types	of	bells,	horns,	strobes,	and	horn	strobes.			Over	the	years	that	the	system	has	been	in	the	building,	individual	items	have	been	added	or	replaced,	and	they	often	don’t	match	previous	items	that	were	installed.	At	the	time	of	this	report,	there	are	at	least	4	different	types	of	horns,	3	different	types	of	strobes,	4	different	types	of	horn	strobes,	and	1	bell.	Some	of	the	items	were	fairly	new,	and	some	appeared	to	be	over	20	years	old.			
Table	10:	Types	of	Alarm	Notification	Devices	on	the	main	system	
Bell	 Horn	 Strobe	 Horn	Strobe	Amseco	10”	MBA	Series	 Faraday	6120	 Wheelock	RSS-241575W	Wall	Mounted	 Faraday	AS-MC-R	–	 System	Sensor	HR	 System	Sensor	SCR	Ceiling	Mounted	 Gentex	GES3-24	–	 System	Sensor	H12/24	 Gentex	GES24-15/75WR	 Gentex	GEC-24-15/75	–	 System	Sensor	MA12/24D	 –	 System	Sensor	P2R		
   									
Figure	22:	Four	types	of	horns	used	
	
									
Figure	23:	Three	types	of	strobes	used	
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Figure	24:	Four	types	of	horn	strobes	used		Secondary	System	The	fire	alarm	system	in	the	data	center	doesn’t	have	as	many	discrepancies	with	notification	appliances	as	the	main	system	does.	Inside	the	data	center	are	a	single	bell,	and	a	single	type	of	horn	strobe	used	to	indicate	the	activation	of	the	clean	agent	system.	The	other	horn	strobes	in	the	data	center	are	connected	to	the	main	fire	alarm	system	and	don’t	activate	with	the	secondary	system.			
Table	11:	Types	of	Alarm	Notification	Devices	on	the	secondary	system	
Bell	 Horn	Strobe	System	Sensor	6”	SSM24-6	 System	Sensor	P2475		Compatible	Appliances	A	problem	that	can	arise	with	using	various	types	of	notification	appliances	is	that	they	may	not	be	compatible	with	the	FACP.	Inside	the	manual	for	the	IntelliKnight	5820XL	FACP	is	a	list	of	compatible	notification	appliances.	Table	12	below	lists	the	notification	appliances	that	are	found	in	the	building	and	connected	to	the	main	fire	alarm	system.	If	the	devices	are	not	compatible,	the	device	may	not	work	at	the	designed	capacity,	or	at	all.			 	Table	12:	Compatible	and	Incompatible	Devices		
Compatible	 Incompatible	Faraday	6120	Horn	Gentex	GES3-24	Horn	Strobe	Gentex	GEC-24-15/75	Horn	Strobe	System	Sensor	SCR	Strobe	System	Sensor	HR	Horn	System	Sensor	P2R	Horn	Strobe	Wheelock	RSS-241575W	Strobe	
Faraday	AS-MC-R	Horn	Strobe	System	Sensor	H12/24	Horn	System	Sensor	SS24M	Horn		
	There	can	also	be	a	problem	resulting	from	using	older	(pre-2000)	notification	appliances.	Notification	appliances	designed	before	the	year	2000	could	have	been	designed	for	a	different	minimum	voltage	than	if	they	were	designed	after	the	year	2000	due	to	changes	in	UL	1971.	An	older	notification	appliance	may	require	a	minimum	voltage	of	18V,	but	a	
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newer	appliance	might	only	need	16V.	If	an	older	appliance	is	connected	to	a	newer	FACP,	it	may	not	receive	the	18V	it	requires.	That	might	cause	the	appliance	to	work	in	a	diminished	capacity,	or	not	work	at	all.	Without	knowing	the	results	of	the	system’s	electrical	tests,	and	what	each	appliance	requires,	it	is	unclear	if	this	is	an	issue.			
Location,	Spacing,	&	Placement	of	Fire	Alarm	Notification	
Appliances:		Vertical	Placement	of	Appliances	on	Walls	There	are	two	sections	in	NFPA	72	(2013)	that	dictate	the	vertical	placement	of	the	notification	appliances	on	a	wall,	section	18.4	for	audible	appliances	and	section	18.5	for	visible	appliances	in	public	mode.	Audible	appliances	(horns,	bells)	shall	be	mounted	so	the	top	of	the	appliances	is	between	6”	below	the	finished	ceiling	(BFC),	and	90”	above	the	finished	floor	(AFF).	In	this	building	with	a	9ft	(108	inch)	tall	ceiling,	the	area	that	is	acceptable	is	between	90”	and	102”	AFF,	or	18”	to	6”	BFC.			
18.4.8.1	If	ceiling	heights	allow,	and	unless	otherwise	permitted	by	18.4.8.2	through	18.4.8.5,	wall-mounted	appliances	shall	have	their	tops	above	the	finished	floors	at	heights	of	not	less	than	90	in.	(2.29	m)	and	below	the	finished	ceilings	at	distances	of	not	less	than	6	in.	(150	mm).	
18.4.8.2	Ceiling-mounted	or	recessed	appliances	shall	be	permitted.		The	locations	for	visible	appliances	are	a	little	bit	different.	Instead	of	being	measured	by	the	top	of	the	appliance,	the	code	requires	that	the	whole	lens	is	within	a	certain	height	range.	The	whole	lens	can’t	be	below	80”	AFF,	or	more	than	96”	AFF.	In	relation	to	the	ceiling,	those	values	are	28”	BFC	to	12”	BFC.			
18.5.5.1*	Wall-mounted	appliances	shall	be	mounted	such	that	the	entire	lens	is	not	less	than	80	in.	(2.03	m)	and	not	greater	than	96	in.	(2.44	m)	above	the	finished	floor	or	at	the	mounting	height	specified	using	the	performance-based	alternative	of	18.5.5.6.		However,	when	the	visual	and	audible	appliances	are	combined	in	a	horn	strobe,	the	acceptable	range	is	smaller.	If	for	example	the	appliance	is	4”	tall,	in	this	building	the	top	of	the	appliance	could	be	located	between	18”	and	6”	BFC	for	the	audible	requirements,	and	between	~27”	to	11”	BFC	for	the	visible	requirements.	Now	combining	those	two	requirements,	and	the	acceptable	range	shrinks	to	the	top	of	the	appliance	can	be	located	between	18”	and	11”	BFC.			By	applying	these	rules	to	appliances	present	in	the	building,	it	is	apparent	that	there	are	multiple	code	violations	throughout	the	building.	Several	appliances	are	too	close	to	the	ceiling,	while	others	are	too	low.	For	example,	a	horn	strobe	on	the	main	fire	alarm	system	located	in	the	data	center	is	mounted	such	that	the	top	of	the	appliances	is	only	4.5”	below	the	ceiling.	That	is	too	close	to	the	ceiling	for	both	audible	and	visible	requirements.			
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Figure	25:	Notification	devices	installed	too	low,	and	too	high	in	the	building		Visible	Appliances	in	Corridors	When	visible	appliances	are	required	in	a	corridor,	an	appliance	needs	to	be	located	no	more	than	15	feet	from	each	end	of	the	corridor,	and	they	can’t	be	spaced	more	than	100	feet	apart:		
18.5.5.5.5*	Visible	notification	appliances	shall	be	located	not	more	than	15	ft.	(4.57	m)	from	the	end	of	the	corridor	with	a	separation	not	greater	than	100	ft.	(30.5	m)	between	appliances.		In	the	building	there	are	only	two	horn	strobes	in	corridors.	One	located	in	the	center	of	the	northern	corridor	on	the	first	floor,	and	one	near	the	entrance	in	the	northern	corridor	on	the	second	floor.	The	corridor	on	the	first	floor	is	66	feet	in	length	and	would	require	two	strobes;	one	within	15	feet	of	each	end	of	the	corridor.	That	placement	would	leave	36	feet	between	the	two	which	is	acceptable.	As	there	is	only	one	horn	strobe	in	the	hallway,	it	does	not	satisfy	the	code.	The	corridor	on	the	second	floor	is	48	feet	in	length	and	requires	two	strobes;	one	within	15	feet	of	each	end	of	the	corridor.	That	placement	would	leave	18	feet	between	the	two	which	is	acceptable.	While	the	appliance	is	within	15	feet	of	one	end	of	the	corridor,	there	would	need	to	be	a	second	one	at	the	other	end	of	the	corridor	to	satisfy	the	code.			The	other	much	larger	corridors	are	all	less	than	200	feet	in	length	and	require	three	strobes	per	corridor.	One	within	15	feet	of	each	end	of	the	corridor,	and	one	in	the	center.	That	would	leave	at	maximum,	85	feet	between	the	appliances,	which	is	acceptable	under	the	code.	However,	none	of	the	other	corridors	have	any	strobes,	just	one	horn	per	corridor	which	is	a	violation	of	the	code.	
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Number	of	Audible	Appliances	According	to	NFPA	72,	the	number	of	audible	appliances	in	a	space	is	dependent	on	the	size	and	arrangement	of	that	space.	The	reason	for	that	is	because,	according	to	section	A.18.4.3:	Sound	levels	can	be	significantly	reduced	due	to	distance	and	losses	through	building	elements.	Every	time	the	distance	from	the	source	doubles,	the	sound	level	decreases	by	about	6	decibels	(dB).			And	according	to	section	18.4.3.1:	To	ensure	that	audible	public	mode	signals	are	clearly	heard,	unless	otherwise	permitted	by	18.4.3.2	through	18.4.3.5,	they	shall	have	a	sound	level	at	least	15	dB	above	the	average	ambient	sound	level	or	5	dB	above	the	maximum	sound	level	having	a	duration	of	at	least	60	seconds,	whichever	is	greater,	measured	5	ft.	(1.5	m)	above	the	floor	in	the	area	required	to	be	served	by	the	system	using	the	A-weighted	scale	(dBA).		For	a	Group-B	business	occupancy,	Table	A.18.4.3	lists	the	average	ambient	sound	level	at	55	dBA.	Therefore,	a	horn	strobe	would	need	to	put	out	a	minimum	of	70dBA	anywhere	in	the	room.	The	bigger	the	room,	the	more	decibels	the	horn	has	to	put	out,	or	the	more	horns	that	are	required.		While	attempting	to	verify	the	decibel	ratings	of	the	horns	in	the	building,	it	was	determined	that	none	of	the	horns	were	labeled	with	their	decibel	rating	on	the	exterior	of	the	appliance.					While	walking	through	the	building	with	the	alarm	technician	(from	Gray	Electric)	during	a	semi-annual	test	of	the	system,	it	was	discovered	by	Mr.	Carman	that	the	sound	of	the	alarm	is	very	quiet	in	several	areas	of	the	building.	As	the	building	was	empty	at	the	time,	it	was	apparent	that	those	areas	did	not	have	the	audible	coverage	necessary	to	satisfy	NFPA	72.			To	verify	the	sound	levels	in	each	department	one	would	simply	need	to	know	the	size	and	shape	of	the	room,	and	how	many	horns	are	planned	to	go	into	the	room.	Since	the	decibel	level	decreases	by	6	dBA	every	time	the	distance	from	the	appliance	is	doubled,	then	a	quick	calculation	can	determine	what	decibel	rating	is	required	to	have	at	least	70	dBA	anywhere	in	the	room.			For	example,	according	to	one	of	the	catalog	cut	sheets,	the	System	Sensor	horn	in	the	Planning	Department	has	a	decibel	rating	between	75	dBA	and	85	dBA	depending	on	the	supplied	voltage.	If	a	calculation	is	done	based	on	the	size	of	the	Planning	Department,	the	minimum	acceptable	decibel	rating	for	the	horn	can	be	determined.	The	room	is	~60	feet	wide	(E/W)	and	~40	feet	long	(N/S)	with	the	horn	located	in	the	southwest	corner.	Since	the	horn	isn’t	in	the	center	of	the	west	wall,	the	calculation	for	the	decibel	rating	would	be	the	same	as	if	the	horn	was	in	the	center	of	a	wall	in	a	room	that	was	twice	the	size	(N/S).	With	the	longest	distance	in	the	room	being	60	feet,	the	math	can	be	worked	backwards	to	see	what	decibel	rating	will	produce	a	sound	of	70	dBA	at	60	feet	from	the	appliance.	A	horn	with	a	dBA	rating	of	85	decibels	would	read	85	dBA	at	10	feet	from	the	appliance.	
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Double	that	distance	and	the	sound	level	would	be	79	dBA	at	20	feet.	Double	the	distance	again	and	it	would	be	73	dBA	at	40	feet.	If	the	distance	is	doubled	again,	it	would	reach	80	feet	and	another	6	dBA	would	be	lost	thus	dropping	the	decibel	level	to	67	dBA.	Since	60	feet	is	in	the	middle	between	40	and	80	feet,	the	sound	level	at	that	distance	would	be	exactly	70	dBA,	thereby	satisfying	the	minimum	requirement.	Since	the	System	Sensor	horn	can	produce	a	sound	of	85	dBA,	the	audible	coverage	in	this	room	would	be	sufficient.	However,	if	the	horn	was	not	able	to	produce	a	decibel	level	at	its	maximum	level	of	85	dBA,	the	sound	level	at	the	other	end	of	the	room	would	be	too	quiet	thus	violating	the	code.			While	the	audible	notification	coverage	is	potentially	acceptable	in	the	Planning	Department,	in	some	locations	like	the	Building	department,	there	isn’t	a	single	horn	or	a	horn	strobe	present	which	is	a	violation	of	the	code.		Number	of	Visible	Appliances	According	to	section	18.5.5.4.1	of	NFPA	72:	Spacing	shall	be	in	accordance	with	either	Table	18.5.5.4.1(a)	and	Figure	18.5.5.4.1,	or	Table	18.5.5.4.1(b)		Table	18.5.5.4.1(a)	lists	room	spacing	for	wall-mounted	visible	appliances,	for	both	one-light	or	four-light	options.	The	information	in	the	table	reads	that	if	there	is	a	20’	x	20’	room,	only	one	15cd	strobe	is	required.	However,	if	there	is	a	40’	x	40’	room,	four	15cd	strobes,	or	one	60cd	strobe	would	be	needed.			The	building’s	cafeteria	is	~33’	wide	(E/W)	x	20’	long	(N/S).	To	satisfy	the	number	of	strobes	required	in	the	cafeteria,	the	number	and	size	of	strobes	can	be	varied.	If	only	one	strobe	was	desired,	it	would	need	to	cover	40’	x	40’	to	cover	the	length	and	the	width,	so	a	60cd	strobe	would	be	required.	If	two	strobes	were	desired,	the	area	could	be	divided	into	two	20’	x	20’	sections,	both	of	which	could	be	covered	by	one	15cd	strobe.	Inside	the	cafeteria	is	a	single	Faraday	AS-MC-R	Horn	Strobe	on	the	east	wall.	The	horn	has	a	field	selectable	setting	of	either	15,	30,	75,	or	110cd.	Since	there	is	only	one	strobe	in	the	room,	it	would	need	to	be	at	a	rating	of	75cd	or	above.	In	this	case,	the	appliance	was	set	to	110cd,	far	above	the	minimum.			While	the	visible	notification	coverage	is	acceptable	in	the	cafeteria,	there	are	some	areas	of	the	building	that	don’t	have	any	strobes	and	violate	the	requirements	of	the	code.	Those	areas	lacking	visual	notification	coverage	are	the	building,	planning,	environmental	health,	and	social	services	departments.			In	total	there	are	only	11	horn	strobes	on	the	first	floor,	and	6	strobes	(one	in	each	bathroom).	The	second	floor	has	only	13	horn	strobes,	and	6	strobes	in	the	bathrooms.	That	means	there	are	not	enough	strobes	to	ensure	that	every	portion	the	building	has	at	least	the	minimum	level	of	visual	notification	coverage.					
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Data	Center	The	data	center	consists	of	three	rooms,	totaling	just	over	1000ft2	in	size.	Inside	the	data	center	are	two	horn	strobes	(15/75cd	rating)	connected	to	the	main	system,	one	horn	strobe	(15/75cd	rating)	connected	to	the	secondary	system,	and	a	6”	bell	connected	to	the	secondary	system.	The	bell	is	located	in	the	center	of	the	first	room	and	has	an	audible	rating	of	82dBA.	By	itself,	the	bell	has	just	enough	sound	output	capacity	to	cover	the	minimum	requirements	based	on	the	room	size.	However,	the	bell	is	also	paired	with	a	horn	strobe	that	can	output	between	75-85dBA,	which	when	combined	is	more	than	enough	audible	notification	coverage	for	the	data	center.		The	two	horn	strobes	connected	to	the	main	system	are	located	in	different	rooms	within	the	data	center.	Each	horn	strobe	is	capable	of	putting	out	70-82dBA.	Combined,	they	have	enough	output	capacity	to	meet	the	minimum	requirements	of	the	code.			The	data	center’s	visual	notification	comes	from	the	same	three	horn	strobes	mentioned	above.	Each	15/75cd	horn	strobe	can	only	cover	an	area	of	20’	x	20’.	As	the	two	horn	strobes	connected	to	the	main	system	are	located	in	different	rooms,	the	visual	notification	coverage	is	different	for	each.	The	main	room	is	smaller	than	20’	x	20’	so	the	coverage	provided	by	one	horn	strobe	is	sufficient.	The	second	room	is	larger	at	~21’	x	24’,	therefore	a	horn	strobe	larger	than	15/75cd	would	be	required	to	satisfy	the	code.	The	third	room	doesn’t	have	any	visual	notification	in	it	at	all.	Even	though	the	light	from	the	first	horn	strobe	would	bounce	into	this	room,	it	wouldn’t	satisfy	the	code	requirements.	The	secondary	alarm	system	only	has	the	one	horn	strobe	located	in	the	first	room.	Since	the	room	is	smaller	than	20’	x	20’,	the	coverage	in	that	room	is	sufficient;	but	the	coverage	in	the	other	two	rooms	doesn’t	meet	the	code	requirements.		
Emergency	Communication	System:	
	While	the	building	doesn’t	have	a	typical	mass	notification	system,	there	is	an	area	of	rescue	with	two-way	communication	at	the	top	of	each	stairwell	(East/West)	(see	Figure	
26	below).	In	each	area	of	rescue	is	an	intercom	(AIPHONE	NEM-NE-NVP-RA)	with	a	speaker	and	push	button.	When	the	button	is	pushed	for	5	seconds,	a	signal	is	sent	to	the	master	station	(AIPHONE	NEM-10)	in	the	lobby	and	a	dispatch	center	(see	Figure	15	above).	The	dispatch	center	immediately	contacts	the	fire	department	and	notifies	them	of	the	caller’s	location.	The	master	station	in	the	lobby	beeps	until	someone	answers	the	call.	This	system	meets	the	standards	for	an	emergency	communication	system	set	out	in	Section	24.5.3	of	NFPA	72.			 - 24.5.3.1*	Where	required	by	the	building	code	in	force,	an	area	of	rescue	assistance	two-way	emergency	communications	system	shall	be	installed	in	accordance	with	24.5.3.	- 24.5.3.2	The	area	of	refuge	(rescue	assistance)	emergency	communications	system	shall	be	comprised	of	remotely	located	area	of	refuge	stations	and	a	central	control	point.	- 24.5.3.3	The	remote	area	of	refuge	stations	and	the	central	control	point	shall	communicate	with	each	other.	
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- 24.5.3.4*	If	the	central	control	point	is	not	constantly	attended,	it	shall	have	a	timed	automatic	communications	capability	to	connect	with	a	constantly	attended	monitoring	location	acceptable	to	the	authority	having	jurisdiction	where	responsible	personnel	can	initiate	the	appropriate	response.																
Figure	26:	Emergency	intercom	system	located	at	the	top	of	the	east	stairwell	
	Another	emergency	communications	system	is	located	in	the	data	center.	A	Viking	E-1600a	Emergency	Phone	system	is	located	next	to	the	pull	station	and	abort	button	for	the	ANSUL	system	(see	Figure	19	below).	When	the	button	on	the	phone	is	pressed	it	begins	dialing	a	sequence	of	numbers.	First	three	numbers	are	dialed	people	associated	with	the	Information	&	General	Services	Department	(which	manages	the	data	center	and	is	directly	outside	of	the	sever	rooms).	If	there	is	no	answer	after	three	rings,	it	calls	the	Sheriff’s	Dispatch.	If	again	there	is	no	answer	after	three	rings,	it	calls	911.	Whomever	answer	hears	a	recorded	message	with	the	caller’s	location.	If	they	person	answering	presses	the	asterisk	key	(*),	they	are	connected	with	the	person	in	the	data	center.	This	system	also	meets	the	code	requirements.			
Secondary	Power	Requirements:		Each	FACP	in	the	building	is	required	by	NFPA	72	to	have	backup	power	sources	to	maintain	the	fire	alarm	systems	in	the	event	of	a	power	outage.	The	Main	FACP	has	two	7.2-amp	hour	(Ah)	batteries,	while	the	Secondary	FACP	has	two	7.5	Ah	batteries.	Section	10.6.7.2.1	of	NFPA	72	(2013)	states,	"The	secondary	power	supply	shall	have	sufficient	capacity	to	operate	the	system	under	quiescent	load	(system	operating	in	a	nonalarm	condition)	for	a	minimum	of	24	hours	and,	at	the	end	of	that	period,	shall	be	capable	of	operating	all	alarm	notification	appliances	used	for	evacuation	or	to	direct	aid	to	the	location	of	an	emergency	for	5	minutes…”Some	of	the	notification	appliances	cut	sheets	didn’t	have	complete	data,	or	exact	catalog	cut	sheet	were	not	available.	In	those	cases,	either	cut	sheets	from	similar	devices	were	used,	or	values	were	estimated	based	on	similar	devices.		
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  55 
Table	13:	Voltage	Loss	Calculations	Main	Fire	Alarm	System	–	Floor	1	
Type	of	Device	 Item	#	 Device	 Quantity	
Standby	Current	Per	Appliance	(Amps)	
Total	Standby	Current	(Amps)	
Alarm	Current	Per	Appliance	(Amps)	
Total	Alarm	Current	(Amps)	Pull	Station	-	16	 1	 Silent	Knight	SD500-PS	 16	 0.00055	 0.0088	 0.00055	 0.0088	Smoke	Detector	–	16	 2	 Silent	Knight	SD505-APS	 16	 0.00055	 0.0088	 0.00055	 0.0088	Strobe	-	6	 3	 RSS-241575W	 4	 None	 None	 0.09	 0.36		 4	 Gentex	GES24	15/75	 2	 None	 None	 0.063	 0.126	Horn	-	8	 5	 System	Sensor	HR	 4	 None	 None	 0.058	 0.232		 6	 System	Sensor	H12/24	 2	 None	 None	 0.038	 0.076		 7	 System	Sensor	MA12/24D	 1	 None	 None	 0.075	 0.075		 8	 Faraday	6120	Horn	 1	 None	 None	 0.35	 0.35	Horn	Strobe	-	11	 9	 Gentex	GEC	15/75	 3	 None	 None	 0.063	 0.189		 10	 Faraday	AS-MC-R	 3	 None	 None	 0.8	 2.4		 11	 System	Sensor	P2475	 2	 None	 None	 0.164	 0.328		 12	 System	Sensor	P2R	 3	 None	 None	 0.08	 0.24	Bell	-	1	 13	 Amseco	MBA	Series	 1	 None	 None	 0.023	 0.023		 	 	 	 Total=	 0.0176	 Total=	 4.4166	*These	values	are	estimations/approximations	based	on	information	from	catalog	cut	sheets		5	minutes	=	0.0833	hours	4.4166	amps	X	0.0833	hours	alarm	=	0.37	Amp	Hours	0.0176	amps	X	24	hours	standby	=	0.42	Amp	Hours		
Table	14:	Voltage	Loss	Calculations	Main	Fire	Alarm	System	–	Floor	2	
Type	of	Device	 Item	#	 Device	 Quantity	
Standby	Current	Per	Appliance	(Amps)	
Total	Standby	Current	(Amps)	
Alarm	Current	Per	Appliance	(Amps)	
Total	Alarm	Current	(Amps)	Pull	Station	-	10	 1	 Silent	Knight	SD500-PS	 9	 0.00055	 0.00495	 0.00055	 0.00495		 2	 Faraday	F1GT	 1	 None	 None	 0.0006	 0.0006	Smoke	Detector	-	23	 3	 Silent	Knight	SD505-APS	 23	 0.00055	 0.01265	 0.00055	 0.01265	Strobe	-	6	 4	 RSS-241575W	 6	 None	 None	 0.09	 0.54	Horn	-	8	 5	 System	Sensor	HR	 5	 None	 None	 0.058	 0.29		 6	 System	Sensor	H12/24	 1	 None	 None	 0.038	 0.038		 7	 System	Sensor	MA12/24D	 1	 None	 None	 0.075	 0.075		 8	 Faraday	6120	Horn	 1	 None	 None	 0.35	 0.35	Horn	Strobe	-	13	 9	 Gentex	GEC	15/75	 3	 None	 None	 0.063	 0.189		 10	 Faraday	AS-MC-R	 3	 None	 None	 0.8	 2.4		 11	 System	Sensor	P2475	 2	 None	 None	 0.164	 0.328		 12	 System	Sensor	P2R	 5	 None	 None	 0.08	 0.4		 	 	 	 Total=	 0.0176	 Total=	 4.6282	*These	values	are	estimations/approximations	based	on	information	from	catalog	cut	sheets	
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5	minutes	=	0.0833	hours	4.6282	amps	X	0.0833	hours	alarm	=	0.39	Amp	Hours	0.0176	amps	X	24	hours	standby	=	0.42	Amp	Hours		In	total,	both	floors	have	a	combined	alarm	requirement	of	0.76Ah	and	a	combined	standby	requirement	of	0.84Ah.	There	are	two	7.2Ah	batteries	in	the	panel	which	have	more	than	enough	power	to	cover	the	requirements.			
Inspection,	Testing	and	Maintenance:		Chapter	14	of	NFPA	72	(2013)	details	the	requirements	for	inspection,	testing,	and	maintenance	of	the	fire	alarm	systems	in	the	building.	The	Facilities	Department	of	the	Nevada	County	Government	contracted	with	two	companies	to	perform	all	of	the	inspection,	testing,	and	maintenance	of	the	fire	alarm	systems	in	the	building	which	is	allowed	under	section	14.2.3.3	of	NFPA	72.	Gray	Electric	is	contracted	with	regards	to	the	main	fire	alarm	system,	while	Sentinel	Fire	Equipment	Company	is	contracted	with	regards	to	the	secondary	fire	alarm	system	(ANSUL/Inergen).		According	to	the	requirements	of	Chapter	14	of	NFPA	72,	the	contracted	companies	are	required	to	have	a	plan	for	inspection,	testing,	and	maintenance	of	the	fire	alarm	system	and	to	carry	out	that	plan.			Inspections	Section	14.3	of	NFPA	72	pertains	to	the	Inspection	of	the	fire	alarm	systems.	Section	14.3.1	states	that	“…visual	inspections	shall	be	performed	in	accordance	with	the	schedules	in	Table	14.3.1	or	more	often	if	required	by	the	AHJ.”	The	portions	of	“Table	14.3.1	Visual	Inspection”	that	apply	to	the	Rood	Center	can	be	found	in	the	table	below:	
	
Table	15:	Visual	Inspection	Schedule	
Component(s)	 Frequency	of	Visual	Inspection	All	equipment	 Annually	Control	equipment	(Systems	monitored	for	alarm,	supervisory	and	trouble	signals	like	Fuses,	Interfaced	Equipment,	Lamps	and	LED’s,	and	the	Main	Power	Supply)	 Annually	(Trouble	Signals	are	Semi-Annually)	Batteries	(Lead	Acid)	 Monthly	Remote	Annunciators	 Semi-Annually	Manual	Fire	Alarm	Pull	Stations	 Semi-Annually	Smoke	Detectors	 Semi-Annually	Supervisory	Signal	Devices	 Quarterly	Waterflow	Devices	 Quarterly	Audible	Appliances	 Semi-Annually	Visible	Appliances	 Semi-Annually	Area	of	Rescue	Two-Way	Communication	System	 Annually		
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	Testing	Section	14.4	of	NFPA	72	pertains	to	the	Testing	of	the	fire	alarm	systems.	Section	14.4.3.2	states	“Systems	and	associated	equipment	shall	be	tested	according	to	Table	14.4.3.2.”	The	portions	of	“Table	14.4.3.2	Testing”	that	apply	to	the	Rood	Center	can	be	found	in	the	table	below:		
Table	16:	Testing	Schedule	
Component(s)	 Frequency	of	Visual	Inspection	All	equipment	 See	Table	14.3.1	(Annually)	Control	equipment	(Fuses,	Interfaced	Equipment,	Lamps	and	LED’s,	and	the	Main	Power	Supply)	 Annually	Fire	Alarm	Control	Unit	Trouble	Signals	 Annually	Transmission	Equipment	 Annually	Emergency	Communications	Equipment	 Annually	Secondary	Power	Supply	 Annually	Lead	Acid	Batteries	Replacement	 Annually	Lead	Acid	Batteries	Charger/Discharge	 Annually	Lead	Acid	Batteries	Load	Voltage	 Semi-Annually	Lead	Acid	Batteries	Specific	Gravity	 Semi-Annually	Remote	Annunciators	 Annually	System’s	Conductors	 Annually	Electromechanical	Releasing	Device		(Fusible	Links)	 Annually	Fire	Suppression	Systems	 Annually	Manual	Fire	Alarm	Pull	Stations	 Annually	Smoke	Detectors	Functional	Test	 Annually	Supervisory	Signal	Devices		(High-low	air	pressure	switch)	 Annually	Waterflow	Devices	 Semi-Annually	Abort	Switch	 Annually	Audible	Appliances	 Annually	Visible	Appliances	 Annually	Area	of	Rescue	Two-Way	Communication	System	 Annually		Maintenance	Section	14.5	of	NFPA	72	pertains	to	the	Maintenance	of	the	fire	alarm	systems.	Section	14.5.1	states	“System	equipment	shall	be	maintained	in	accordance	with	the	manufacturer’s	published	instructions.”	The	frequency	of	the	maintenance	is	also	referred	back	to	the	manufacturer’s	published	instructions	in	Section	14.5.2.			Records	The	building	owner	or	contracted	companies	are	required	to	maintain	all	records	in	accordance	with	Chapter	7	and	Section	14.6.			
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7.7.1.1	A	complete	record	of	the	tests	and	operations	of	each	system	shall	be	kept	until	the	next	test	and	for	1	year	thereafter	unless	more	stringent	requirements	are	required	elsewhere	in	this	Code.	
7.7.1.4	Required	documents	regarding	system	design	and	function	shall	be	maintained	for	the	life	of	the	system.	
7.7.1.5	Revisions	and	alterations	to	systems	shall	be	recorded	and	records	maintained	with	the	original	system	design	documents.		
14.6.1.1	A	set	of	reproducible	as-built	installation	drawings,	operation	and	maintenance	manuals,	and	a	written	sequence	of	operation	shall	be	provided	to	the	building	owner	or	the	owner’s	designated	representative.	
14.6.2.1	Records	shall	be	retained	until	the	next	test	and	for	1	year	thereafter.	
14.6.2.4*	A	record	of	all	inspections,	testing,	and	maintenance	shall	be	provided	in	accordance	with	7.8.2.		When	asked,	the	Facilities	Department	staff	stated	that	they	didn’t	have	copies	of	the	as-built	installation	diagrams	or	any	paperwork/records	associated	with	the	inspection,	testing	or	maintenance	of	the	systems.	They	recommended	following	up	with	both	Gray	Electric	and	Sentinel	Fire	Equipment	Company.			Follow-up	with	Gray	Electric	determined	that	they	don’t	have	copies	of	the	as-built	installation	diagrams	for	the	main	portion	of	the	fire	alarm	system.	They	also	didn’t	have	any	records	regarding	the	upgrades	done	to	the	system	(Main	FACP,	notification	appliances,	or	detection	devices).	The	only	records	they	had	indicated	when	one	of	their	technicians	visited	the	building	for	a	semi-annual	inspection,	but	not	what	the	details	of	that	inspection	included,	nor	the	results	of	the	inspection.			Sentinel	Fire	Equipment	Company	had	copies	of	the	as-built	installation	diagrams	for	the	secondary	alarm	system,	Inergen	Clean	Agent	flow	calculations,	as	well	as	the	battery	and	notification	line	loss	calculations	stored	on	site	in	the	building.	They	also	had	records	regarding	their	semi-annual	inspections	of	the	secondary	fire	alarm	system.	Please	see	APPENDIX	E	for	the	installation	diagrams	and	documents	for	the	secondary	system.			The	Nevada	City	Fire	Department	(AHJ)	was	also	contacted	and	asked	what,	if	any,	records	they	had	regarding	the	fire	alarm	system.	They	stated	that	they	didn’t	have	any	copies	of	the	as-built	diagrams	or	any	other	installation	documents.	Nor	did	they	have	any	copies	of	any	inspection,	testing,	maintenance	or	repair	work	done	on	the	fire	alarm	system.	When	asked	what	information	they	did	have,	the	AHJ	stated	that	the	work	was	done	before	their	time,	they	really	don’t	know	much	about	the	fire	alarm	system,	and	that	they	don’t	have	any	information	pertaining	to	it.				
Summary:		Overall	the	alarm	system	was	pieced	together	over	the	years	starting	as	just	a	manual	system	with	a	few	pull	stations	and	a	few	notification	devices.	Additional	notification	
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devices	were	added	along	with	detection	devices	transforming	the	system	into	an	automatic	alarm	system.	The	building’s	water	suppression	system	also	acts	as	an	automatic	detection	device	with	the	use	of	water	flow	alarms	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.	As	the	alarm	system	was	added	onto,	it	doesn’t	appear	that	checks	were	done	to	ensure	compatibility	between	devices,	or	if	there	were	enough	devices	installed,	or	if	the	devices	that	were	installed	were	in	the	correct	locations.	There	are	multiple	issues	with	the	primary	alarm	system	on	all	fronts.	The	secondary	system	located	in	the	data	center	is	on	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	as	it	meets	all	of	the	requirements	of	the	code.	Further	discussion	of	the	issues	associated	with	the	alarm	system	can	be	found	in	the	Comments	&	Recommendations	section.			
Sprinklers		
System	Overview		An	automatic	sprinkler	system	was	installed	when	the	building	was	built	in	1985-1986.	The	applicable	code	at	the	time	regarding	the	sprinkler	systems	would	have	been	the	1983	edition	of	NFPA	13.	The	building	is	protected	by	both	a	wet-pipe	and	a	dry-pipe	system.	The	wet-pipe	system	protects	the	building’s	internal	occupied	spaces	as	well	as	the	second	floor’s	attic.	The	dry-pipe	system	protects	the	mansard	roof,	the	lobby,	and	the	exterior	eaves.	The	riser	room	is	a	cement-lined	room	located	on	the	first	floor,	east	side	of	the	building	and	contains	the	risers	for	both	the	wet	and	dry-pipe	sprinkler	systems.	The	pump	room	is	separate	from	the	main	building	located	across	the	east	side	of	the	parking	lot.	It	is	a	cement-lined	room	with	a	ceiling	mounted	space	heater	and	contains	a	fire	pump,	pump	controller,	jockey	pump,	and	a	water	booster	system	for	the	potable	water.		
Water	Supply		The	water	supply	for	the	building	is	supplied	via	a	large	storage	tank	located	on	a	hill	above	the	building	to	the	northeast.	The	cylindrical	tank	is	99	feet	in	diameter	by	22	feet	tall	and	holds	1,380,000	gallons	of	water.	The	tank	is	supplied	by	the	Nevada	City	water	mains.	The	water	is	gravity	fed	through	14”	then	10”	Ductile	Iron	pipes	into	the	pump	room.												
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  60 
																								
Figure	27:	Google	Maps	overview	of	the	Rood	Center.	To	the	top	right	of	the	photo	is	the	water	
supply	tank,	to	the	right	is	the	public	library,	and	to	the	left	is	the	county	jail.	The	pump	house	
is	located	across	the	parking	lot	from	the	right	side	of	the	rood	center.			Once	in	the	pump	room,	the	water	enters	a	split	case,	motor	driven,	centrifugal	fire	pump:		 	 Patterson	Fire	Pump		 	 Model	#	8x6	MI		 	 GPM:	1500		 	 PISG:	70		The	water	pressure	coming	out	of	the	fire	pump	is	maintained	at	100	psi	by	a	Jockey	Pump:		 	 Grundfos		 	 Model	#CP3-40KU	GPM:	24	PSIG:	65	The	fire	pump	provides	water	pressure	to	hydrants	and	several	buildings	on	the	property;	including	the	Rood	Center,	the	Nevada	County	Jail,	and	the	Nevada	County	Public	Library	(see	Figure	27	above).			On	the	exterior	of	the	pump	room,	the	water	pipe	for	the	Rood	Center	runs	through	a	backflow	preventer	(two	gate	valves,	two	check	valves),	and	a	post	indicator	valve	(PIV).	
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Then	runs	underneath	the	parking	lot	(towards	the	west)	where	it	comes	up	through	the	4”	concrete	slab	in	the	riser	room.			According	to	the	original	hydraulic	calculations	(APPENDIX	O),	dated	4/26/1986:		 Static	Pressure	 =	 122.00	psi		 Residual	Pressure	 =	 74.00	psi		Flow	 	 	 =	 1500	gpm	
	
*A	hydrant	flow	test	was	done	by	the	Nevada	City	Fire	Department	in	1993	which	
showed	slightly	lower	numbers,	but	as	the	system	was	designed	using	the	above	
numbers,	those	are	the	ones	that	will	be	referenced	in	this	report.		There	is	a	fire	department	connection	located	in	the	parking	lot	on	the	north	side	of	the	building	near	a	fire	hydrant.	The	FDC	is	a	4”	diameter	stand-alone	pipe	with	two	connection	ports,	2	½”	in	diameter.	A	secondary	fire	department	connection	is	located	on	the	exterior	of	the	pump	room’s	west	wall.	This	FDC	is	approximately	10”	in	diameter	and	sticks	out	of	the	wall	with	8	separate	connection	ports	on	it	(octopus),	2	of	which	were	plugged.	The	remaining	6	ports	are	2	½”	in	diameter	with	a	single	globe	valve	controlling	each	port.			Refer	to	APPENDIX	I	for	the	Underground	Water	Supply	Drawing.	
	
Automatic	Sprinkler	System	Design		The	sprinkler	system	design	criteria	for	the	wet	pipe	and	dry	pipe	systems	are	as	follows:		Wet	Pipe	Occupancy	Hazard	Classification	=	Light	Hazard	Density	=	0.10	gpm/ft2	Area	of	Operation:	1500	ft2		Number	of	Sprinklers:	14	most	remote/demanding	Sprinkler	Protection	Coverage	Area:	Max	coverage	area	is	130ft2/sprinkler	K-Value:	5.6	Hose	Stream	Allowance:	100	gpm	Water	Supply	Duration:	30	minutes		The	sprinkler	system	on	the	first	floor	is	primarily	a	gridded	system	with	some	tree	system	components.	The	sprinkler	system	on	the	second	floor	is	a	tree	system.	The	14	most	hydraulically	remote	sprinklers	were	located	on	the	west	end	of	the	second	floor.			Dry	Pipe	Occupancy	Hazard	Classification	=	Light	Hazard	Density	=	0.10	gpm/ft2	Area	of	Operation:	1950	ft2	(30%	increase	due	to	inherent	delays	in	response	times)	
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Number	of	Sprinklers:	14	most	remote/demanding	Sprinkler	Protection	Coverage	Area:	Max	coverage	area	is	130ft2/sprinkler	K-Value:	5.6	Hose	Stream	Allowance:	100	gpm	Water	Supply	Duration:	30	minutes		The	dry	pipe	sprinkler	system	in	the	lobby	and	mansard	is	a	loop	system.	The	14	most	hydraulically	remote	sprinklers	were	located	on	the	south	end	of	the	building,	above	the	center	and	western	portions	of	the	lobby.		
Sprinkler	System	Components		The	water	enters	the	building	in	a	4”	ductile	iron	pipe	as	it	comes	up	through	the	slab	in	the	riser	room	on	the	east	side	of	the	building.	The	water	travels	up	through	a	4”	T-valve	where	it	splits	to	the	wet	pipe	and	dry	pipe	systems.			Wet	Pipe	Once	in	the	riser	room,	the	wet	pipe	system	rises	up	through	a	butterfly	valve	and	water	flow	alarm	valve.	The	water	continues	up	through	the	ceiling,	through	the	second	story	electrical	room,	and	then	up	into	the	attic	above	the	second	story.	In	the	attic,	the	top	of	the	riser	meets	the	feed	main	which	travels	west	through	the	building.	The	feed	main	has	six	cross	mains	(3	on	each	side)	and	approximately	eight	branch	lines	(4	on	each	side)	coming	off	of	it.			The	westernmost	cross	main	(on	the	south	side	of	the	feed	main)	has	twelve	branch	lines	(6	on	each	side).	Between	the	second	and	third	branch	line,	the	cross	main	is	redirected	around	an	air	handler	before	returning	to	its	original	path.			Each	branch	line	is	connected	to	the	cross	main	via	a	riser	nipple	with	a	one-foot	rise.	The	branch	lines	have	T-valves	in	them	with	a	sprig	going	up	to	an	upright	sprinkler.	At	the	base	of	the	sprig	is	a	second	T-valve	that	feeds	a	drop	to	a	pendant	sprinkler.	The	upright	sprinklers	cover	the	attic,	while	the	drop	sprinklers	penetrate	the	drop	ceilings	and	cover	the	office	spaces	below.	Each	branch	line	has	eight	upright	and	eight	pendant	sprinklers	on	it.			The	southernmost	branch	lines	have	6	additional	sprinklers	on	each	line.	These	additional	sprinklers	are	connected	to	the	branch	line	via	T-valves,	and	a	sprig.	The	pipe	travels	vertically,	then	horizontally	through	the	exterior	wall	into	the	mansard.	The	sprinkler	plans	indicate	that	the	additional	sprinklers	are	upright,	but	that	was	not	visually	confirmed.	Due	to	these	additional	sprinklers	being	located	in	the	mansard,	they	would	be	less	likely	to	be	involved	in	a	fire;	therefore,	they	were	left	out	of	the	hydraulic	calculations	which	determined	the	most	remote	sprinklers.		 Riser:			 3”	SCH	10	black	steel	C=120	Feed	Main:		 3”	SCH	10	black	steel	C=120	
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Cross	Main:	 2.5”	SCH	10	black	steel	C=120	Riser	Nipple:	 1.5”	SCH	40	black	steel	C=120	Branch	Line:	 1”	–	1.5”	SCH	40	black	steel	C=120	Sprigs:	 1”	–	1.5”	SCH	40	black	steel	C=120	Drops:		 1”	–	1.5”	SCH	40	black	steel	C=120		Dry	Pipe	Once	in	the	riser	room,	the	dry	pipe	system	rises	up	through	a	butterfly	valve	and	into	the	dry	pipe	valve.	The	dry	pipe	valve	has	an	air	compressor	hooked	up	to	keep	a	pressure	of	32	psi	inside	the	valve.	The	dry	pipe	valve	is	also	equipped	with	low	pressure	alarm	(25	psi)	and	an	accelerator	which	is	designed	to	trip	at	18	psi.	Above	the	dry	pipe	valve	is	a	water	flow	alarm	valve.	From	there	the	water	rises	through	the	first	and	second	stories	into	the	attic	above.	At	that	location	the	feed	main	travels	west	across	one	intersection	and	tees	into	another.	The	feed	main	branches	off	at	those	two	intersections	and	travels	around	the	length	of	the	building	in	the	mansard	roof	as	two	loops.	On	the	opposite	end	of	the	loop,	the	two	feed	main	loops	are	connected	by	2”	diameter	pipe.	On	the	south	side	of	the	building,	above	the	lobby,	there	are	two	cross	mains	and	two	branch	lines	which	come	off	the	outermost	loop.	The	most	remote	sprinklers	are	located	above	the	lobby	on	the	southwest	side.			 Dry	Pipe	Valve:	 4”		Riser:			 	 3”	SCH	10	black	steel	C=120	Feed	Main:		 	Outer	Loop:	 2”	SCH	40	black	steel	C=100		Inner	Loop:	 1.5”	SCH	40	black	steel	C=100	Cross	Main:	 	 1.25”	–	1.5”	SCH	40	black	steel	C=100	Branch	Line:	 	 1”	–	1.25”	SCH	40	black	steel	C=100		Three	types	of	sprinklers	were	installed	with	the	original	system;	two	different	types	of	pendant	sprinklers	protecting	the	occupied	spaces,	and	one	type	of	upright	sprinkler	head	that	is	used	in	the	attic	spaces.			 Upright:		 GEM	Automatic	Sprinkler	Model	F950	Fusible	Solder	Type	(1986)	458a	SSU-3	Orifice	=	½”	K	=	5.6	Temperature	Rating	=	212°F	/	100°C		 Pendant:	1)	 GEM	Automatic	Sprinkler	Model	F950	Fusible	Solder	Type	(1986)	458a	SSP-3	Orifice	=	½”	K	=	5.6	
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Temperature	Rating	=	212°F	/	100°C		 2)	 Central	Sprinkler	Corporation	Model	“H”	Fusible	Center	Strut	(1986)	804a	SSP-52	Orifice	=	½”	K	=	5.6	Temperature	Rating	=	165°F	/	73°C		Starting	in	1990,	and	continuing	throughout	the	years,	tenant	improvements	were	done	and	a	third	type	of	pendant	sprinkler	was	added.		 Pendant:	3)	 Viking	Micromatic	Sprinkler	Model	M	–	Glass	Bulb	589a	Orifice	=	½”	K	=	5.6	Temperature	Rating	=	155°F	/	68°C	See	APPENDIX	L	for	data	sheets	of	the	system	components	and	APPENDIX	J	for	the	original	sprinkler	system	layouts.		
Hydraulic	Calculations		When	the	system	was	first	designed,	the	sprinkler	contractors	did	hydraulic	calculations	for	the	first	floor,	the	second	floor,	and	the	mansard.	Their	results	are	as	follows:		
Table	17:	Original	Hydraulic	Calculation	Results	
System	Location	 Total	Flow	(No	HSA)	 Total	Pressure	First	Floor	 189.77	gpm	 95.97	psi	Second	Floor	 291.76	gpm	 101.71	psi	Mansard	 262.87	gpm	 109.07	psi		The	most	demanding	flow	was	located	on	the	second	floor,	while	the	most	demanding	pressure	was	located	in	the	mansard.	The	most	likely	location	where	a	fire	might	potentially	overwhelm	the	system	would	be	inside	the	occupied	space	of	the	building	and	not	in	the	mansard.	Therefore,	hand	calculations	were	done	for	the	second	floor	back	to	the	base	of	the	riser,	then	back	to	the	fire	pump.			The	14	most	remote	sprinklers	were	labeled	101	–	114	on	the	original	sprinkler	plans	and	calculation	sheets,	so	that	is	how	they’ll	be	referred	to	in	this	report.	The	layout	of	the	most	remote	sprinklers	can	be	seen	in	Figure	6	below.			The	required	area	of	coverage	was	1500	ft2	with	a	maximum	protection	coverage	area	of	130	ft2	per	sprinkler.	The	actual	coverage	area	(indicated	by	the	dashed	line)	is	1624	ft2.		
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Figure	28:	Basic	Layout	of	the	Most	Remote	Sprinklers		 The	sprinklers	in	the	above	diagram	are	numbered	as	follows:	#101	 #104	#102	 #105	 #107	 #109	 #111	 #113	#103	 #106	 #108	 #110	 #112	 #114															
	
	
Figure	29:	Layout	of	the	most	Remote	Sprinklers	with	pipe	diameters	and	distances		The	blue	numbers	indicate	pipe	diameters	in	inches,	the	green	numbers	indicate	distances	in	feet.		The	maximum	protection	coverage	area	was	calculated	for	each	individual	sprinkler	indicated	in	the	diagrams	above.	The	calculations	were	done	based	on	the	formula	from	section	8.5.2.1.1	of	NFPA	13	(2013):	 𝐴" = 𝐿×𝑆	
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Where	L	is	the	distance	between	branch	lines,	and	S	is	the	distance	between	the	sprinklers	along	the	branch	lines.			
Table	18:	Maximum	Protection	Coverage	Area	for	Individual	Sprinklers	
Sprinkler	 L		(feet)	 S		(feet)	 As		(ft2)	 Density	(gpm/ft2)	 Flow	(Q)	(gpm)	101	 12	 10	 120	 0.10	 12.0	102	 13	 10	 130	 0.10	 13.0	103	 13	 10	 130	 0.10	 13.0	104	 12	 10	 120	 0.10	 12.0	105	 13	 10	 130	 0.10	 13.0	106	 13	 10	 130	 0.10	 13.0	107	 13	 10	 130	 0.10	 13.0	108	 13	 10	 130	 0.10	 13.0	109	 13	 9.33	 121.3	 0.10	 12.1	110	 13	 9.33	 121.3	 0.10	 12.1	111	 13	 9.33	 121.3	 0.10	 12.1	112	 13	 9.33	 121.3	 0.10	 12.1	113	 13	 9.33	 121.3	 0.10	 12.1	114	 13	 9.33	 121.3	 0.10	 12.1		 	 Total	 1,748	 	 		The	required	coverage	area	was	1500	ft2,	the	actual	coverage	area	was	1624	ft2,	while	the	calculated	coverage	area	for	all	the	sprinklers	was	1,748	ft2.		The	maximum	spacing	between	sprinklers	was	130	ft2,	and	the	average	spacing	is	only	124.8	ft2.			
Table	19:	Hand	Calculations	vs.	Original	Calculations	
	 Hand	Calculations	 Original	Calculations	
Sprinkler	Demand	Location	 Flow	(gpm)	 Pressure	(psi)	 Flow	(gpm)	 Pressure	(psi)	Most	Remote	Sprinkler	(#114)	 12.1	 4.7	 14.7	 7.0	Base	of	Riser	(BOR)	 313.5	 123.8	 291.8	 94.7	Fire	Pump	 313.5	 131.8	 291.8	 101.7	See	APPENDIX	M	for	the	hydraulic	calculations	done	by	hand,	and	APPENDIX	O	for	the	original	hydraulic	calculations.		There	are	a	few	things	that	could	account	for	the	differences	in	the	calculations.	One	of	which	is	that	there	have	been	tenant	improvements	since	the	original	installation.	For	example,	a	section	of	the	Cross	Main	feeding	the	most	remote	sprinklers	was	moved	and	rerouted	to	accommodate	an	air	handler,	which	would	increase	the	calculated	demand.	Also,	when	following	the	calculations	from	the	most	remote	sprinkler	back	to	the	pump,	several	of	the	equivalent	lengths	for	fittings	didn’t	match	up	to	what	was	seen	on	site.	That	
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could	be	due	to	the	system	having	been	changed	since	it	was	originally	designed,	or	the	individuals	doing	the	calculations	somehow	over	looked	those	items.			Based	on	the	hydraulic	graph	(see	Figure	30	below),	the	water	supply,	in	conjunction	with	the	fire	pump,	is	more	than	adequate	for	this	system	and	the	hose	stream	allowance.	If	the	demands	of	the	other	buildings	on	the	property	are	ignored,	the	combined	supply	has	an	extra	~1,224	gpm	available	at	131.8	psi	beyond	the	HSA.			The	static	pressure	from	the	combined	graph	can	reach	220psi	(at	140%	capacity),	which	is	far	above	the	170	psi	working	pressure	rating	of	the	sprinkler	heads.	However,	as	the	pump	also	supplies	water	pressure	to	the	hydrants,	the	Jail,	and	the	County	Library,	the	actual	maximum	static	pressure	would	be	much	lower.	Further	calculations	would	need	to	be	done	for	those	systems	to	see	what	the	exact	values	would	be.		At	the	pump’s	rating	of	1500	gpm,	the	combined	supply	would	reach	a	pressure	of	144	psi,	well	within	the	working	limits	of	the	sprinkler	heads.																																	
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Figure	30:	Hydraulic	Graph	
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Clean	Agent	System		The	server	rooms	are	protected	by	an	Inergen-ANSUL	clean	agent	system.	The	system	protects	three	server	rooms	that	act	as	one	data	room	located	on	the	first	floor,	west	side	of	the	building.	The	three	rooms	and	the	underfloor	space	comprise	2,011ft2	and	8,945ft3.	Smoke	detectors	and	spray	nozzles	are	located	both	at	the	ceiling	and	underneath	the	raised	floors.			The	system	is	comprised	of	10	cylinders	located	in	a	closet	off	the	first	floor	western	corridor	adjacent	to	the	data	room	(see	Figure	31	below).	The	cylinders	supply	4,390ft3	of	Inergen	agent	at	195	psi.	The	system	can	complete	a	90%	discharge	in	46	seconds	at	an	estimated	flow	rate	of	5,153ft3/min.			In	order	for	the	system	to	activate	automatically,	two	smoke	detectors	need	to	activate,	followed	by	a	30	second	activation	delay.	If	needed,	an	abort	button	can	be	pressed	to	deactivate	the	process	during	the	30	second	delay.	The	system	can	also	be	activated	manually	with	a	pull	station	located	next	to	the	abort	button	near	the	entrance	to	the	room	(see	Figure	19	above).																											
Figure	31:	Inergen	cylinders	and	clean	agent	spray	nozzle		
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Inspection,	Testing	and	Maintenance		The	responsibility	for	the	maintenance	and	inspections	of	the	system	belong	to	the	Facilities	Department	that	oversees	the	building.	The	maintenance	staff	observe	the	system	regularly	during	their	routine	work	throughout	the	building	and	perform	the	weekly	and	monthly	inspections.	The	quarterly	and	annual	system	maintenance	and	inspections	are	contracted	out	to	a	private	sprinkler	contractor.	All	inspections,	testing	and	maintenance	are	done	according	to	the	guidelines	of	NFPA	25.			For	a	table	showing	the	requirements	for	inspections,	testing,	and	maintenance,	please	see	APPENDIX	P.		
Summary		The	water	suppression	system	consisting	of	both	wet	pipe	and	dry	pipe	sprinkler	systems	met	the	code	requirements	set	forth	in	NFPA	13.	It	is	still	unclear	why	the	designer	decided	to	use	a	dry	pipe	sprinkler	system	to	protect	the	front	of	the	lobby.	In	the	next	section	the		performance	based	analysis	will	exam	four	fire	scenarios	that	examine	how	the	building’s	systems	will	react	to	a	fire.	The	fourth	scenario	discusses	the	dry	pipe	system	in	the	front	of	the	lobby	in	more	detail	and	how	it	could	potentially	affect	a	fire.			
Performance	Based	Analysis		Prescriptive	based	analyses	examine	how	the	existing	building	or	new	design	compare	with	what	is	required	in	various	codes	and	standards.	These	codes	and	standards	are	designed	to	ensure	that	the	way	in	which	a	building	is	constructed	will	provide	its	occupants	(who	are	not	intimate	with	the	initial	fire)	enough	time	to	escape	to	safety.	Unfortunately,	there	are	situations	where	there	may	be	no	direct	comparison	between	the	building/design	and	the	code(s).	In	those	situations,	the	AHJ	may	allow	a	performance	based	analysis	to	be	completed	instead	to	determine	if	the	building’s	fire	protection	systems	will	provide	enough	time	to	exit	the	building	safely.			This	performance	based	analysis	utilized	a	computational	fluid	dynamics	model,	Fire	Dynamics	Simulator	(FDS),	to	estimate	how	long	occupants	would	have	to	get	out	of	the	Rood	Center	safely.	Four	different	fire	scenarios	were	considered	in	which	the	simulation	would	reflect	a	worst-case	scenario	for	a	given	area.	Once	the	simulations	were	complete,	they	were	analyzed	to	determine	if	the	conditions	in	the	building	remained	tenable	long	enough	for	the	occupants	to	escape	to	safety.	 
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Tenability	Criteria		The	Required	Safe	Egress	Time	(RSET)	estimates	how	long	it	will	take	people	to	evacuate	a	building.	In	the	event	of	a	fire,	the	building’s	fire	protection	systems	need	to	be	able	to	contain	the	fire	and	keep	conditions	tenable	long	enough	for	people	to	escape	the	building.	That	amount	of	time	is	known	as	the	Available	Safe	Egress	Time	(ASET).	The	ASET	begins	when	the	fire	is	discovered	and	ends	when	either	conditions	become	untenable,	or	everyone	has	escaped.	If	the	ASET	is	greater	than	the	RSET,	then	there	is	enough	time	available	to	get	the	people	out	of	the	building.	If	the	ASET	is	less	than	the	RSET,	then	the	conditions	will	become	untenable	prior	to	everyone	exiting	the	building.				To	specify	when	conditions	become	untenable,	criteria	must	be	established	to	determine	what	thresholds	for	various	factors	affecting	tenability.	According	to	the	Handbook	of	Smoke	Control	Engineering	(2012	edition,	the	factors	which	affect	tenability	the	most	are	reduced	visibility,	exposure	to	toxic	gases	like	carbon	monoxide	(CO),	and	heat	exposure	(high	temperatures	and	thermal	radiation).			Visibility		Several	factors	need	to	be	considered	to	determine	proper	values	for	determining	visibility	thresholds	in	smoky	conditions.	Dr.	Tadahisa	Jin	proposes	that	these	factors	should	include	how	familiar	the	occupants	are	with	the	building,	how	large	are	the	rooms,	how	large	is	the	building,	and	how	complex	is	the	layout	of	the	building.	If	the	layout	is	simple,	the	rooms	and	building	are	smaller	(so	one	could	see	their	target	destination),	and	the	occupants	are	familiar	with	the	building,	then	the	minimum	criterion	for	visibility	would	be	quite	low.	However,	if	the	occupants	aren’t	familiar	with	the	building,	the	layout	is	complex,	and	the	rooms	are	large,	then	the	minimum	criterion	for	visibility	would	need	to	be	higher.			According	to	Dr.	Jin,	the	minimum	distance	an	occupant	would	need	to	be	able	to	see	to	exit	a	building	they’re	familiar	with	is	13	feet	(4	meters).	Whereas,	if	the	occupant	was	unfamiliar	with	the	building,	the	minimum	distance	they	would	need	to	be	able	to	see	would	be	43	feet	(13	meters).			As	the	occupants	in	the	Rood	Center	would	be	primarily	made	up	of	staff	who	are	familiar	with	the	building,	and	the	egress	paths	are	fairly	simple	(and	well-marked),	the	minimum	visibility	criterion	for	these	simulations	was	26	feet	(8	meters).			Carbon	Monoxide	Exposure		While	there	are	several	chemicals	in	smoke	that	pose	a	health	risk	(including	a	lack	of	oxygen),	exposure	to	CO	accounts	for	the	majority	of	fatalities	in	fires.	Exposure	to	CO	can	result	in	carboxyhemoglobin	(COHb)	uptake	in	the	blood	which	can	decrease	the	capacity	of	the	blood	to	carry	oxygen	to	the	brain.	In	the	SFPE	Handbook	(4th	edition),	research	by	Dr.	David	Purser	is	presented	which	states	that	a	dose	of	27,000	parts	per	million	per	min	
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(ppm-min)	will	cause	incapacitation.	Therefore,	a	dose	of	2,700	ppm-min	would	cause	incapacitation	in	10	minutes.			The	movement	times	calculated	in	APPENDIX	C,	state	how	long	it	would	take	people	to	escape	from	the	building	once	they’ve	started	moving,	but	does	not	take	into	account	the	time	from	ignition	to	detection,	pre-movement	time	delays,	or	a	safety	factor.	The	longest	movement	time	from	a	department	calculated	was	4	minutes,	53	seconds.	If	it	is	assumed	that	detection	takes	10	seconds,	the	recognition	time	takes	30	seconds,	and	the	response	time	takes	anywhere	from	60	seconds	to	180	seconds,	with	a	safety	factor	of	1.5,	complete	evacuation	could	take	about	13	minutes.			 (4.88	min	+	0.16	min	+	0.5	min	+	3	min)	x	1.5	=	12.81	minutes		If	an	egress	pathway(s)	gets	blocked	by	fire	or	smoke,	that	will	cause	the	evacuation	time	will	go	up	as	the	occupants	have	to	re-route	to	another	exit.	A	maximum	threshold	of	1,350	ppm-min	would	provide	occupants	with	20	minutes	for	safe	egress	before	incapacitation	would	occur.	That	would	give	occupants	enough	time	to	re-route	to	another	exit	with	tenable	conditions.			Heat	Exposure		In	the	SFPE	Handbook	(4th	edition),	research	from	Dr.	David	Purser	indicates	that	250°F	(121°C)	is	the	point	where	temperatures	above	will	cause	pain,	blisters,	and	burns.	To	create	a	safety	margin,	the	maximum	threshold	for	heat	exposure	for	these	simulations	was	set	at	212°F	(100°C).			Research	from	Dr.	Vyto	Babrauskas	in	the	SFPE	Handbook	(4th	edition)	indicates	that	the	maximum	threshold	for	thermal	radiation	exposure	is	2.5	kW/m2.	At	that	level	of	thermal	radiation	exposure,	bare	skin	would	feel	pain	but	burns	could	be	avoided	if	exposures	were	short.				Table	20	below	lists	the	various	tenability	thresholds	for	the	computer	fire	modeling	scenarios.			
Table	20:	Tenability	Criteria	Values	
Tenability	Criterion	 Threshold	Limit	Visibility	 26	feet	(8m)	Carbon	Monoxide	 1,350	ppm	Temperature	 212°F	(100°C)	Thermal	Radiation	 2.5	kW/m2		These	values	will	be	monitored	in	the	simulations	at	a	height	of	6	feet	(1.8m)	above	each	floor	level.	If	any	of	these	values	are	exceeded,	the	conditions	in	the	building	will	be	considered	untenable	thereby	marking	the	end	to	the	ASET.	
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Scenarios			Each	of	the	following	scenarios	were	designed	to	be	a	worst-case	scenario	for	the	room/area	in	which	they	were	located.	The	computers	models	were	originally	designed	three-dimensionally	using	a	program	called	SketchUp	with	data	from	an	AutoCAD	file	and	measurements	taken	on-site.	That	3D	model	was	then	transferred	into	a	program	called	Pyrosim	where	the	rest	of	the	details	(fire,	fire	protection	systems,	surface	properties,	etc.)	were	added.	Pyrosim	was	used	to	run	the	models	in	Fire	Dynamics	Simulator	(FDS).	Once	the	calculations	were	complete,	the	simulations	were	viewed	in	a	program	called	Smokeview.	The	screen	renderings	that	will	be	included	below	were	taken	from	either	Pyrosim	or	Smokeview.	As	exact	data	wasn’t	available	regarding	the	surfaces,	fuels,	sprinkler/detector	responses,	etc.,	estimates	were	made	in	each	instance	to	try	and	best	replicate	reality.			
Scenario	#1	The	first	scenario	evaluated	a	fire	that	could	occur	on	the	counter	in	the	cafeteria.	Stored	on	the	counter	are	several	small	appliances	including	a	cappuccino	machine,	a	coffee	grinder,	and	two	drip	coffee	makers.	Directly	above	the	small	appliances	are	wooden	cabinets	which	extend	to	the	acoustic	tile	drop-ceiling	above.	The	north	wall	is	covered	with	countertop	and	cabinets,	the	west	wall	is	covered	with	several	large	vending	machines,	the	south	wall	is	made	up	of	windows,	and	the	east	wall	is	where	a	bulletin	board	and	a	couple	trash	cans	are	located.	There	are	two	rows	of	rectangular	tables	with	chairs	on	all	sides	in	the	center	of	the	cafeteria.				The	cafeteria	is	35.5	feet	wide	(east/west)	and	25	feet	long	(north/south).	The	main	entrance/exit	is	at	a	45-degree-angle	to	the	room	in	the	southeast	corner.	This	doorway	leads	to	the	lobby	and	then	to	the	exterior	of	the	building.		A	secondary	entrance	is	located	on	the	north	wall	at	the	northeast	corner.	This	doorway	leads	to	a	35-foot-long	hallway	to	the	north	that	connects	to	the	building’s	main	western	corridor.			The	room	has	a	9-foot-tall	acoustic	tile	drop	ceiling,	with	gypsum	walls	and	a	tiled	floor.	The	hallway	to	the	north	has	the	same	type	of	construction	as	the	cafeteria	with	9-foot	ceilings	and	a	closed	door	at	the	north	end.	The	lobby	to	the	southeast	has	a	ceiling	that	is	23-foot-tall	and	such	a	large	air	volume,	that	this	portion	of	the	model	was	left	open.			There	are	six	wet-pipe	sprinkler	heads	in	the	cafeteria	and	three	wet-pipe	sprinkler	heads	in	the	hallway	to	the	north.	The	activation	temperature	for	all	the	sprinklers	
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was	74°C.	For	a	more	detailed	description	of	the	sprinkler	heads,	please	refer	to	the	sprinkler	section	in	this	report.	There	are	no	smoke	detectors	in	the	cafeteria,	hallway	to	the	north,	or	in	the	lobby.			The	fire	was	theorized	to	start	in	the	cappuccino	machine	due	to	an	electrical	failure.	The	fire	would	spread	to	a	coffee	grinder,	the	wooden	cabinets	above,	and	countertop	nearby.	As	an	exact	Heat	Release	Rate	(HRR)	of	a	cappuccino	machine	(and	coffee	grinder)	was	unavailable,	an	estimate	HRR	was	needed.	Figure	26.14	(see	Figure	32	below)	from	the	SFPE	Handbook	(5th	Edition)	shows	the	HRR	of	a	small	air	conditioner	of	similar	size.	The	maximum	HRR	of	that	test	was	300kW	which	was	reached	in	250-300	seconds.	For	this	scenario,	a	maximum	HRR	of	300kW	was	used	but	a	medium-speed	t-squared	fire	growth-rate	curve	was	used	instead.	A	custom	fire	ramp	was	created	to	follow	the	t2	medium	growth	fire	curve	and	then	diminish	with	time.	The	maximum	HRR	was	reached	160	seconds	after	ignition.	The	burner	was	placed	on	a	plastic	box	on	the	counter	top	in	the	northern	portion	of	the	cafeteria	(see	Figure	33	below).		As	the	sprinklers	were	not	directly	above	the	fire,	the	fire	ramp	was	not	adjusted	to	reflect	the	activation	of	the	sprinklers.																				
Figure	#32:	HRR	of	a	small	air	conditioner	(SFPE	Handbook	5th	Ed.)				
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Figure	#33:	View	of	the	cafeteria	fire	model	in	Smokeview.	(The	red	square	is	the	burner)																						
Figure	#34:	View	of	the	cafeteria	facing	northwest	from	the	exit	door	
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Scenario	#2	The	second	scenario	evaluated	a	fire	that	could	occur	in	a	copy	machine	located	in	a	dead-end	hallway	on	the	second	floor.	The	hallway	is	located	on	the	second	floor	at	the	north	end	of	the	lobby.	In	the	hallway	are	four	doors,	one	to	the	Grand	Jury,	one	to	the	LAFCo	offices,	and	the	last	two	go	to	“named”	conference	rooms.	The	entrance	door	to	the	hallway	is	a	36”	wide	door	at	the	south	end	of	the	hallway.	The	Grand	Jury	is	located	to	the	east,	the	LAFCo	offices	to	the	north,	and	the	conference	rooms	to	the	west.	At	the	south	end	of	the	hallway	is	a	small	common	area.	To	the	west	is	a	large	wooden	table	and	three	chairs,	on	the	east	side	is	a	copy	machine	with	a	small	recycle	container	next	to	it,	a	metal	desk	with	a	chair,	and	then	a	64-gallon	plastic	recycle	container	behind	the	door.			The	hallway	has	a	9-foot	acoustic	tile	drop	ceiling,	with	gypsum	walls,	and	low-pile	carpet	over	cement	floor.	At	the	southeast	of	the	common	area	is	a	photo	electric	smoke	detector.	There	are	three	Viking	sprinkler	heads	in	the	common	area	and	two	more	in	the	hallway.	These	sprinkler	heads	have	glass	bulbs	as	opposed	to	the	metal	fusible	links	the	other	sprinklers	had.	Their	activation	temperature	is	68°C.			The	fire	was	theorized	to	start	in	the	area	of	the	copy	machine	due	to	an	electrical	failure.	The	fire	could	potentially	spread	to	the	nearby	small	recycle	container	next	to	it,	the	foam	and	plastic	desk	chair,	and	then	eventually	the	64-gallon	recycle	container	behind	the	door.	While	this	fire	could	potentially	get	quite	large,	there	is	one	sprinkler	directly	above	the	copy	machine,	and	another	within	6	feet.	Therefore,	the	fire	ramp	was	designed	to	stop	the	growth	of	the	burner	and	begin	diminishing	the	HRR	when	the	second	sprinkler	activated.			An	exact	HRR	value	for	a	copy	machine	was	not	found,	so	an	example	HRR	graph	for	business-machine	cabinets	was	used	from	the	SFPE	Handbook	(5th	Edition),	Figure	26.36	(see	Figure	35	below).	The	graph	indicated	the	maximum	HRR	was	600	seconds,	which	was	reached	in	150	seconds.	This	value	is	in-between	the	medium	and	fast	t2	growth-rates	(227	seconds	and	114	seconds	respectively).	Since	a	worst-case	scenario	is	assumed,	the	fast	t2	growth-rate	was	chosen.	Again,	a	custom	fire	ramp	was	created	to	follow	the	the	fast	t2	growth-rate,	but	the	growth	was	stopped	at	90	seconds	(time	of	the	second	sprinkler’s	original	activation	time).	The	burner	was	placed	on	top	of	an	inert	box	approximately	the	same	size	as	the	copier.	The	36”-wide	door	at	the	south	end	of	the	hallway	is	held	open	with	a	magnet	which	deactivates	and	closes	the	door	upon	activation	of	the	fire	alarm.	To	simulate	this	behavior,	the	door	closes	one	second	after	the	smoke	detector	activates	(to	simulate	time	for	the	door	to	close).	The	door	to	the	Grand	Jury	room	is	kept	closed,	the	door	
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at	the	north	end	of	the	hallway	to	the	LAFCo	offices	is	propped	open	with	a	door	stop,	and	the	conference	room	doors	vary	whether	they’re	open	or	closed.	For	the	simulation	they	were	considered	to	be	closed.			This	fire	scenario	was	designed	to	see	if	the	occupants	of	the	dead-end	hallway	would	be	trapped	by	a	fire	in	the	common	area	at	the	south	of	the	hallway.	As	the	fire	would	be	in	close	proximity	to	the	only	exit,	the	question	was	if	the	conditions	would	remain	tenable	long	enough	for	them	the	occupants	to	escape	into	the	second	floor	lobby.					 																		
Figure	#35:	HRR	of	a	small	air	conditioner	(SFPE	Handbook	5th	Ed.)										
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Figure	#36:	View	of	the	2nd	Floor	Hallway	in	Smokeview	(facing	east)	
	
																		
Figure	#37:	View	of	the	copier,	desk,	and	recycle	containers	in	2nd	Floor	Hall	common	area	
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Figure	#38:	View	facing	north	down	the	2nd	Floor	Hall	from	the	common	area		
Scenario	#3	The	third	scenario	evaluated	a	fire	that	could	occur	in	a	trash	can	located	in	the	western	corridor	on	the	first	floor	(see	Figure	43	below).	Located	on	the	north	side	of	the	corridor	are	three	plastic	recycle	containers,	a	trash	can,	and	two	soda	vending	machines.	Two	of	the	recycle	containers	are	64-gallon	while	the	third	is	significantly	smaller.	The	35-gallon	trash	can	doesn’t	have	a	lid,	while	the	two	larger	recycle	containers	both	had	lids	(not	locked).	Stacks	of	loose	cardboard	boxes	have	also	been	seen	piled	around	these	containers	during	different	visits	to	the	site.			In	this	portion	of	the	corridor,	the	width	(N/S)	is	16	feet.	The	ceiling	is	a	9-foot	acoustic	drop	ceiling,	the	walls	are	gypsum,	and	the	floor	is	tiled.	To	the	southeast	of	this	area	is	the	hallway	that	leads	to	the	northeast	corner	of	the	cafeteria.	Directly	to	the	northeast	is	the	main	northern	exit	corridor	for	the	first	floor.	To	the	east	at	the	end	of	the	corridor	is	the	exit	into	the	CDA	waiting	area	(~65’	away).	To	the	west	at	the	end	of	the	corridor	is	the	exit	into	the	western	stairwell	(~135’	away).			The	fire	was	theorized	to	start	in	one	of	the	64-gallon	recycle	containers	due	ignition	by	open	flame	(arson).	Inside	of	the	container	on	several	visits	have	been	
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plastics,	cardboard,	and	paper.	The	fire	would	spread	to	the	64-gallon	recycle	container	to	the	immediate	west,	the	35-gallon	trash	can	to	the	immediate	east,	followed	by	the	smaller	recycle	container	and	the	soda	machines.	To	simulate	the	fire	spreading	between	the	containers,	three	burners	were	used.	The	first	burner	was	horizontal	(Z-plane)	on	top	of	the	easternmost	64-gallon	recycle	container.	The	second	burner	was	located	vertically	(Y-plane)	on	the	front	of	the	westernmost	64-gallon	recycle	container.	The	third	burner	was	also	located	vertically	(Y-plane)	on	the	front	of	the	35-gallon	trash	can.	The	vertical	burners	were	used	to	simulate	ignition	of	the	sides/front	of	the	secondary	fuels	due	to	radiant	heating	from	the	initial	fire.			The	fires’	HRR	values	and	growth	rates	were	modeled	after	tests	done	on	HDPE	(high-density	polyethylene)	plastic	trash/recycle	containers	at	National	Institute	of	Standards	and	Technology	(NIST)	and	the	Western	Fire	Center.	The	HRR	for	the	first	burner	was	2400kW	(64-gallon	can	with	combustibles	inside)	and	grew	slightly	slower	than	a	t2	fast	growth	rate	fire,	reaching	a	maximum	HRR	at	250	seconds.	As	the	second	container	wasn’t	as	full	of	combustible	materials,	a	maximum	HRR	of	2100kW	was	used	with	a	time	of	240	seconds.	However,	the	second	burner	didn’t	ignite	until	60	seconds	after	the	first	burner	did,	to	simulate	the	object	igniting	from	the	radiant	heat.	The	third	burner	simulated	a	smaller	30-gallon	trash	can	that	was	only	partially	full.	The	maximum	HRR	was	800kW	with	a	time	of	150	seconds,	also	delayed	60	seconds	after	the	first	burner	ignited.	Due	to	the	large	amount	of	fuel	present,	it	was	hypothesized	that	the	fire	would	overwhelm	the	sprinklers,	so	the	fire	ramps	were	not	adjusted	to	simulate	the	sprinklers	having	an	effect.			There	are	a	total	of	20	sprinklers	in	the	length	of	the	western	corridor,	and	one	in	the	portion	of	the	northern	corridor	that	was	modeled.	Of	the	20	sprinklers,	4	were	in	the	same	portion	of	the	corridor	as	the	fire,	two	at	the	north,	and	two	at	the	south	end.		The	sprinklers	have	an	activation	temperature	of	74°C.	There	are	a	total	of	7	photo	electric	smoke	detectors	in	the	western	corridor,	the	closest	to	the	fire	is	approximately	6	feet	to	the	east	of	the	easternmost	recycle	container.			All	of	the	doors	in	the	corridor	are	closed	during	normal	operation,	with	the	exception	of	the	door	into	the	northern	corridor.	It	is	held	open	by	a	magnet	that	disengages	when	the	fire	alarm	goes	off.	To	simulate	this,	the	door	would	close	one	second	after	the	nearest	smoke	detector	activated.			This	fire	was	chosen	to	show	the	danger	of	having	such	a	large	amount	of	fuel	stored	in	an	exit	corridor,	and	adjacent	to	a	second	corridor’s	entry.	As	this	fire	grows,	the	
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smoke	will	spread	throughout	the	corridor	slowing	the	egress	of	several	departments,	and	causing	a	few	departments	to	choose	an	alternate	egress	pathway.																
Figure	#39:	HRR	of	a	96	gal	PE	garbage	can	-	Western	Fire	Center	(SFPE	Handbook	5th	Ed.)																			
Figure	#40:	HRR	of	a	30	gal	PE	garbage	can	from	NIST	(SFPE	Handbook	5th	Ed.)					
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									Figure	#41:	HRR	of	a	trash	bag	with		 	 	 											Figure	#42:	HRR	of	trash	bags	
crumpled	newspaper	(SFPE	Handbook	5th	Ed.)	 	 	 					(SFPE	Handbook	5th	Ed.)																							
Figure	#43:	The	recycle	containers,	trash	can,	and	vending	machines	in	the	west	corridor			
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Figure	#44:	Overview	of	1st	Floor	West	Corridor	in	Smokeview	(facing	north)																			
Figure	#45:	Close-up	of	the	burners	in	the	West	Corridor	in	Smokeview	(facing	north)		
Scenario	#4	The	fourth	scenario	evaluated	a	fire	that	could	occur	in	a	book	fair	in	the	lobby.	During	one	visit	to	the	Rood	Center,	a	book	fair	was	set	up	throughout	the	lobby.	In	total,	16	rectangular	plastic	folding	tables	were	set	up	with	cardboard	boxes,	books,	and	loose	paper	both	on	top	of,	and	below,	the	tables.	The	tables	were	primarily	set	up	at	the	south	end	of	the	lobby	near	the	large	two-story	glass	wall,	but	some	were	placed	up	against	the	northern	wall	of	the	lobby	(southern	wall	of	the	BOS	chambers).	To	the	south	of	the	tables,	organizers	had	pushed	four	large	wood/foam	chairs	up	against	the	glass	wall.	On	either	side	of	the	glass	wall	are	walls	covered	
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with	wood	siding	(T-111	tongue	and	groove).	The	rest	of	the	lobby	walls	are	covered	with	gypsum	wall	board.	The	ceiling	of	the	lobby	is	the	same	T-111	tongue	and	groove	wood	and	has	a	peak	in	the	center	(with	a	N/S	ridgeline),	and	a	matching	ceiling	on	either	side,	which	slopes	from	the	south	upwards	to	the	north.	At	the	north	end	of	the	lobby	the	ceiling	changes	to	a	flat	acoustic	drop-ceiling,	9	feet	above	the	second	floor	walkway.			On	either	side	of	the	glass	wall	at	the	front	(south	side)	of	the	lobby	are	double	36”-wide	glass	doors.	To	the	northwest	is	the	36”-wide	door	into	the	cafeteria,	to	the	north	are	double	36”-wide	doors	into	the	CDA	waiting	area,	and	upstairs	there	are	single	36”-wide	wooden	doors	to	the	east	and	west	leading	to	the	respective	exit	corridors.	The	lobby	is	72	feet	wide	(E/W)	at	the	front,	84	feet	long	(N/S)	on	the	first	floor	and	104	feet	long	(N/S)	on	the	second	floor.	The	ceiling	height	in	the	front	of	the	lobby	rises	from	13	feet	at	the	front	on	either	side,	to	23	feet	at	the	rear,	with	the	central	peak	reaching	a	height	of	33.5	feet.	The	flat	ceiling	is	23	feet	above	the	first	floor,	9	feet	above	the	second	floor.			The	fire	was	theorized	to	be	started	intentionally	(arson)	with	an	open	flame	in	cardboard	boxes	underneath	tables	at	the	western	and	eastern	ends	of	the	central	group	of	tables.	The	fires	spread	along	boxes,	books	and	paper	underneath	the	table,	eventually	spreading	to	the	plastic	table	tops	and	additional	boxes,	books	and	paper	on	top	of	the	tables.	Once	the	tables	(and	contents)	are	ignited,	the	fire	spreads	south	to	the	foam	chairs,	and	then	to	the	wood	siding.	Once	the	wood	siding	is	ignited,	the	fire	would	climb	vertically	until	it	began	to	spread	across	the	wooden	ceiling.			Two	burners	were	used,	placed	on	top	of	cardboard	boxes	underneath	plastic	tables.	Both	burners	are	ignited	at	the	same	time.	Each	burner	had	a	maximum	HRR	of	80kW,	which	was	reached	at	an	ultra-fast	t2	growth	rate	of	20	seconds.	These	values	were	chosen	to	simulate	that	of	a	large	wastebasket	fire	with	paper	inside	(SFPE	Handbook,	5th	Edition,	Table	26.31).			In	the	front	portion	of	the	lobby	are	13	dry-pipe	sprinklers,	four	in	the	western	section,	six	in	the	center,	and	three	in	the	eastern	section.	All	of	the	sprinklers	are	at	varying	heights	as	the	western	and	eastern	sections	of	the	ceiling	are	sloped.	After	several	attempts	at	trying	to	determine	what	the	dry-pipe	system’s	delay	is,	an	accurate	value	was	not	obtained.	Therefore,	a	value	was	estimated	for	the	computer	model	of	60	seconds.	Spread	throughout	the	northern	portion	of	the	lobby	(where	the	flat	ceiling	is	located)	are	17	wet-pipe	sprinklers.	Two	additional	wet-pipe	sprinklers	are	located	underneath	the	open-air	walkway	near	the	elevator.	All	of	the	
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sprinklers	had	an	activation	temperature	of	74°C.	The	only	smoke	detector	in	the	entire	lobby	is	a	photoelectric	detector	on	the	second	floor,	~6	feet	from	the	northernmost	wall.	As	the	three	doors	in	the	upstairs	lobby	are	all	held	open	by	a	magnet	which	disengages	when	the	fire	alarm	activates,	all	three	doors	closed	one	second	after	the	single	smoke	detector	activated.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	#46:	View	of	the	book	fair	in	the	south	end	of	the	lobby	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	#47:	Overview	of	the	book	fair	in	the	lobby	facing	southwest	-	Pyrosim	
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Figure	#48:	The	book	fair	in	the	northern	portion	of	the	lobby	and	the	open	air	walkway	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	#49:	Overview	of	the	book	fair	in	the	lobby	facing	north	(south	wall	invisible)	–	
Pyrosim.	At	the	right	and	top	of	the	photo:	the	stairs,	open	air	walkway,	and	the	door	to	the	
dead	end	hallway	can	be	seen.		
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To	define	the	smoke	and	carbon	monoxide	production	in	these	simulations,	values	of	0.02	(2%)	were	selected	for	both	the	CO	yield	and	the	soot	yield.	As	exact	data	was	not	available	for	any	of	the	fuels,	values	were	estimated	and	held	constant	through	all	four	fire	scenarios.	These	values	may	be	conservative	for	some	scenarios,	and	not	for	others.				
Results		
Scenario	#1	The	fire	in	the	cafeteria	grew	following	a	medium	speed	t2	fire	growth	curve.	It	reached	a	maximum	HRR	of	300kW	at	160	seconds	into	the	simulation.			All	six	of	the	sprinklers	in	the	cafeteria	activated,	and	one	of	the	three	sprinklers	in	the	north	hallway	activated.	The	first	two	sprinklers	in	the	cafeteria	activated	at	107.4	seconds	into	the	model.	The	first	two	sprinklers	were	the	north-west	and	north-center	sprinklers.	The	last	sprinkler	in	the	cafeteria	activated	at	117.0	seconds.	The	only	sprinkler	in	the	north	hallway	activated	at	147.6	seconds.	The	simulation	was	stopped	at	162.6	seconds	after	the	burner	reached	the	maximum	HRR.			
Table	#21:	Cafeteria	Sprinkler	Activation	Times	and	Locations	
Sprinkler	Name	 Activation	Time	(s)	 Location	Cafeteria	#1	 112.8	 South-West	Cafeteria	#2	 111.6	 South-Center	Cafeteria	#3	 116.4	 South-East	Cafeteria	#4	 107.4	 North-West	Cafeteria	#5	 107.4	 North-Center	Cafeteria	#6	 117.0	 North-East	North	Hallway	#1	 147.6	 Southern	North	Hallway	#2	 N/A	 Center	North	Hallway	#3	 N/A	 Northern		The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	cafeteria	is	60	people.	According	to	the	movement	time	calculations	in	APPENDIX	C,	the	time	it	would	take	the	occupants	of	the	cafeteria	to	escape	to	safety	was	122	seconds	once	they	started	their	evacuation.	The	discovery	time	(td)	in	this	scenario	had	to	be	estimated	because	there	is	no	smoke	detector	in	the	cafeteria	or	northern	hallway.	The	simulation	was	played	in	Smokeview	and	an	estimate	of	30	seconds	was	chosen	based	on	when	the	smoke	had	traveled	south	across	the	ceiling	and	reached	the	southern	wall	of	the	cafeteria.	By	that	time,	everyone	in	the	small	cafeteria	would	be	in	a	position	to	see/smell	the	smoke	and	potentially	see	the	flames.	This	value	would	likely	be	
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  88 
less	than	30	seconds	as	there	is	usually	an	employee	working	behind	the	serving	counter	who	would	be	within	a	few	feet	of	the	ignition	source.	Once	they	discovered	the	fire,	they’d	likely	yell	to	everyone	else	warning	them	of	the	fire.			Once	the	occupants	in	the	cafeteria	are	alerted	to	the	fire,	the	pre-movement	time	(tpre)	portion	of	the	evacuation	begins.	As	the	occupants	in	the	cafeteria	would	be	able	to	see/smell	the	smoke	and	potentially	see	the	fire,	the	recognition	time	(time	it	takes	to	understand	evacuation	is	needed)	would	be	instantaneous.	Occupants	in	the	cafeteria	would	likely	be	a	mix	of	staff	and	the	public.	The	staff	would	have	a	majority	(if	not	all)	of	their	belongings	at	their	desk	and	not	with	them	in	the	cafeteria.	The	public	might	have	a	few	items	with	them	but	would	likely	keep	those	items	close	by.	Therefore,	the	response	time	(time	it	would	take	someone	to	start	evacuating	after	they	realized	a	need	to	do	so)	was	estimated	at	10	seconds.			With	a	discovery	time	of	30	seconds,	a	pre-movement	time	of	10	seconds,	and	a	movement	time	of	122	seconds,	the	evacuation	time	would	be	162	seconds.	With	a	safety	factor	of	1.5,	the	total	RSET	(Required	Safe	Egress	Time)	value	is	243	seconds.			Because	of	the	tall	ceilings	and	large	size	of	the	lobby	(~23	feet	tall,	72	feet	wide),	once	the	occupants	passed	through	the	doorway	from	the	cafeteria	into	the	lobby,	they	would	be	out	of	the	smoke	layer	and	would	be	in	tenable	conditions	for	the	remaining	portion	of	the	evacuation.		All	60	people	would	have	passed	through	the	door	into	the	lobby	by	126	seconds	(not	counting	the	safety	factor).			As	this	is	a	simulation	of	a	worst-case	scenario,	the	maximum	occupancy	value	of	60	people	was	used.	However,	after	several	visits	to	the	location,	the	normal	day-to-day	occupancy	would	be	less	than	10	people.	If	that	occupancy	value	was	used,	RSET	would	be	113	seconds,	and	the	time	it	would	take	to	reach	the	lobby	would	be	64	seconds.	The	RSET	would	still	be	larger	than	the	ASET,	but	occupants	could	reach	the	lobby	before	conditions	became	untenable.		Slice	files	at	Z=1.8m	(6	feet)	and	detectors	near	the	doorways	into	the	lobby	and	north	hallway	were	used	to	determine	when	the	conditions	were	no	longer	tenable	(based	on	the	criteria	mentioned	above).		Table	22	below	lists	when/if	conditions	became	untenable	based	on	the	four	factors	listed	above.							
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Table	#22:	Cafeteria	Tenability	Criteria	Factor	Times	
	 Tenability	Criteria	Factor	
Location	 Visibility	
(<	8m)	
Temperature		
(>	100°C)	
Carbon	Monoxide	
(>	1,350	ppm-min)	
Radiant	Heat	Flux	
(>	2.5kW/m2)	Exit	to	Lobby	 102.0	sec	 106.8	sec	 N/A	 154.8	sec	Exit	to	North	Hallway	 105.6	sec	 111.0	sec	 N/A	 N/A	
ASET	Pass/Fail	 Fail	 Fail	 Pass	 Pass*	
*The	radiant	heat	flux	exceeded	the	threshold	only	after	the	occupants	had	escaped	the	
cafeteria	and	were	passing	through	the	exterior	doors	of	the	lobby.			Based	on	the	values	in	the	table	above,	conditions	became	untenable	due	to	visibility	and	temperature	before	the	first	sprinklers	activated	(107.4	sec).		Due	to	conditions	becoming	untenable,	thereby	marking	an	end	to	the	ASET,	RSET	(243	sec)	values	are	greater	than	the	ASET	values	(102	sec).																					
Figure	#50:	Cafeteria	Fire	-	Visibility	slice	file	at	Z=1.8	facing	northwest	in	Smokeview	(102s)	
Tenability	failure	at	southeast	exit.	Black	indicates	visibility	threshold.				
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Figure	#51:	Cafeteria	Fire	-	Visibility	slice	file	at	east	side	of	room	facing	east	(102	sec)																			
Figure	#52:	Cafeteria	Fire	–	Temperature	slice	file	at	Z=1.8	facing	northwest	(106.8	sec)	
Tenability	failure	at	southeast	exit.	Black	indicates	temperature	threshold.	
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Figure	#53:	Cafeteria	Fire	-	Temperature	slice	file	at	east	side	of	room	facing	east	(107.4	sec)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	#54:	Cafeteria	Fire	–	Visible	smoke/fire	detection	(30.0	sec)	
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Figure	#55:	Cafeteria	Fire	–	First	sprinklers	activate	(107.4	sec)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	#56:	Cafeteria	Fire	–	Smoke	&	Fire	when	the	first	sprinklers	activate	(107.4	sec)	
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Figure	#57:	Cafeteria	Fire	–	Smoke	&	Fire	when	first	sprinklers	activate	facing	north	(107.4s)	
(South	wall	invisible)			Due	to	the	fact	that	HRR,	fire	growth,	soot	yield,	and	CO	yield	values	were	estimated,	actual	results	may	be	slightly	different.	Examining	the	graph	of	Total	HRR	vs.	Time	below,	the	HRR	values	did	drop	slightly	when	the	sprinklers	were	activated.	However,	in	the	simulation,	the	burner’s	fire	ramp	was	not	modified	to	simulate	activation	of	sprinklers.	These	facts	may	extend	the	ASET	value	slightly,	however	it	is	unlikely	that	there	will	be	more	time	available	for	egress	(ASET)	than	what	is	required	(RSET).																				
Figure	#58:	Cafeteria	Fire	-	Total	HRR	v	Time	Graph		
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Scenario	#2		The	fire	in	the	second	floor	northern	hallway	grew	following	a	fast	speed	t2	fire	growth	curve.	It	was	designed	to	reach	a	maximum	HRR	of	600kW	at	114	seconds	into	the	simulation.	However,	due	to	the	proximity	of	the	sprinklers	to	the	fire	origin,	the	fire	growth	was	halted	when	the	second	sprinkler	activated	at	90.0	seconds.		
	All	three	of	the	sprinklers	in	the	small	common	area	at	the	south	end	of	the	hallway	activated.	Neither	of	the	two	sprinklers	in	the	northern	portion	of	the	hallway	activated.	Unlike	the	other	three	scenarios,	the	sprinklers	in	the	second	floor	northern	hallway	are	a	different	brand	(Viking)	and	have	a	lower	activation	temperature	of	68°C.	The	table	below	lists	activation	times	of	the	sprinklers.	The	simulation	was	stopped	at	200.4	seconds	when	the	conditions	in	the	hallway/office	had	plateaued.		
	
Table	#23:	Second	Floor	Hallway	Sprinkler	Activation	Times	and	Locations	
Sprinkler	Name	 Activation	Time	(s)	 Location	North	Hall	#1	 76.2	 Eastern	Common	Area	North	Hall	#2	 90.0	 Western	Common	Area	North	Hall	#3	 97.8	 Northern	Common	Area	North	Hall	#4	 N/A	 South	in	the	Hallway	North	Hall	#5	 N/A	 North	in	the	Hallway		The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	second	floor	northern	hallway	is	102	people.	According	to	the	movement	time	calculations	in	APPENDIX	C,	the	time	it	would	take	the	occupants	of	the	second	floor	hallway	(“LAFCo,	Grand	Jury	&	Conference	Rooms”)	to	escape	to	safety	was	293	seconds	once	they	started	their	evacuation.	The	discovery	time	(td)	in	this	scenario	was	the	time	it	took	the	smoke	detector	in	the	hallway	to	activate.	That	time	was	9.0	seconds.		Once	the	smoke	detector	activates,	it	triggers	the	building’s	fire	alarm	system	immediately	notifying	everyone	in	the	building.			Once	the	occupants	in	the	second	floor	hallway	and	adjoining	rooms	are	alerted	to	the	fire,	the	pre-movement	time	(tpre)	portion	of	the	evacuation	begins.	Unlike	the	first	scenario	in	the	cafeteria,	most	of	the	occupants	in	the	area	of	the	second	floor	north	hallway	would	not	be	able	to	see	the	smoke	or	fire	by	the	time	the	fire	alarm	triggers.	Therefore,	the	recognition	time	would	be	higher	as	it	would	take	people	time	to	realize	the	alarms	are	indicating	there	is	a	fire	in	the	building.	The	department	is	composed	primarily	of	staff,	but	there	would	be	people	in	the	Grand	Jury	room	and	potentially	the	conference	rooms	who	are	not	familiar	with	the	fire	alarm	system.	Therefore,	the	recognition	time	was	estimated	to	be	30	seconds.	The	response	time	of	the	occupants	could	vary	greatly	though.	For	people	
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in	the	conference	rooms	or	LAFCo	offices,	it	might	take	only	30	seconds	for	them	to	respond,	but	for	people	in	the	Grand	Jury	room,	it	could	take	significantly	longer	if	they	try	to	finish	a	portion	of	testimony	before	exiting	or	try	to	pack	all	their	belongings	before	leaving.	Because	of	the	large	variance,	two	estimates	will	be	used	for	the	pre-movement	times	(recognition	time	plus	response	time),	60	seconds	and	240	seconds.		
	With	a	discovery	time	of	9	seconds,	a	pre-movement	time	of	60/240	seconds,	and	a	movement	time	of	293	seconds,	the	evacuation	time	would	be	362/542	seconds.	With	a	safety	factor	of	1.5,	the	total	RSET	(Required	Safe	Egress	Time)	value	is	543/813	seconds	which	is	equivalent	to	~9/13.5	mins.		
	Because	of	the	three	sprinklers	directly	above	the	fire	in	the	small	common	area,	and	the	large	solid-core	wooden	door	that	closes	automatically,	once	the	occupants	could	reach	the	second	floor	lobby,	tenability	conditions	would	drastically	improve.	Occupants	could	be	completely	out	of	the	north	hallway	and	into	the	lobby	by	262/442	seconds,	100	seconds	before	they	could	exit	the	building.	That	does	not	take	into	account	the	opening	of	the	door	while	the	occupants	would	be	exiting.		
	Slice	files	at	Z=1.8m	(6	feet)	above	the	floor	and	detectors	near	the	LAFCo	office,	Grand	Jury,	and	the	exit	doorways	were	used	to	determine	when	the	conditions	were	no	longer	tenable	(based	on	the	criteria	mentioned	above).		Table	24	below	lists	when/if	conditions	became	untenable	based	on	the	four	factors	listed	above.		
	
Table	#24:	2nd	Floor	Hallway	Tenability	Criteria	Factor	Times	
	 Tenability	Criteria	Factor	
Location	
Visibility	
(<	8m)	
Temperature		
(>	100°C)	
Carbon	Monoxide	
(>	1,350	ppm-min)	
Radiant	Heat	Flux	
(>	2.5kW/m2)	
LAFCo	Door	 79.2	sec	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	
Grand	Jury	Door	 74.4	sec	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	
Exit	Door	to	Lobby	 76.2	sec	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	
ASET	Pass/Fail	 Fail	 Pass	 Pass	 Pass	
*The	simulation	was	stopped	at	200.4	seconds	when	conditions	began	to	plateau.	Because	the	
egress	times,	were	longer	than	200	seconds,	trends	were	analyzed	to	determine	if	any	of	the	
thresholds	(other	than	visibility)	would	be	exceeded.		
	Based	on	the	values	in	the	table	above,	conditions	became	untenable	due	to	visibility	at	74.4	seconds	in	the	center	of	the	hallway.	The	first	sprinklers	didn’t	activate	till	76.2	sec.		Due	to	conditions	becoming	untenable,	thereby	marking	an	end	to	the	ASET,	RSET	values	are	greater	than	the	ASET	values.	
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Figure	#59:	2nd	Floor	Hall	Fire	-	Visibility	slice	file	at	Z=1.8	facing	east	in	Smokeview	(74.4s)	
Tenability	failure	at	Grand	Jury	doorway.	Black	indicates	visibility	threshold.																				
Figure	#60:	2nd	Floor	Hall	Fire	–	Smoke	&	fire	facing	east	in	Smokeview	(74.4	sec)	
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Figure	#61:	2nd	Floor	Hall	Fire	–	Smoke	&	fire	facing	south	into	the	hallway	from	the	LAFCo	
office	doorway	at	the	time	of	smoke	detector	activation	(9.0	sec)																				
Figure	#62:	2nd	Floor	Hall	Fire	–	Smoke	&	fire	facing	south	into	the	hallway	from	the	LAFCo	
office	doorway	at	the	time	of	visibility	tenability	failure	at	Grand	Jury	doorway	(74.4	sec)		
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Figure	#63:	2nd	Floor	Hall	Fire	–	Last	sprinkler	activation	facing	east	(97.8	sec)																						
Figure	#64:	2nd	Floor	Hall	Fire	–	Smoke	&	fire	facing	southeast	in	the	common	area	when	the	
last	sprinkler	activated	(97.8	sec)	
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Due	to	the	fact	that	HRR,	fire	growth,	soot	yield,	and	CO	yield	values	were	estimated,	actual	results	may	be	slightly	different.	That	may	extend	the	ASET	value	slightly,	however	it	is	unlikely	that	there	will	be	more	time	available	for	egress	(ASET)	than	what	is	required	(RSET)	due	to	long	egress	times	and	the	visibility	conditions	failing	so	early	in	the	fire.				With	the	current	configuration,	if	the	occupants	can’t	exit	the	hallway	in	less	than	74	seconds	after	detection,	then	they	would	be	forced	to	either	enter	the	hallway	under	untenable	conditions,	or	retreat	to	the	rooms/offices	they	started	in	and	wait	for	the	fire	department	to	come	rescue	them.	As	there	is	no	other	way	out	of	any	of	these	rooms,	the	occupants	would	be	trapped.	In	the	simulation,	the	sprinklers	maintained	tenable	conditions	with	the	exception	of	visibility.	If	the	other	fuel	packages	would	have	ignited,	(two	plastic	recycle	containers	and	a	foam	chair)	it	is	possible	that	the	sprinklers	could	have	been	overwhelmed	if	the	fire	grew	quickly	in	the	early	stages	prior	to	the	activation	of	the	sprinklers.	If	that	occurs,	then	the	occupants	would	in	danger	of	smoke	leaking	into	the	rooms	and	the	fire	spreading	above	them	while	they	wait	for	the	fire	department	to	arrive.																						
Figure	#65:	2nd	Floor	Hallway	Fire	-	Total	HRR	v	Time	Graph				
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Scenario	#3		There	are	three	fires	(burners)	in	the	first	floor	western	corridor	scenario.	All	three	grew	at	a	pace	slightly	slower	a	fast	speed	t2	fire	growth	curve.	The	growth	rates	were	based	upon	test	data	from	burns	of	HDPE	(high-density	polyethylene)	plastic	at	NIST	and	Western	Fire	Center.	The	first	burner	reached	a	maximum	HRR	of	2400kW	at	250	seconds.	The	second	burner	didn’t	ignite	until	60	seconds	into	the	scenario	but	reached	a	maximum	HRR	of	2100kW	in	240	seconds.	The	third	burner	also	didn’t	ignite	until	60	seconds	into	the	scenario	but	reached	a	maximum	HRR	of	800kW	in	150	seconds.	Due	to	the	large	amount	of	fuel	present,	it	was	hypothesized	that	the	fire	would	overwhelm	the	sprinklers,	so	the	fire	ramps	were	not	adjusted	to	simulate	the	sprinklers	having	an	effect.			17	of	the	20	sprinklers	in	the	western	corridor	activated,	and	the	one	in	the	portion	of	the	northern	corridor	that	was	modeled	did	not	activate.	Of	the	three	sprinklers	that	did	not	activate,	one	was	at	the	easternmost	end	of	the	corridor,	and	the	other	two	were	at	the	westernmost	end	of	the	corridor.	All	of	the	sprinklers	have	an	activation	temperature	of	74°C.	The	table	below	lists	activation	times	of	the	sprinklers.	The	simulation	was	stopped	at	240.0	seconds	when	the	conditions	in	the	corridor	had	plateaued.		
	
Table	#25:	First	Floor	Hallway	Sprinkler	Activation	Times	
Sprinkler	Name	 Activation	Time	(s)	West	Hall	#1	*	 N/A	West	Hall	#2	 154.8	West	Hall	#3	 	138.0	West	Hall	#4	 105.6	West	Hall	#5	 55.8	West	Hall	#6	 40.2	West	Hall	#7	 76.8	West	Hall	#8	 56.4	West	Hall	#9	 72.0	West	Hall	#10	 96.6	West	Hall	#11	 88.2	West	Hall	#12	 97.2	West	Hall	#13	 111.6	West	Hall	#14	 117.0	West	Hall	#15	 126.0	West	Hall	#16	 135.6	West	Hall	#17	 133.2	West	Hall	#18	 156.6	West	Hall	#19	 N/A	West	Hall	#20	**	 N/A	North	Hall	#1	 N/A	
*	Easternmost	Sprinkler	**	Westernmost	Sprinkler	
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As	the	location	of	this	fire	was	in	a	corridor,	there	was	no	maximum	occupancy	associated	with	the	space.	However,	two	departments	have	to	enter	the	first	floor	western	corridor	to	exit	the	building	(in	different	directions)	so	the	occupancies	of	both	departments	will	be	discussed	separately.			The	first	department	required	to	enter	the	western	corridor	is	the	Child	Support	Services	(CSS).	Their	primary	evacuation	route	would	take	them	from	the	east	end	of	the	corridor	westward,	and	then	north	into	the	northern	corridor.	This	fire	scenario	will	change	their	evacuation	route,	but	they’ll	still	need	to	enter	the	western	corridor	before	heading	east	into	the	CDA	waiting	area	and	out	the	front	of	the	building.			The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	CSS	department	is	38	people.	According	to	the	movement	time	calculations	in	APPENDIX	C,	the	time	it	would	take	the	occupants	to	escape	to	safety	via	their	secondary	evacuation	route	was	152	seconds	once	they	started	their	evacuation.	The	discovery	time	(td)	in	this	scenario	was	the	time	it	took	a	smoke	detector	in	the	hallway	to	activate.	That	time	was	6.0	seconds.		Once	the	smoke	detector	activates,	it	triggers	the	building’s	fire	alarm	system	immediately	notifying	everyone	in	the	building.			Once	the	occupants	in	the	CSS	department	are	alerted	to	the	fire,	the	pre-movement	time	(tpre)	portion	of	the	evacuation	begins.	The	occupants	would	not	be	able	to	see	the	smoke	or	fire	by	the	time	the	fire	alarm	triggers,	therefore,	there	would	be	a	recognition	time	as	people	realize	they	need	to	evacuate.	The	recognition	time	was	estimated	to	be	15	seconds	as	the	department	is	composed	entirely	of	staff	who	are	trained	to	recognize	the	alarm.	Once	alerted	to	the	fire,	the	response	time	would	be	fairly	low	as	everyone	is	trained	to	evacuate.	The	response	time	was	estimated	to	be	15	seconds	for	the	same	reasons	just	mentioned.			With	a	discovery	time	of	6	seconds,	a	pre-movement	time	of	30	seconds,	and	a	movement	time	of	152	seconds,	the	evacuation	time	would	be	188	seconds.	With	a	safety	factor	of	1.5,	the	total	RSET	(Required	Safe	Egress	Time)	value	is	282	seconds.			Like	previous	scenarios,	once	out	of	the	corridor	where	the	fire	is	located,	the	occupants	would	reach	an	area	where	tenability	conditions	would	drastically	improve	and	they	would	no	longer	be	in	immediate	danger.	Occupants	could	exit	the	western	corridor	via	the	eastern	door	into	the	CDA	waiting	area	within	137	seconds;	53	seconds	before	exiting	the	building.	At	that	time,	both	visibility	and	temperature	levels	would	have	been	considered	untenable.			The	second	department	required	to	enter	the	western	corridor	is	the	Information	&	General	Services	(IGS).	Their	primary	evacuation	route	would	take	them	from	the	west	end	of	the	corridor	westward	to	the	western	stairwell.	This	fire	scenario	will	not	change	their	evacuation	route	as	there	is	not	another	option,	but	the	occupants	will	be	exposed	to	the	smoke	and	heat	from	the	fire			The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	IGS	department	is	107	people.	According	to	the	movement	time	calculations	in	APPENDIX	C,	the	time	it	would	take	the	occupants	to	escape	to	safety	
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via	their	primary	evacuation	route	was	204	seconds	once	they	started	their	evacuation.	The	discovery	time	(td)	in	this	scenario	was	the	same	as	above,	6.0	seconds.		Once	the	smoke	detector	activates,	it	triggers	the	building’s	fire	alarm	system	immediately	notifying	everyone	in	the	building.		
	Once	the	occupants	in	the	IGS	department	are	alerted	to	the	fire,	the	pre-movement	time	(tpre)	portion	of	the	evacuation	begins.	For	the	same	reasons	as	the	CSS	department,	the	recognition	time	and	the	response	time	were	estimated	to	be	15	seconds	each		
	With	a	discovery	time	of	6	seconds,	a	pre-movement	time	of	30	seconds,	and	a	movement	time	of	204	seconds,	the	evacuation	time	would	be	240	seconds.	With	a	safety	factor	of	1.5,	the	total	RSET	(Required	Safe	Egress	Time)	value	is	360	seconds.		
	Slice	files	at	Z=1.8m	(6	feet)	above	the	floor	were	used	to	determine	when	the	conditions	were	no	longer	tenable	(based	on	the	criteria	mentioned	above).		Table	26	below	lists	when/if	conditions	became	untenable	based	on	the	four	factors	listed	above.		
	
Table	#26:	1st	Floor	Corridor	Tenability	Criteria	Factor	Times	
	 Tenability	Criteria	Factor	
Location	
Visibility	
(<	8m)	
Temperature		
(>	100°C)	
Carbon	Monoxide	
(>	1,350	ppm-min)	
Radiant	Heat	Flux	
(>	2.5kW/m2)	
Western	End	 118.2	sec	 135.6	sec	 N/A	 N/A	
Central/Origin	 70.2	sec	 87.6	sec	 N/A	 72.0	sec	
Eastern	End	 94.8	sec	 128.4	sec	 N/A	 N/A	
ASET	Pass/Fail	 Fail	 Fail	 Pass	 Fail	
*The	simulation	was	stopped	at	240.0	seconds	when	conditions	began	to	plateau.	Because	the	
RSET	value	is	larger	than	240	seconds,	trends	were	analyzed	to	determine	if	the	carbon	
monoxide	threshold	would	be	exceeded.		
	Based	on	the	values	in	the	table	above,	conditions	first	became	untenable	due	to	visibility	at	70.2	seconds	in	the	center	of	the	hallway.	The	first	sprinklers	activated	at	40.2	sec.	By	the	time	conditions	became	untenable	three	sprinklers	had	already	activated.	Due	to	conditions	becoming	untenable,	thereby	marking	an	end	to	the	ASET,	RSET	values	are	greater	than	the	ASET	values.								
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Figure	#66:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	-	Visibility	slice	file	at	Z=1.8	facing	north	in	Smokeview	(70.2s)	
Tenability	failure	at	the	origin.	Black	indicates	visibility	threshold.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	#67:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	–	Smoke/fire	at	the	origin	when	visibility	fails	(70.2	sec)	
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Figure	#68:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	-	Visibility	slice	file	at	Z=1.8.	(94.8	sec)	
Tenability	failure	at	east	end	of	hallway.	Black	indicates	visibility	threshold.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	#69:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	-	Smoke/fire	overview	when	visibility	fails	at	the	east	end	of	the	
hallway	(94.8	sec)	
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Figure	#70:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	-	Smoke/fire	interior	view	from	the	east	end	of	the	hallway	
looking	west	towards	the	origin	just	after	the	smoke	detector	activated.	(7.2	sec)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	#71:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	-	Smoke/fire	interior	view	from	the	east	end	of	the	hallway	
looking	west	towards	the	origin	when	tenability	fails.	(94.8	sec)	
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Figure	#72:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	-	Visibility	slice	file	at	Z=1.8.	(118.2	sec)	
Tenability	failure	at	west	end	of	hallway	(and	throughout)																						
Figure	#73:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	-	Smoke/fire	overview	when	visibility	fails	at	the	west	end	of	the	
hallway	(118.2	sec)	
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  107 
														
Figure	#74:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	-	Temperature	slice	file	at	Z=1.8.	(127.8	sec)	
Tenability	failure	at	east	end	of	hallway.	Black	indicates	temperature	threshold.																							
Figure	#75:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	-	Temperature	slice	file	at	Z=1.8.	(135.6	sec)	
Tenability	failure	at	west	end	of	hallway		
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  108 
																
Figure	#76:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	–	Smoke/fire	at	the	origin	when	1st	sprinkler	activates	(40.2s)																				
Figure	#77:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	–	First	sprinkler	activation	(at	the	origin)	(40.2	sec)		
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Figure	#78:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	–	Temp	slice	(looking	east)	through	the	first	burner	when	the	
first	sprinkler	activates	(40.2	sec).	Vertical	rise	at	ceiling	level	is	through	an	HVAC	vent.																						
Figure	#79:	1st	Floor	Hall	Fire	–	Boundary	Heat	Flux	looking	east	at	the	origin	threshold	is	
reached	(72.0	sec).	Black	indicates	the	threshold	value.	
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Due	to	the	fact	that	HRR,	fire	growth,	soot	yield,	and	CO	yield	values	were	estimated,	actual	results	may	be	slightly	different.	That	may	extend	the	ASET	value	slightly,	however	it	is	unlikely	that	there	will	be	more	time	available	for	egress	(ASET)	than	what	is	required	(RSET)	due	to	long	egress	times	and	the	visibility	conditions	failing	so	early	in	the	fire.			
	With	the	current	configuration	of	the	recycle/trash	containers	in	the	exit	corridors,	this	fire	scenario	blocks	one	exit	forcing	three	departments	to	use	secondary	exit	routes,	and	two	departments	to	be	exposed	to	the	effects	of	the	fire,	and	untenable	conditions	for	a	portion	of	their	evacuation.	This	setup	contained	three	recycle	containers,	one	trash	can,	and	two	soda	vending	machines.	During	one	visit,	as	many	as	nine	recycle	containers	and	two	trash	cans	were	arranged	next	to	each	other	in	the	exit	corridors.	This	amount	of	fuel	can	overwhelm	the	sprinkler	systems.	In	the	fire	models,	the	ceilings	were	modeled	as	gypsum	wall	board,	but	in	reality,	they’re	constructed	of	acoustic	ceiling	tiles	on	a	metal	T-bar	frame.	As	seen	in	the	HRR	graph	below,	the	total	HRR	from	this	fire	exceeded	9,000kW	which	could	potentially	cause	the	ceiling	to	collapse	above	the	fire,	allowing	the	fire	to	spread	into	other	areas.			
	
	
Figure	#80:	1st	Floor	Hallway	Fire	-	Total	HRR	v	Time	Graph	
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Scenario	#4		There	are	two	fires	(burners)	in	the	lobby	fire	scenario.	Both	grew	following	an	ultra-fast	speed	t2	fire	growth	curve.	Both	burners	ignited	at	the	same	time	and	reached	a	maximum	HRR	of	80kW	each	at	20	seconds.	Due	to	the	large	amount	of	fuel	present,	and	the	presence	of	dry-pipe	sprinklers	above	the	fire,	the	fire	ramps	were	not	adjusted	to	simulate	the	sprinklers	having	an	effect	on	the	fire.			All	13	of	the	dry-pipe	sprinklers	in	the	lobby	activated,	along	with	all	17	of	the	wet-pipe	sprinklers	on	the	second	floor	ceiling,	and	the	two	underneath	the	open	air	walkway.	Both	the	wet-pipe	and	the	dry-pipe	sprinkler	heads	had	an	activation	temperature	of	74°C.	One	sprinkler	was	placed	in	the	second	floor	north	hallway	as	a	comparison.	That	sprinkler	was	a	Viking	brand	with	an	activation	temperature	of	68°C,	and	it	never	activated.	The	table	below	lists	activation	times	of	the	sprinklers.	The	simulation	was	stopped	at	270	seconds	when	the	conditions	in	the	lobby	had	plateaued.		
Table	#27:	Lobby	Sprinkler	Activation	Times	
Sprinkler	Name	 Activation	Time	(s)	Dry	Pipe	East	Lobby	#1	 93.0	Dry	Pipe	East	Lobby	#2	 91.8	Dry	Pipe	East	Lobby	#3	 99.6	Dry	Pipe	West	Lobby	#1	 94.2	Dry	Pipe	West	Lobby	#2	 93.0	Dry	Pipe	West	Lobby	#3	 100.8	Dry	Pipe	West	Lobby	#4	 96.0	Dry	Pipe	Center	Lobby	#1	 82.8	Dry	Pipe	Center	Lobby	#2	 84.6	Dry	Pipe	Center	Lobby	#3	 78.6	Dry	Pipe	Center	Lobby	#4	 81.0	Dry	Pipe	Center	Lobby	#5	 79.8	Dry	Pipe	Center	Lobby	#6	 84.6	Second	Floor	Lobby	#1	 109.2	Second	Floor	Lobby	#2	 112.8	Second	Floor	Lobby	#3	 101.4	Second	Floor	Lobby	#4	 104.4	Second	Floor	Lobby	#5	 97.8	Second	Floor	Lobby	#6	 101.4	Second	Floor	Lobby	#7	 94.8	
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Second	Floor	Lobby	#8	 95.4	Second	Floor	Lobby	#9	 111.0	Second	Floor	Lobby	#10	 92.4	Second	Floor	Lobby	#11	 92.4	Second	Floor	Lobby	#12	 90.6	Second	Floor	Lobby	#13	 94.2	Second	Floor	Lobby	#14	 92.4	Second	Floor	Lobby	#15	 92.4	Second	Floor	Lobby	#16	 93.0	Second	Floor	Lobby	#17	 116.4	Under	Open	Air	Walkway	#1	 106.8	Under	Open	Air	Walkway	#2	 106.8	Viking	Second	Floor	Hall	#1	 N/A	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	lobby	is	25	people.	According	to	the	movement	time	calculations	in	APPENDIX	C,	the	time	it	would	take	the	occupants	of	the	lobby	to	escape	to	safety	was	a	maximum	of	34	seconds	once	they	started	their	evacuation.	Like	the	first	scenario,	discovery	time	(td)	in	this	scenario	had	to	be	estimated	because	the	only	smoke	detector	was	approximately	90	feet	away	from	the	fire.	With	this	scenario,	there	is	a	book	fair	in	the	lobby	which	would	have	an	attendant	present	at	all	times.	If	the	fires	were	ignited,	an	attendant	would	realize	fairly	quickly.	That	person	would	likely	yell	out	and	alert	others	in	the	lobby,	but	they	might	not	activate	a	pull	station	(located	on	the	west	side	of	the	lobby	near	the	cafeteria	door	entrance)	because	either	they	don’t	know	where	one	is,	or	they	choose	to	just	yell	out,	evacuate,	and	call	911.	If	the	BOS	Chambers	were	occupied,	then	it	is	likely	that	someone	in	the	lobby	(possibly	the	book	fair	attendant)	would	know	people	were	in	the	room	and	bang	on	the	glass	walls	that	separate	the	BOS	Chambers	from	the	lobby	alerting	the	occupants	to	the	fire.	Therefore,	the	discovery	time	for	the	lobby	and	BOS	Chambers	will	be	estimated	at	30	seconds.	The	discovery	time	for	the	rest	of	the	building	will	be	when	the	smoke	detector	at	the	north	end	of	the	lobby	activates.			The	recognition	time	for	the	occupants	of	the	lobby	would	be	near	instantaneous,	for	the	BOS	Chambers	it	would	be	a	bit	longer,	and	for	the	rest	of	the	building,	even	longer	(once	the	alarm	was	triggered).	Therefore,	the	recognition	time	for	the	lobby	is	estimated	at	0	seconds,	the	BOS	Chambers	at	15	seconds,	and	the	rest	of	the	building	at	30	seconds.	
	Once	the	occupants	in	the	lobby	and	BOS	Chambers	are	alerted	to	the	fire,	the	pre-movement	time	(tpre)	portion	of	the	evacuation	begins.	Similar	to	the	first	scenario	in	the	cafeteria,	most	of	the	occupants	in	the	area	of	the	lobby	would	be	able	to	see	the	smoke	or	fire.	As	the	occupants	of	the	lobby	would	likely	be	passing	through,	or	browsing	the	book	
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fair,	they	would	already	have	their	items	on	their	person.	Therefore,	the	response	time	for	the	lobby	was	estimated	at	10	seconds.	If	the	BOS	Chambers	are	occupied,	then	their	response	time	would	be	longer	as	they	could	have	belongings	around	their	chairs	that	they	would	have	to	gather,	therefore	their	response	time	is	estimated	at	30	seconds.			
Table	#28:	Lobby	Scenario	Pre-Movement	Times	
	 	 Pre-Movement	Time	 	
Location	 Discovery	Time	 Recognition	
Time	
Response	Time	 Total	Time	Lobby	 30	sec	 0	sec	 10	sec	 40	sec	BOS	Chambers	 30	sec	 15	sec	 30	sec	 75	sec	Rest	of	Building	 Activation	of	Detector	(72	sec)	 30	sec	 30	sec	 132	sec		The	movement	times	for	both	the	lobby	and	the	BOS	Chambers	utilize	the	two	exits	at	the	front	of	the	lobby.	The	movement	time	for	the	lobby	is	34	seconds	and	for	the	BOS	Chambers	is	62	seconds.	If	those	values	are	added	to	those	in	the	table	above,	and	multiplied	by	a	safety	factor	of	1.5,	the	RSET	for	the	lobby	is	111	seconds,	and	the	RSET	for	the	BOS	Chambers	is	206	seconds.		
	Slice	files	at	Z=1.8m	and	Z=6.2m	(6	feet	above	the	first	and	second	floors)	and	detectors	at	the	BOS	Chambers	south	exit,	BOS	Chambers	east	exit,	under	the	Open	Air	Walkway,	at	the	top	of	the	stairwell,	and	at	the	northern	portion	of	the	second	floor	were	used	to	determine	when	the	conditions	were	no	longer	tenable	(based	on	the	criteria	mentioned	above).		Table	29	below	lists	when/if	conditions	became	untenable	based	on	the	four	factors	listed	above.			
Table	#29:	Lobby	Tenability	Criteria	Factor	Times	
	 Tenability	Criteria	Factor	
Location	 Visibility	
(<	8m)	
Temperature		
(>	100°C)	
Carbon	Monoxide	
(>	1,350	ppm-min)	
Radiant	Heat	Flux	
(>	2.5kW/m2)	
South	BOS	Chambers	Exit	 84.6	sec	 93.6	sec	 N/A	 99.0	sec	
East	BOS	Chambers	Exit	 94.8	sec	 100.2	sec	 N/A	 115.2	sec	
Under	Open	Air	Walkway	 94.2	sec	 100.2	sec	 N/A	 N/A	
Top	of	Stairwell	 77.4	sec	 84.6	sec	 N/A	 91.8	sec	
North	of	2nd	Floor	Lobby	 87.6	sec	 96.0	sec	 N/A	 N/A	
ASET	Pass/Fail	 Fail	 Fail	 Pass	 Fail	
*The	simulation	was	stopped	at	270	seconds	when	conditions	began	to	plateau.		
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	Based	on	the	values	in	the	table	above,	conditions	became	untenable	due	to	visibility	at	77.4	seconds	on	the	second	floor	at	the	top	of	the	stairwell,	and	at	84.6	seconds	on	the	first	floor	near	the	BOS	Chambers	southern	exit.	The	first	dry-pipe	sprinklers	activated	at	79.2	sec	but	due	to	a	60	second	delay,	didn’t	flow	water	until	139.2	sec.		The	first	wet-pipe	sprinklers	(located	on	the	second	floor	ceiling)	activated	at	90.6	seconds.			Without	the	safety	factors	included,	the	evacuation	times	for	the	lobby	were	below	the	ASET	times.	Therefore,	it	is	possible	that	everyone	in	the	lobby	would	be	able	to	get	out	of	the	building	using	the	front	exit.	More	than	likely	though,	some	of	the	occupants	would	retreat	away	from	the	fire	to	the	north	and	try	to	find	another	exit.	In	that	case,	the	lobby	occupants	would	have	a	similar	evacuation	time	to	the	north	of	~70	seconds	before	they	enter	the	CDA	Waiting	Area	which	would	have	tenable	conditions.				The	BOS	Chambers	have	an	evacuation	time	of	137	seconds	without	the	safety	factor,	so	it	is	possible	that	some	quick	reacting	people	could	get	out	through	the	front	doors	of	the	lobby.	The	rest	of	the	occupants	would	have	to	exit	to	the	east	out	of	the	chambers,	then	to	the	north	out	of	the	lobby.	Assuming	that	20%	of	the	occupants	were	able	to	make	it	out	of	the	lobby,	that	would	leave	an	occupancy	of	108	people	remaining.	For	108	people	exiting	out	of	one	set	of	double	doors	at	the	east	end	of	the	BOS	Chambers,	then	progressing	north	through	the	lobby	through	another	set	of	double	doors	and	into	the	CDA	Waiting	area,	would	take	~74	seconds	of	movement	time.	Add	that	to	the	pre-movement	and	detection	time	of	75	seconds,	and	the	egress	time	would	be	149	seconds	till	they	reached	tenable	conditions	in	another	portion	of	the	building.	(With	a	1.5	safety	factor,	that	value	increases	to	224	seconds.)	The	visibility	conditions	for	the	first	floor	becomes	untenable	in	the	northern	portion	of	the	lobby	(in	the	BOS	Chambers	occupant’s	egress	pathway)	at	93.0	seconds;	before	they	all	could	make	it	into	the	CDA	Waiting	Area.	The	temperature	conditions	become	untenable	in	the	same	location	at	approximately	95.4	seconds.	Heat	flux	conditions	would	become	untenable	in	the	same	location	at	approximately	100.8	seconds.			For	a	total	egress	and	RSET	value	from	the	building,	the	occupants	would	have	to	travel	west	out	of	the	CDA	Waiting	Area	into	the	western	corridor,	then	north	through	the	northern	corridor.	That	would	add	171	seconds	to	the	egress	time	for	a	total	egress	time	of	320	seconds,	or	an	RSET	value	(with	safety	factor)	of	480	seconds.			Another	issue	would	be	the	smoke	generation	due	to	the	height	of	the	lobby	ceiling.	The	smoke	reaches	the	north	end	of	the	second	floor	lobby	and	activates	the	smoke	detector	at	72.6	seconds.	Immediately	the	fire	alarm	system	activates	and	one	second	later,	the	three	doors	in	the	second	floor	lobby	close.	The	occupants	in	the	east	and	west	corridors	on	the	second	floor	would	most	likely	proceed	with	their	normal	evacuation	routes	and	try	and	
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enter	the	second	floor	lobby.	When	they	saw	the	smoke,	they	would	turn	around	and	exit	the	stairwells	on	either	side	of	the	building.	The	occupants	in	the	dead	end	hallway	where	the	LAFCo	offices	and	the	Grand	Jury	room	are	located,	would	open	the	door	to	the	second	floor	lobby	and	discover	the	smoke,	but	be	unable	to	turn	around	and	find	another	egress	route.	Those	occupants	would	have	to	travel	into	the	second	floor	lobby,	and	then	into	either	the	western	or	eastern	corridors.			At	a	maximum	occupancy	of	102	people,	it	would	take	them	between	266	and	446	seconds	to	completely	evacuate	into	either	the	west	or	east	corridor	where	conditions	would	be	tenable.	The	difference	would	be	based	upon	whether	the	pre-movement	time	was	60	seconds,	or	240	seconds	as	mentioned	in	Scenario	#2.	The	visibility	and	temperature	conditions	become	untenable	at	the	second	floor	lobby	within	87.6	and	96.0	seconds	respectively.	The	occupants	of	the	dead	end	hallway	could	not	reach	the	door	to	the	second	floor	lobby	by	that	time.	They	would	be	trapped	and	forced	to	retreat	and	wait	for	fire	department	personnel.																							
Figure	#81:	Lobby	Fire	-	Visibility	slice	file	at	Z=6.2	looking	down	from	above	(77.4	sec)	
Tenability	failure	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.	Black	indicates	visibility	threshold.	
Top	of	the	image	is	north	
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Figure	#82:	Lobby	Fire	-	Visibility	slice	file	at	Z=1.8	looking	down	from	above	(84.6	sec)	
Tenability	failure	at	the	south	of	BOS	Chambers.	Black	indicates	visibility	threshold.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
			
Figure	#83:	Lobby	Fire	-	Temperature	slice	file	at	Z=6.2	(84.6	sec)	
Tenability	failure	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.	Black	indicates	visibility	threshold.	
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Figure	#84:	Lobby	Fire	-	Temperature	slice	file	at	Z=1.8	(93.6	sec)	
Tenability	failure	at	the	south	BOS	Chambers.	Black	indicates	visibility	threshold.	
																		
Figure	#85:	Lobby	Fire	–	Smoke/Fire	looking	north	(27.0	sec)	
Approximate	fire	discovery	time	
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Figure	#86:	Lobby	Fire	–	Smoke/Fire	looking	south	inside	the	lobby	(30.0	sec)	
Approximate	fire	discovery	time	
																		
	
Figure	#87:	Lobby	Fire	–	Smoke/Fire	looking	north	(72.6sec)	
Activation	time	of	the	smoke	detector	
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Figure	#88:	Lobby	Fire	–	Smoke/Fire	looking	down	from	above	(72.6sec)	
Activation	time	of	the	smoke	detector	
																		
Figure	#89:	Lobby	Fire	–	Fire	only	looking	north	(79.2	sec)	
Activation	time	of	the	first	dry-pipe	sprinkler	
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Figure	#90:	Lobby	Fire	–	Activation	of	the	first	dry-pipe	sprinklers	looking	north.	(139.8	sec)	
																			
Figure	#91:	Lobby	Fire	–	Fire	only	looking	north	(90.6	sec).	Activation	time	of	the	first	wet-
pipe	sprinkler.	Fire	has	climbed	the	wall	and	spread	across	the	ceiling	
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Figure	#92:	Lobby	Fire	–	Activation	of	the	first	wet-pipe	sprinkler.	(91.8	sec)																					
Figure	#93:	Lobby	Fire	–	Activation	of	the	closest	wet-pipe	sprinklers	to	the	origin	(94.8	sec)	
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Figure	#94:	Lobby	Fire	–	Smoke	only	–	2nd	Floor	looking	south	from	dead	end	hallway	(27.0s)	
Visible	fire	detection	in	the	lobby	
												
Figure	#95:	Lobby	Fire	–	Smoke	only	–	2nd	Floor	looking	south	from	dead	end	hallway	(72.6s)	
Activation	of	the	smoke	detector	directly	above	this	location												
Figure	#96:	Lobby	Fire	–	Smoke	only	–	2nd	Floor	looking	south	from	dead	end	hallway	(87.6s)	
Visibility	tenability	failed	in	second	floor	lobby	(15	seconds	after	detection)	
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Figure	#97:	Lobby	Fire	–	Visibility	Slice	at	Z=1.8	looking	top	down	10	sec	before	the	people	
can	exit	out	the	front	doors	without	the	safety	factor	(62.4	sec)																	
	
Figure	#98:	Lobby	Fire	–	Smoke/Fire	looking	south	inside	the	lobby	10	sec	before	the	people	
can	exit	out	the	front	doors	without	the	safety	factor	(62.4	sec)				
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Figure	#99:	Lobby	Fire	–	Visibility	Slice	at	Z=1.8	looking	northwest	toward	the	east	exit	door	
from	the	BOS	Chambers.	Visibility	tenability	in	the	north	lobby	fails	(93.0	sec)	
(East	wall	of	the	north	lobby	invisible)		Due	to	the	fact	that	HRR,	fire	growth,	soot	yield,	and	CO	yield	values	were	estimated,	actual	results	may	be	slightly	different.	That	may	extend	the	ASET	value	slightly,	however	it	is	unlikely	that	there	will	be	more	time	available	for	egress	(ASET)	than	what	is	required	(RSET)	due	to	conditions	becoming	untenable	so	early	in	the	fire.			
	Below	is	a	graph	of	the	Total	HRR	v.	Time	for	the	Lobby	Fire	showing	a	peak	HRR	close	to	90,000kW	around	100	seconds	as	the	fire	spread	up	the	wooden	walls	of	the	lobby	and	across	the	wooden	ceiling.										
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Figure	#100:	Lobby	Fire	-	Total	HRR	v	Time	Graph			
ASET	v.	RSET		
	The	performance	based	analyses	were	conducted	to	determine	if	the	building’s	fire	protection	system	could	provide	the	occupants	enough	time	to	evacuate	to	safety	in	four	different	fire	scenarios.	The	original	RSET	values	were	calculated	for	the	departments	affected	by	the	fire	scenarios.	If	the	occupants	in	a	department	had	to	alter	their	evacuation	route,	a	modified	RSET	value	was	calculated.	The	fire	models	were	analyzed	and	the	ASET	values	were	determined	when	conditions	either	first	became	untenable,	or	when	all	the	occupants	had	exited	the	building;	whichever	came	first.	The	following	table	shows	the	RSET	values	compared	with	the	ASET	values.	Every	fire	scenario	that	was	designed	caused	conditions	to	become	untenable	before	people	could	evacuate	the	building.	In	some	situations,	conditions	became	untenable	several	minutes	before	evacuations	were	complete.			The	last	column	in	the	table	is	present	to	act	strictly	as	a	comparison	to	show	how	quickly	the	conditions	become	untenable.	The	data	shows	the	time	it	would	take	the	occupants	affected	to	evacuate	into	another	room/corridor/area	where	conditions	would	be	tenable	
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and	they	could	then	proceed	with	their	evacuation.	Escaping	into	another	room	with	tenable	conditions	does	not	signal	an	evacuation	or	that	ASET	is	complete.	These	values	did	not	include	the	safety	factor	of	1.5	that	the	RSET	values	did.	None	the	less,	there	was	only	one	scenario	where	the	occupants	of	a	department	were	able	to	get	out	of	the	building	before	conditions	became	untenable.			The	occupants	in	the	lobby	had	the	advantage	of	quick	discovery	and	pre-movement	times,	low	occupancy,	and	large	exit	discharge	capabilities.	As	the	occupants	would	have	to	exit	on	either	side	of	a	rapidly	growing	fire,	it	is	possible	that	some	of	the	occupants	in	that	department	would	have	retreated	and	found	another	exit.	
	
Table	#30:	ASET	v.	RSET	Comparison	
Scenario	 Location	 Original	
RSET	
Modified	
RSET	
ASET	 Pass/Fail	
Evacuate	to	
Tenable	
Conditions*	1	 Cafeteria	Fire	 243	sec	 N/A	 102.0	sec	 Fail	 126	sec	
Fail	2	 Second	Floor	North	Hallway	Fire	 543/813	sec	 N/A	 74.4	sec	 Fail	 262/442	sec	Fail	
3	 First	Floor	West	Corridor	Fire	
CSS	Dept.	 309	sec	 282	sec	 94.8	sec	 Fail	 137	sec	Fail	IGS	Dept.	 360	sec	 N/A	 118.2	sec	 Fail	 N/A	
4	 Lobby	Fire	 Lobby	 111	sec	 N/A	 84.6	sec	 Fail	
62	sec	
PASS	BOS	 206	sec	 480	sec	 93.0	sec	 Fail	 149	sec	
Fail	2nd	Floor	North	Hall	 543/813	sec	 N/A	 87.6	sec	 Fail	 266/446	sec	Fail	
*Without safety margin of 1.5 
	While	none	of	the	scenarios	had	an	ASET	value	that	surpassed	RSET	values,	these	are	representations	of	worst-case	scenarios.	Normal	day-to-day	operations	could	result	in	different	outcomes,	but	the	fire	protection	system	needs	to	be	judged	based	off	of	the	worst	that	could	happen.		These	results	are	indications	that	improvements	need	to	be	made.		
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Figure	#101:	ASET	&	RSET	breakdown	(SFPE	Handbook	4th	Ed.)	
	
	
Comments	&	Recommendations			The	prescriptive	and	performance-based	analyses	of	the	Rood	Center	identified	various	issues	that	might	affect	the	occupant’s	life	safety.	The	four	computer	fire	model	scenarios	discussed	above	show	that	even	with	an	automatic	sprinkler	system,	maximum	occupancy	loads	will	not	have	enough	time	to	evacuate	the	building	with	tenable	conditions	intact.		The	comments	and	recommendations	discussed	below	could	potentially	decrease	the	Required	Safe	Egress	Times	(RSET)	and	increase	the	Available	Safe	Egress	Times	(ASET),	allowing	occupants	more	time	to	escape.	Some	of	these	are	simple	fixes,	while	others	could	require	significant	alterations.			
Alarm	System		According	to	sections	from	the	California	Building	Code	and	the	Life	Safety	Code	(NFPA	101),	at	minimum,	a	manual	fire	alarm	system	is	required	in	the	Rood	Center.	The	fire	alarm	system	is	required	to	notify	occupants	in	the	building	to	the	existence	of	a	fire	both	
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audibly,	and	visually.	Because	audible	and	visible	notification	is	required,	the	installation,	location,	placement,	spacing,	inspection,	testing,	and	maintenance	of	the	notification	appliances	must	follow	the	requirements	put	forth	in	NFPA	72.				The	system	that	is	currently	in	place	in	the	Rood	Center	is	lacking	in	both	detection	and	notification	capabilities.	According	to	NFPA	72,	the	CBC,	and	the	LSC,	the	only	smoke	detector	required	in	building	would	need	to	be	in	the	same	room	as	the	Main	FACP;	the	rest	of	the	building	is	not	required	to	have	smoke	detectors.	While	the	code	is	vague,	it	is	interpreted	in	this	report	that	if	smoke	detectors	are	installed	in	the	building,	then	they	need	to	be	installed	in	accordance	with	NFPA	72	requirements.	If	that	is	the	case,	then	the	number	of	smoke	detectors	would	need	to	be	greatly	increased	throughout	the	building.			As	mentioned	above	in	the	prescriptive	based	alarm	section,	there	are	currently	16	smoke	detectors	on	the	first	floor,	and	23	on	the	second	floor.	Smoke	detectors	are	not	to	exceed	a	nominal	spacing	of	30	feet	from	one-another,	and	all	points	on	the	ceiling	shall	have	a	detector	within	21	feet.	Based	on	the	square	footage	of	each	floor,	and	each	detector	limited	to	no	more	than	a	900	ft2	coverage	area,	the	first	floor	would	require	a	minimum	of	56	smoke	detectors	and	the	second	floor	would	require	a	minimum	of	58	smoke	detectors.	An	analysis	would	need	to	be	done	for	each	floor	to	determine	if	that	number	of	smoke	detectors	would	satisfy	the	requirement	of	having	a	detector	within	21	feet	of	every	point	on	the	ceiling.			With	an	adequate	number	of	detectors,	the	detection	time	of	fires	would	greatly	decrease.	In	the	cafeteria	and	lobby	fires	(scenarios	#1	&	#4),	detection	took	107	seconds	and	73	seconds	respectively.	When	compared	with	the	other	two	scenarios,	detection	only	took	9	seconds	and	5	seconds.	That	additional	time	could	be	crucial	to	being	able	to	evacuate	everyone	safely	with	tenable	conditions.				An	analysis	of	the	building’s	notification	system	revealed	that	the	current	system	is	substantially	lacking.	A	quick	glance	through	the	list	of	notification	appliances	in	the	building	determined	that	there	were	appliances	still	in	use	that	are	not	compatible	with	the	Fire	Alarm	Control	Panel	(FACP).	The	appliances	that	are	compatible	with	the	panel	are	often	installed	in	odd	locations	in	the	building,	installed	at	the	wrong	heights,	and	are	not	in	enough	quantities	to	properly	notify	all	the	building’s	occupants.				When	an	alarm	system	technician	from	Gray	Electric	(who	was	conducting	the	semi-annual	test)	was	asked	if	they	ever	test/verify	the	audible	(dBA)	and	visible	(cd)	levels	from	the	notification	appliances,	he	stated	that	they	don’t.	He	explained	that	they	(Gray	Electric)	don’t	have	the	money,	the	equipment,	or	the	training	to	do	such	tests.	Further	questions	were	asked	regarding	whether	or	not	the	voltages	at	various	notification	appliances	are	tested,	and	again	the	response	was	that	they	don’t	do	those	types	of	tests.	He	stated	that	the	type	of	FACP	that	is	installed	can	tell	when	a	connected	device	isn’t	working,	and	will	send	out	a	trouble	alarm.	In	reality,	the	FACP	can	tell	when	there	is	a	connection	error	to	a	device,	but	it	can’t	tell	if	a	device	is	receiving	enough	power,	if	it	is	out	of	sync,	or	if	it	is	operating	appropriately.		
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	During	the	same	semi-annual	test	of	the	system,	the	testing	procedures	of	the	alarm	technician	were	witnessed	and	documented.	The	testing	methods	that	were	witnessed	were	not	up	to	the	requirements	set	forth	in	NFPA	72.	The	technician	began	the	test	with	a	can	of	smoke	and	a	~2-foot	metal	pipe	(~1/2”	diameter)	in	his	hand.	With	someone	ready	to	press	the	silence	button	on	the	Main	FACP,	the	technician	walked	through	to	the	planning	department	on	the	east	end	of	the	building.	The	technician	walked	underneath	the	detector	and	sprayed	the	can	of	smoke	up	through	the	metal	pipe	aimed	at	the	opening	in	the	detector.	The	technician	then	waited	to	see	if	the	detector	would	activate,	but	it	never	did.	He	tried	spraying	the	can	of	smoke	through	the	pipe	a	second	time,	and	still	no	activation.	Instead	of	trying	to	determine	why	the	detector	wasn’t	activating,	he	moved	on	to	try	a	pull	station.	After	activating	the	pull	station,	the	technician	proceeded	to	test	another	smoke	detector	in	the	same	manner	and	this	time	it	activated	immediately.	The	technician	continued	on	testing	pull	stations	and	detectors.			On	the	first	floor,	the	technician	tested	a	total	of	3	smoke	detectors	on	the	east	end	of	the	building	(only	1	activated),	and	3	pull	stations	(all	functioned	properly).	On	the	second	floor	the	technician	tested	only	1	smoke	detector	in	the	western	corridor	(no	activation),	then	2	pull	stations	near	the	entrances	to	each	stairwell	(all	functioned	properly.		After	the	test	was	completed,	the	technician	cleared	the	alarms	from	the	panel,	put	it	back	into	the	normal	operating	mode,	and	left	the	building.	It	is	possible,	but	the	technician	didn’t	appear	to	document	or	notify	anyone	of	the	three	smoke	detectors	that	didn’t	activate.	Overall	the	testing	methods	and	procedures	didn’t	follow	those	listed	in	NFPA	72.			In	NFPA	72	(2013),	section	14.2.3.6	lists	the	qualifications	and	experience	that	service	personnel	should	have.		
14.2.3.6*	Service	Personnel	Qualifications	and	Experience.	Service	personnel	shall	be	qualified	and	experienced	in	accordance	with	the	requirements	of	10.5.3.	
A.14.2.3.6	Service	personnel	should	be	able	to	do	the	following:	(1)	Understand	the	requirements	contained	in	NFPA	72,	National	Fire	Alarm	
and	Signaling	Code,	and	the	fire	alarm	requirements	contained	in	NFPA	70,	
National	Electrical	Code	(2)	Understand	basic	job	site	safety	laws	and	requirements		(3)	Apply	troubleshooting	techniques,	and	determine	the	cause	of	fire	alarm	system	trouble	conditions	(4)	Understand	equipment	specific	requirements,	such	as	programming,	application,	and	compatibility	(5)	Read	and	interpret	fire	alarm	system	design	documentation	and	manufacturer’s	inspection,	testing,	and	maintenance	guidelines	(6)	Properly	use	tools	and	test	equipment	required	for	testing	and	maintenance	of	fire	alarm	systems	and	their	components	(7)	Properly	apply	the	test	methods	required	by	NFPA	72,	National	Fire	
Alarm	and	Signaling	Code	
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	In	this	case,	it	is	highly	recommended	to	have	a	qualified	alarm	service	professional	do	a	thorough	and	proper	analysis	of	the	fire	alarm	system	and	all	of	the	components	connected	to	it	to	verify	any	potential	issues.	Once	that	analysis	is	complete,	and	those	issues	have	been	addressed,	then	the	location,	spacing,	and	placement	of	the	notification	appliances	and	detectors	should	be	reevaluated	and	compared	with	requirements	set	forth	in	NFPA	72.	Lastly,	the	notification	appliances	and	detectors	should	be	updated	to	required	standards.	If	Gray	Electric	cannot	inspect,	monitor,	maintain,	and	update	the	system	to	industry	standards,	then	another	company	who	can	should	be	contracted	to	do	the	work.	Sentinel	Fire	Equipment	Company	already	services	the	secondary	alarm	system	and	appears	familiar	with	industry	standards	and	requirements	as	they	have	met	all	of	them	with	regards	to	their	work	on	the	secondary	system.	It	is	unknown	if	they	would	be	able	to	handle	the	task	of	analyzing	the	entire	building,	or	would	want	to,	but	they	may	be	a	good	option	to	start	with.			While	the	fire	alarm	system	and	its	components	need	to	be	tested	and	updated,	and	the	inspection,	testing,	maintenance	and	record	keeping	procedures	need	to	be	revised,	the	Authority	Having	Jurisdiction	(Nevada	City	Fire	Department)	needs	to	get	involved	in	the	process	and	make	sure	everything	is	done	according	to	the	code	and	consequences	are	in	place	for	when	those	codes	are	not	met	and	followed.		A	fire	alarm	system	intended	for	life	safety	should	alert	the	building’s	occupants	and	notify	emergency	personnel	as	quickly	as	possible.	Without	a	properly	designed/tested	fire	alarm	system,	early	detection	of	a	fire	and	notification	of	the	occupants	would	be	hindered	and	would	not	be	guaranteed.	The	performance	based	analysis	has	shown	how	important	early	detection	is	for	getting	people	safely	out	of	the	building.			While	the	number	of	pull	stations	in	the	building	is	sufficient,	additional	pull	stations	in	public	areas	(or	better	labeling	of	the	current	locations),	especially	the	lobby,	could	also	help	decrease	detection	times.		
Suppression	System		Analysis	of	the	sprinkler	system	determined	that	it	met	the	prescriptive	requirements	set	forth	in	NFPA	13.	However,	as	the	fourth	fire	scenario	showed,	with	dry-pipe	sprinklers	protecting	the	front	portion	of	the	lobby,	the	inherent	delay	could	potentially	lead	to	large	and	catastrophic	fire	growth.	As	the	two	primary	exits	of	the	building	are	located	at	the	front	of	the	lobby,	maintaining	tenable	conditions	in	that	area	is	very	important.	If	the	dry-pipe	sprinklers	in	the	lobby	were	converted	to	a	wet-pipe	system,	it	could	provide	water	suppression	much	earlier	in	the	fire,	thereby	helping	to	control	the	fire	and	maintain	
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tenable	conditions	for	longer	periods	of	time.	Estimates	are	that	the	current	fire	pump	could	handle	the	load	of	the	additional	sprinklers.			Another	option	could	help	would	be	to	limit	the	types	of	events	and	furnishings	that	are	allowed	in	the	lobby.	If	an	event	is	allowed	to	take	place,	like	the	book	fair	for	example,	then	an	attendant	could	be	required	who	was	trained	on	how	to	use	fire	extinguishers	and	would	have	one	on	hand	at	all	times.	This	could	be	done	by	listing	these	items	as	potential	fire	hazards	and	requirements	in	the	building’s	Fire	Safety	Management	Plan	(Section	404.3.2	of	the	2013	California	Fire	Code).		
Structural	Fire	Protection		As	mentioned	above,	there	were	batts	of	insulation	installed	in	the	second	floor	attic	with	the	Kraft	paper	side	exposed.	To	remedy	this,	the	batts	of	insulation	could	simply	be	turned	over	so	the	fiberglass	insulation	side	was	exposed.	Or	it	could	be	protected	from	fire	by	covering	it	with	gypsum	wall	board	or	something	similar.				Another	issue	that	needs	to	be	addressed	is	the	paper	art	projects	and	quilts	hung	in	the	exit	corridors.	It	is	recommended	to	remove	the	flammable	interior	wall	decorations	from	the	exit	corridors	or	place	them	inside	some	sort	of	fire	resistant	display	case.			The	trash	and	recycle	containers	located	throughout	the	building’s	exit	corridors	are	convenient,	but	can	be	dangerous.	As	seen	in	scenario	#3,	a	majority	of	these	items	have	very	large	Heat	Release	Rate	(HRR)	values.	If	ignited,	these	items	would	block	the	main	exit	pathways.	In	some	instances,	people	in	the	departments	would	be	forced	to	enter	the	same	corridor	where	the	fire	was	in	order	to	exit.	This	would	expose	the	occupants	to	the	smoke,	toxic	gases,	and	heat	from	the	fire,	potentially	making	conditions	untenable.	With	enough	of	these	stacked	together,	the	fire	could	become	so	large	that	it	could	overwhelm	the	sprinklers	and	spread	throughout	the	interstitial	areas	above	the	ceilings.	A	simple	remedy	would	be	to	take	these	items	out	of	the	exit	corridors	and	place	them	in	locations	where	the	occupants	do	not	need	to	path	during	an	evacuation.	For	example,	one	large	trash	and	recycle	container	could	be	placed	in	each	department	in	the	building.	That	wouldn’t	change	the	fuel	load	dangers,	but	they	would	be	out	of	the	reach	of	the	public	(arson	concerns),	and	if	they	were	ignited,	people	could	escape	the	department	and	into	the	corridor	as	designed.							
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Egress	
	The	biggest	egress	issue	in	the	building	is	the	dead	end	hallway.	While	the	length	of	the	hallway	is	48	feet,	and	would	be	acceptable	for	a	Group	B	occupancy,	it	is	unclear	if	the	AHJ	approved	it	for	a	Mixed	Occupancy	building	or	what	their	reasoning	would	have	been.	Without	the	AHJ’s	approval,	Section	1018.4	of	the	CBC	states	that	the	hallway’s	length	would	be	limited	to	20	feet.			Whichever	length	is	appropriate,	the	fact	that	there	is	only	one	way	out	of	that	hallway,	yet	multiple	ways	for	occupants	to	be	trapped,	creates	an	issue	where	people	could	potentially	get	hurt	or	even	die.	In	the	second	and	fourth	scenario,	two	situations	were	presented	where	fires	could	trap	the	occupants	in	the	dead	end	hallway,	long	before	they	would	be	able	to	egress.			With	the	second	scenario,	a	copier,	a	small	desk,	and	a	chair	are	located	in	the	common	area	to	provide	easy	access	to	the	items	for	all	departments	in	the	hallway.	For	further	convenience,	small	and	large	recycle	containers	are	placed	on	either	side	of	the	copier	and	the	desk.	While	the	location	and	arrangement	of	these	items	may	be	convenient,	they	are	potentially	hazardous.	The	copier	and	the	power	cord	are	potential	ignition	sources,	while	the	recycle	containers	and	chair	are	large	sources	of	fuel.	In	the	fire	model,	the	recycle	containers	never	ignited,	but	if	they	did,	the	fire	might	have	been	able	to	break	through	the	drop	ceiling	and	gain	access	to	the	second	floor	attic.	Once	in	the	attic	the	fire	would	be	able	to	spread	across	exposed	insulation	and	lumber.			The	fourth	scenario	is	a	little	rarer	as	it	requires	an	event	to	be	occurring	in	the	lobby,	and	a	fire	to	be	set	intentionally.	While	the	book	fair	may	be	a	rare	event,	something	similar	could	also	happen	around	Christmas	time	with	a	large	tree	in	the	lobby.	The	tree	would	be	positioned	just	in	front	of	the	large	glass	wall	between	the	wooden	walls.	If	that	caught	fire	(intentionally	or	accidentally),	the	radiant	heat	could	ignite	the	wood	siding	on	the	walls	and	the	flames	could	spread	up	and	reach	the	ceiling.	With	dry-pipe	sprinklers	as	the	only	form	of	water	suppression,	the	delay	in	water	delivery	would	render	the	sprinklers	to	be	of	no	help	controlling	the	fire.	With	the	large	height	of	the	lobby,	smoke	production	levels	are	quite	high.	The	arrangement	of	the	lobby	and	the	second	floor	walkway	allow	the	smoke	to	travel	back	towards	the	entrance	to	the	dead	end	hallway.	When	the	smoke	hits	the	wall	just	outside	the	dead	end	hallway,	the	momentum	of	the	ceiling	jet	will	carry	that	smoke	to	the	floor	very	quickly.	In	the	fire	model,	there	were	~13	seconds	between	when	the	smoke	detector	indicated	there	was	smoke	just	outside	the	dead	end	hallway,	and	when	visibility	conditions	in	that	location	were	no	longer	tenable.			
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The	addition	of	more	smoke	detectors	in	the	lobby	would	decrease	the	detection	time	substantially,	and	if	a	fire	in	the	lobby	could	be	controlled,	either	by	an	attendant	with	a	fire	extinguisher,	or	by	wet-pipe	sprinklers	in	place	of	the	dry-pipe	system,	the	ASET	value	could	be	extended	for	the	occupants	of	the	dead	end	hallway.	While	not	a	permanent	solution,	one	option	that	would	help	the	people	in	the	dead	end	hallway	the	most	would	be	to	put	a	door	in	one	of	the	offices	or	conference	rooms.	That	could	allow	a	second	option	for	an	emergency	evacuation	route	for	the	occupants	to	escape	via	a	neighboring	department	in	case	they	get	trapped.			
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APPENDIX	B	
	Occupancy	Load	Spreadsheets													
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First	Floor	–	2013	CBC	
Space/Room	 Suite	 Type	of	Occupancy	 Area	 OLF	(sq.ft./person)	
Exact	
Occ	#	
Rounded	
Occ	#	
Social	Services	 120	 Business	 8,516	 100	 85.16	 85	
Child	Support	Services	 140	 Business	 3,765	 100	 37.65	 38	
Public	Works	 170	 Business	 2,609	 100	 26.09	 26	
Planning	 170	 Business	 2,892	 100	 28.92	 29	
Environmental	Health	 170	 Business	 2,445	 100	 24.45	 24	
Community	
Development	Agency	 170	 Business	 4,099	 100	 40.99	 41	
Building	 170	 Business	 2,214	 100	 22.14	 22	
Information	&	General	
Services	 130	 Business	 8,455	 100	 84.55	 85	
Sheriff's	Office	 --	 Business	 688	 100	 6.88	 7	
Lobby	Area	 --	 Business	 1,970	 100	 19.70	 20	
Main	Lobby	Seating	 --	 Business	 298	 100	 2.98	 3	
Side	Lobby	Seating	 --	 Business	 150	 100	 1.50	 2	
CDA	Seating	 170	 Business	 1,197	 100	 11.97	 12	
Mail	Room	 --	 Business	 510	 100	 5.10	 5	
Malakoff	Room	 145	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Unconcentrated	 285	 15	 19.00	 19	
Telegraph	Room	 148	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Unconcentrated	 231	 15	 15.40	 15	
Coyote	Room	 160	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Unconcentrated	 302	 15	 20.13	 20	
Reward	Room	 130A	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Unconcentrated	 332	 15	 22.13	 22	
Omega	Room	 170	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Unconcentrated	 207	 15	 13.80	 14	
BOS	Chambers	 100	 Assembly	(A-3)	-		Standing	Space	 70	 5	 14.00	 14	
	 	 Fixed	Seating	 121	 1	 121.00	 121	
Cafeteria	 150	 Assembly	(A-2)	-	Unconcentrated	 903	 15	 60.20	 60	
Janitors	Closet	(West)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 131	 300	 0.44	 1	
"Vault	Storage"	 140	 Storage	(S-1)	 96	 300	 0.32	 1	
"File	Storage"	(PW)	 170	 Storage	(S-1)	 184	 300	 0.61	 1	
"IS	Storage"	(East)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 109	 300	 0.36	 1	
"File	Storage"	(CDA)	 170	 Storage	(S-1)	 567	 300	 1.89	 2	
Unmarked	Storage	
(CDA)	 170	 Storage	(S-1)	 142	 300	 0.47	 1	
Secondary	Unmarked	
Storage	(CDA)	 170	 Storage	(S-1)	 94	 300	 0.31	 1	
"IS	Storage"	(Center)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 159	 300	 0.53	 1	
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Cafeteria	South	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 48	 300	 0.16	 1	
Cafeteria	North	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 94	 300	 0.31	 1	
Exterior	Storage	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 68	 300	 0.23	 1	
"Transformer	Room"	 --	 Utility	 92	 300	 0.31	 1	
Fire	Riser	Room	 --	 Utility	 95	 300	 0.32	 1	
"Integen	Fire	System	
for	IS"	 --	 Utility	 25	 300	 0.08	 0	
"Fire	Alarm"	Closet	 --	 Utility	 31	 300	 0.10	 0	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	DSS	 --	 Utility	 110	 300	 0.37	 2	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	West	 --	 Utility	 381	 300	 1.27	 2	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	
Center	 --	 Utility	 409	 300	 1.36	 2	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	East	 --	 Utility	 377	 300	 1.26	 2	
	     Total:	 706																
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First	Floor	–	2012	LSC	
Space/Room	 Suite	 Type	of	Occupancy	 Area	 OLF	(sq.ft./person)	
Exact	
Occ	#	
Rounded	
Occ	#	
Social	Services	 120	 Business	 8,516	 100	 85.16	 85	
Child	Support	Services	 140	 Business	 3,765	 100	 37.65	 38	
Public	Works	 170	 Business	 2,609	 100	 26.09	 26	
Planning	 170	 Business	 2,892	 100	 28.92	 29	
Environmental	Health	 170	 Business	 2,445	 100	 24.45	 24	
Community	Development	
Agency	 170	 Business	 4,099	 100	 40.99	 41	
Building	 170	 Business	 2,214	 100	 22.14	 22	
Information	&	General	
Services	 130	 Business	 8,455	 100	 84.55	 85	
Sheriff's	Office	 --	 Business	 688	 100	 6.88	 7	
Lobby	Area	 --	 Business	 1,970	 100	 19.70	 20	
Main	Lobby	Seating	 --	 Business	 298	 100	 2.98	 3	
Side	Lobby	Seating	 --	 Business	 150	 100	 1.50	 2	
CDA	Seating	 170	 Business	 1,197	 100	 11.97	 12	
Mail	Room	 --	 Business	 510	 100	 5.1	 5	
Malakoff	Room	 145	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Less	concentrated	 285	 15	 19.00	 19	
Telegraph	Room	 148	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Less	concentrated	 231	 15	 15.40	 15	
Coyote	Room	 160	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Less	concentrated	 302	 15	 20.13	 20	
Reward	Room	 130A	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Less	concentrated	 332	 15	 22.13	 22	
Omega	Room	 170	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Less	concentrated	 207	 15	 13.80	 14	
BOS	Chambers	 100	 Assembly	(A-3)	-	Concentrated	 70	 7	 10	 10	
	 	 Fixed	Seating	 121	 1	 121	 121	
Cafeteria	 150	 Assembly	(A-2)	-	Less	concentrated	 903	 15	 60.2	 60	
Janitors	Closet	(West)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 131	 500	 0.26	 1	
"Vault	Storage"	 140	 Storage	(S-1)	 96	 500	 0.19	 1	
"File	Storage"	(PW)	 170	 Storage	(S-1)	 184	 500	 0.37	 1	
"IS	Storage"	(East)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 109	 500	 0.22	 1	
"File	Storage"	(CDA)	 170	 Storage	(S-1)	 567	 500	 1.13	 1	
Unmarked	Storage	(CDA)	 170	 Storage	(S-1)	 142	 500	 0.28	 1	
Secondary	Unmarked	Storage	
(CDA)	 170	 Storage	(S-1)	 94	 500	 0.19	 1	
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  143
"IS	Storage"	(Center)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 159	 500	 0.32	 1	
Cafeteria	South	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 48	 500	 0.10	 1	
Cafeteria	North	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 94	 500	 0.19	 1	
Exterior	Storage	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 68	 500	 0.14	 1	
"Transformer	Room"	 --	 Industrial	 92	 100	 0.92	 1	
Fire	Riser	Room	 --	 Industrial	 95	 100	 0.95	 1	
"Integren	Fire	System	for	IS"	 --	 Industrial	 25	 100	 0.25	 0	
"Fire	Alarm"	Closet	 --	 Industrial	 31	 100	 0.31	 0	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	DSS	 --	 Industrial	 110	 100	 1.10	 2	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	West	 --	 Industrial	 381	 100	 3.81	 4	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	Center	 --	 Industrial	 409	 100	 4.09	 4	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	East	 --	 Industrial	 377	 100	 3.77	 4	
	 	 	   Total:	 707																	
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Second	Floor	–	2013	CBC	
Space/Room	 Suite	 Type	of	Occupancy	 Area	 OLF	(sq.ft./person)	
Exact	
Occ	#	
Rounded	
Occ	#	
Assessor	 290	 Business	 3,704	 100	 37.04	 37	
Auditor-Controller	 230	 Business	 2,603	 100	 26.03	 26	
Board	of	Supervisors	 200	 Business	 3,008	 100	 30.08	 30	
Clerk	Recorder	 210	 Business	 2,655	 100	 26.55	 27	
County	Executive	
Officer	 220	 Business	 3,369	 100	 33.69	 34	
County	Counsel	 240	 Business	 3,157	 100	 31.57	 32	
Human	Resources	 260	 Business	 2,157	 100	 21.57	 22	
LAFCo	 270	 Business	 653	 100	 6.53	 7	
Sheriffs	 280	 Business	 8,196	 100	 81.96	 82	
Tax	Collector	-	
Treasurer	 290	 Business	 2108	 100	 21.08	 21	
Office	of	Emergency	
Services	 --	 Business	 635	 100	 6.35	 6	
Elections	 250	 Business	 2,511	 100	 25.11	 25	
Gold	Hill	Room	 250A	 Assembly	(A-3)		-	Unconcentrated	 413	 15	 27.53	 28	
Northstar	Room	 240	 Assembly	(A-3)		-	Unconcentrated	 387	 15	 25.80	 26	
Providence	A	 270A	 Assembly	(A-3)		-	Unconcentrated	 355	 15	 23.67	 24	
Providence	B	 270B	 Assembly	(A-3)		-	Unconcentrated	 544	 15	 36.27	 36	
Mountaineer	Room	 290A	 Assembly	(A-3)		-	Unconcentrated	 382	 15	 25.47	 25	
Diamond	Creek	Room	 260A	 Assembly	(A-3)		-	Unconcentrated	 461	 15	 30.73	 31	
Empire	Room	 278	 Assembly	(A-3)		-	Unconcentrated	 963	 15	 64.20	 64	
Grand	Jury	 270	 Assembly	(A-3)		-	Unconcentrated	 523	 15	 34.87	 35	
Locker	Room/Rest	
Rooms	Sheriff	 280	 Locker	Rooms	 963	 50	 19.26	 19	
Storage	East	Hall	(Tax-
Treasury)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 28	 300	 0.09	 1	
Second	story	landing	
closet	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 49	 300	 0.16	 1	
Janitors	Closet	(West)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 136	 300	 0.45	 1	
Facilities	Maintenance	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 137	 300	 0.46	 1	
Elections	South	Storage	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 47	 300	 0.16	 1	
Admin	Storage	(OES)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 51	 300	 0.17	 1	
File	Storage	(Assessor)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 251	 300	 0.84	 1	
Storage	West	Hall	(HR)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 42	 300	 0.14	 1	
IS	Storage	(East)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 29	 300	 0.10	 1	
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Central	Closet/Roof	
Access	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 109	 300	 0.36	 1	
Electrical	Room	East	 --	 Utility	 70	 300	 0.23	 1	
Utility	Room	West	 --	 Utility	 71	 300	 0.24	 1	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	West	 --	 Utility	 365	 300	 1.22	 2	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	Center	 --	 Utility	 447	 300	 1.49	 2	
	     Total:	 651	
     
Grand	
Total:	 1,357																			
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Second	Floor	–	2012	LSC	
Space/Room	 Suite	 Type	of	Occupancy	 Area	
OLF	
(sq.ft./person
)	
Exact	
Occ	#	
Rounded	
Occ	#	
Assessor	 290	 Business	 3,704	 100	 37.04	 37	
Auditor-Controller	 230	 Business	 2,603	 100	 26.03	 26	
Board	of	Supervisors	 200	 Business	 3,008	 100	 30.08	 30	
Clerk	Recorder	 210	 Business	 2,655	 100	 26.55	 27	
County	Executive	Officer	 220	 Business	 3,369	 100	 33.69	 34	
County	Counsel	 240	 Business	 3,157	 100	 31.57	 32	
Human	Resources	 260	 Business	 2,157	 100	 21.57	 22	
LAFCo	 270	 Business	 653	 100	 6.53	 7	
Sheriffs	 280	 Business	 8,196	 100	 81.96	 82	
Tax	Collector	-	Treasurer	 290	 Business	 2,108	 100	 21.08	 21	
Office	of	Emergency	
Services	 --	 Business	 635	 100	 6.35	 6	
Elections	 250	 Business	 2,511	 100	 25.11	 25	
Gold	Hill	Room	 250A	 Assembly	(A-3)	Less	Concentrated	 413	 15	 27.53	 28	
Northstar	Room	 240	 Assembly	(A-3)	Less	Concentrated	 387	 15	 25.80	 26	
Providence	A	 270A	 Assembly	(A-3)	Less	Concentrated	 355	 15	 23.67	 24	
Providence	B	 270B	 Assembly	(A-3)	Less	Concentrated	 544	 15	 36.27	 36	
Mountaineer	Room	 290A	 Assembly	(A-3)	Less	Concentrated	 382	 15	 25.47	 25	
Diamond	Creek	Room	 260A	 Assembly	(A-3)	Less	Concentrated	 461	 15	 30.73	 31	
Empire	Room	 278	 Assembly	(A-3)	Less	Concentrated	 963	 15	 64.20	 64	
Grand	Jury	 270	 Assembly	(A-3)	Less	Concentrated	 523	 15	 34.87	 35	
Locker	Room/Rest	Rooms	
Sheriff	 280	 Locker	Rooms	 963	 50	 19.26	 19	
Storage	East	Hall	(Tax-
Treasury)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 28	 500	 0.06	 1	
Second	story	landing	
closet	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 49	 500	 0.10	 1	
Janitors	Closet	(West)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 136	 500	 0.27	 1	
Facilities	Maintenance	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 137	 500	 0.27	 1	
Elections	South	Storage	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 47	 500	 0.09	 1	
Admin	Storage	(OES)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 51	 500	 0.10	 1	
File	Storage	(Assessor)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 251	 500	 0.50	 1	
Storage	West	Hall	(HR)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 42	 500	 0.08	 1	
IS	Storage	(East)	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 29	 500	 0.06	 1	
Central	Closet/Roof	Access	 --	 Storage	(S-1)	 109	 500	 0.22	 1	
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Electrical	Room	East	 --	 Industrial	 70	 100	 0.70	 1	
Utility	Room	West	 --	 Industrial	 71	 100	 0.71	 1	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	West	 --	 Industrial	 365	 100	 3.65	 4	
Rest	Rooms	(x2)	Center	 --	 Industrial	 447	 100	 4.47	 5	
	  	   Total:	 656	
     
Grand	
Total:	 1,363																														
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APPENDIX	C		 Department	Movement	Time	Calculations																				
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	These	calculations	are	done	by	hand,	and	will	be	completed	for	each	space	in	the	building.	Occupant	load	numbers	can	vary	for	a	space	depending	if	the	CBC	or	the	LSC	are	used.	Therefore,	whichever	number	is	higher	will	be	used	to	aid	in	a	more	conservative	analysis.	These	values	are	only	representative	of	the	movement	times	from	each	department.	As	only	one	department’s	egress	at	a	time	is	calculated,	actual	movement	times	would	be	longer	due	to	multiple	departments	evacuating	through	the	same	pathways.		
	
First	Floor	Spaces	
	
Main	Lobby:	
	The	Main	Lobby	discharges	through	two	exits	with	glass	double-doors	to	the	exterior	of	the	building.	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	lobby	is	25	people.	Since	everyone	is	in	visual	distance	of	the	glass	front	doors	and	could	be	spread	out	throughout	the	lobby,	the	limiting	factors	of	egress	would	be	people	reaching	the	front	doors.			Assuming	people	are	spread	throughout	the	lobby	and	will	need	to	reach	the	front	doors,	the	longest	distance	of	travel	one	would	need	to	take	would	be	~105	feet.	From	Table	3-13.4	from	the	SFPE	Handbook	(4th	Edition),	the	maximum	unimpeded	exit	speed	across	a	flat	surface	is	235	feet/minute.	At	that	rate,	it	would	take	someone:		 (105	feet)	/	(235	ft./min)	=	~27	seconds		The	interior	width	of	the	doors	is	72	inches.	The	effective	width	=	72”-12”	=	60”	or	5’.	From	Table	3-13.5	in	the	SFPE	Handbook	(4th	Edition),	the	maximum	specific	flow	(FSM)	through	a	doorway	is	24.0	people/min/foot	of	effective	width.			 FSM	=	(24	people/min/foot	e.w.)	X	(5	feet	e.w.)	=	120	people/minute	PER	EXIT		Since	there	are	two	exits,	that	means:	
The	FSM	of	the	whole	lobby	is	240	people/minute		That	means	that	it	would	take	25	people,	at	a	rate	of	240	people/minute	a	total	of		
~7	seconds	to	exit	the	building.	
	
Total	egress	time	from	the	lobby:	
27	+	7	=	34	seconds.		
BOS	Chambers:	
	The	BOS	Chambers	discharges	through	two	exits	at	the	south	and	east	sides	of	the	room	with	double-doors	that	feed	into	the	lobby.	The	doorways	are	each	72”-wide	leaving	an	effective	width	of	60”	per	exit.			
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The	layout	of	the	seating	in	the	chambers	is	107	fixed	seats	in	rows.	Each	row	has	an	aisle	down	the	middle	dividing	each	row	into	two	sections.	There	are	5	rows	divided	in	half,	which	equals	10	sections.	There	is	18	inches	in-between	the	seat	backs	and	the	front	of	the	seats	behind.	It	is	assumed	that	the	occupants	in	each	section	will	divide	evenly	with	half	going	to	the	exterior	exit,	and	the	other	half	going	to	the	interior	aisle	exit.	With	that	assumption,	the	furthest	someone	would	have	to	travel	to	the	section	would	be	~15	feet.			In	front	of	these	fixed	seats	are	4	more	seats	(desk	chairs)	at	desks.	These	occupants	exit	down	either	side	of	the	fixed	seats.			At	the	front	of	the	room	are	10	more	seats	(desk	chairs)	for	the	supervisors.		They	will	get	out	of	their	chairs	and	travel	behind	the	other	chairs	along	the	exterior	of	the	room	till	they	reach	the	exit	doorways.			For	the	people	in	the	fixed	seats,	the	farthest	someone	would	theoretically	have	to	travel	is	52	feet	to	reach	the	nearest	double-door	exit.	At	235	feet/min	that	equals:	(52	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds	
	For	the	people	in	the	two	desks,	they’ll	need	to	walk	54	feet	to	reach	the	exits.	That	works	out	to:	 (54	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	14	seconds		For	the	supervisors,	if	they	choose	the	two	main	exits	at	the	front	of	the	building,	they	would	need	to	travel	~52	feet	to	reach	the	exits.		(52	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds		There	are	also	people	standing	at	the	back	of	the	room,	they’ll	travel	approximately	27	feet	to	the	exits	which	will	take:	(27	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	7	seconds		As	calculated	in	the	previous	section,	two	sets	of	72”-wide	double-doors	have	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	240	people/minute.	At	a	maximum	capacity	of	135	people,	that	would	take:	(135	people)	/	(240	people/min)	=	34	seconds	to	completely	evacuate	the	BOS	Chambers.		Since	it	takes	people	a	minimum	of	7	seconds	and	a	maximum	of	14	seconds	(assuming	nobody	else	blocks	their	direct	path)	to	reach	the	exits,	and	34	seconds	for	everyone	to	exit	through	the	doorways,	any	queue	that	may	form	at	either	exit	that	would	clear	rather	quickly.				Once	outside	the	BOS	chambers,	the	occupants	would	need	to	travel	to	the	discharge	exits	at	the	front	of	the	building.	The	distance	from	the	south	BOS	Chambers	exit	to	the	west	discharge	exit	is	16	feet.	The	distance	from	the	east	BOS	Chambers	exit	to	the	east	discharge	exit	is	54	feet.		 (16	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	4	seconds	(54	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	14	seconds		
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As	these	doors	have	a	discharge	capacity	of	120	people/minute	each,	and	people	have	to	travel	to	them	after	exiting	through	exits	of	the	same	capacity,	no	queue	is	expected	to	form.		Since	half	of	the	people	will	be	going	to	each	exit,	the	people	exiting	out	of	the	southern	BOS	chambers	exit	and	then	out	of	the	western	discharge	exit	would	have	a	maximum	egress	time	of:			14	seconds	to	reach	the	BOS	exit,	34	seconds	to	clear	the	BOS	Chambers,	4	seconds	to	reach	the	discharge	exits	at	the	front	of	the	building	and	pass	through:		
14	+	34	+	4	=	52	seconds	
	The	other	half	of	the	occupants	would	be	exiting	out	of	the	eastern	BOS	chambers	exit	and	then	out	of	the	eastern	discharge	exit.	The	maximum	egress	time	would	be:			 14	seconds	to	reach	the	BOS	exit,	34	seconds	to	clear	the	BOS	Chambers,	14	seconds	to	reach	the	discharge	exits	at	the	front	of	the	building	and	pass	through:		
14	+	34	+	14	=	62	seconds			
Cafeteria:	
	The	occupants	in	the	cafeteria	would	exit	through	a	single	36”-wide	doorway	at	the	southeast	corner	of	the	cafeteria	into	the	lobby,	and	then	out	of	the	western	discharge	exit	made	up	of	double	glass	doors	72”-wide.	Another	36”-wide	doorway	is	located	at	the	northeast	corner	of	the	cafeteria	leads	to	a	hallway	and	then	into	the	western	corridor,	but	it	is	NOT	marked	as	an	exit.	Unless	a	staff	member	attempts	to	go	back	to	their	offices	to	grab	personal	effects,	it	is	not	likely	that	anyone	would	use	this	hallway	as	a	primary	exit	as	the	travel	distance	is	almost	three	times	as	long.			The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	cafeteria	is	60	people.	The	effective	width	of	the	exit	doorway	is:		 36”	–	12”	=	24”	or	2’.		 (24.0	people/min/foot	of	effective	width)	X	(2	feet	of	effective	width)	=	48	people/min		The	people	would	have	to	travel	43	feet	to	the	exit	into	the	lobby.	At	a	rate	of	235	feet/min,	that	would	take:	 (43	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	11	seconds		The	60	people	in	the	cafeteria	could	exit	through	that	doorway	in:	(60	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	75	seconds		
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The	people	would	then	have	to	travel	25	feet	to	the	main	discharge	exit	which	is	a	double-door.	At	a	rate	of	235	feet/min,	that	would	take:	(25	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	6	seconds		The	two	36”-wide	doorways	can	discharge	120	people/minute.	For	everyone	to	pass	through	the	exit,	that	would	take:	(60	people)	/	(120	people/min)	=	30	seconds		Total	egress	time	from	the	cafeteria	would	take:		
11	+	75	+	6	+	30	=	122	seconds		
Waiting	area	(CDA):	
	The	maximum	occupancy	for	the	waiting	area	is	12	people.	There	are	two	exits	from	this	space,	the	eastern	stairwell	and	the	main	lobby.	As	the	occupants	of	this	space	would	be	the	general	public,	they	would	be	most	likely	try	to	exit	out	of	the	front	of	the	building	even	though	the	eastern	stairwell	is	closer.	Assuming	the	occupants	exit	through	the	front	of	the	building,	the	longest	travel	distance	to	the	double-door	(72”-wide)	exit	at	the	front	of	the	waiting	area	would	be	70	feet.	That	would	take:		 (70	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	18	seconds		Like	the	main	exit	discharge	rates	calculated	above,	the	maximum	specific	flow	through	these	doors	is	120	people/min.	For	all	12	people	to	pass	through	the	doors,	that	would	take:	 (12	people)	/	(120	people/min)	=	~6	seconds		Once	in	the	lobby,	people	would	have	to	travel	the	105	feet	to	the	front	exit	doors.	Like	calculated	above,	that	would	take	27	seconds.			Total	egress	time	from	the	CDA	Waiting	Area	would	take:		
18	seconds	+	6	seconds	+	27	seconds	=	51	seconds			
Public	Works:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	for	the	public	works	department	is	26	people.	Adding	in	the	occupancy	for	the	Coyote	Room,	that	makes	46	people.	Considering	that	most	of	the	people	work	in	the	building	and	are	familiar	with	exit	procedures,	The	the	most	likely	exit	would	be	the	main	lobby.	That	would	take	the	occupants	through	two	36”-wide	doorways	out	of	public	works	and	into	the	waiting	area	(previously	mentioned).	The	maximum	distance	someone	would	have	to	travel	to	reach	the	exit	doorways	out	of	public	works	would	be	70	feet.	That	would	take:	 (70	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	18	seconds	
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The	two	36”-wide	doorways	can	discharge	96	people/minute.	To	clear	the	department,	that	would	take:	 (46	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	~29	seconds	
	At	that	point,	people	would	be	in	the	same	location	as	the	people	calculated	in	the	previous	example.	It	would	take	the	occupants	18	seconds	to	reach	the	double	doors.	Then	the	46	people	could	exit	through	the	double	doors	in:	(46	people)	/	(120	people/min)	=	23	seconds	It	would	then	take	an	additional	27	seconds	to	reach	and	pass	through	the	front	exits.	So	in	total	the	egress	time	would	be:		
18	+	29	+	18	+	23	+	27	=	115	seconds		
Planning:	
	The	planning	department	has	a	maximum	occupancy	of	29	people.	Their	most	likely	path	of	exit	would	be	through	a	36”	door	leading	to	the	8-foot	wide,	36-foot	long	eastern	corridor.	At	the	end	of	the	corridor,	they’d	have	to	pass	through	another	36”-wide	door,	before	traveling	another	7	feet	in	the	base	of	the	stairwell,	then	exiting	through	the	36”-wide	discharge	door.	The	longest	path	of	travel	to	reach	the	entrance	of	the	corridor	would	be	114	feet.	Both	36”	doors	have	an	FSM	of	48	people/min.		Therefore,	the	calculations	would	be	as	follows:	(114	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	29	seconds	to	reach	the	corridor	entrance		(29	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	36	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	corridor		(36	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	9	seconds	to	travel	through	the	corridor	to	the	stairwell	entrance	(29	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	36	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	stairwell		(7	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	2	seconds	to	reach	the	discharge	door		(29	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	36	seconds	to	pass	through	the	discharge	door		So	in	total	the	egress	time	for	the	planning	department	would	be:		
29	+	36	+	9	+	36	+	2	+	36	=	148	seconds		
Environmental	Health:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	Environmental	Health	offices	is	24	people.	Add	that	to	the	occupancy	of	the	Omega	Room	and	that	is	a	total	of	38	people.	The	shortest	path	of	travel	for	them	would	be	to	exit	through	either	the	break	room	or	Omega	conference	room	(which	are	side	by	side)	and	then	into	the	eastern	corridor	and	out	of	the	stairwell.	All	of	the	doors	are	36”	wide.	The	length	they’d	have	to	travel	to	reach	the	break	room/Omega	room	is	60	feet.	Then	another	12	feet	to	pass	through	those	rooms.	Then	19	feet	through	the	corridor	and	into	the	stairwell.	The	calculations	would	be:	
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		 For	those	people	already	in	the	Omega	room:		(12	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	3	seconds	to	reach	the	door	into	the	corridor		(14	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	18	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	corridor			(19	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	5	seconds	to	reach	the	stairwell	exit	door		(14	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	18	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	stairwell		(7	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	2	seconds	to	reach	the	discharge	door		(14	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	18	seconds	to	pass	through	the	discharge	door				For	Environmental	Health	employees	who	aren’t	in	the	Omega	room:		(60	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	15	seconds	to	reach	the	break	room/Omega	room	entrances	(24	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	30	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	room		**At	this	point,	the	occupants	from	the	Omega	room	are	already	in	the	stairwell	and	not	creating	additional	queuing	for	EH	employees.	Therefore,	the	following	calculations	assume	only	EH	employees	and	no	additional	delays.			 (12	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	3	seconds	to	reach	the	door	into	the	corridor		(24	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	30	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	corridor			(19	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	5	seconds	to	reach	the	stairwell	exit	door		(24	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	30	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	stairwell		(7	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	2	seconds	to	reach	the	discharge	door		(24	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	30	seconds	to	pass	through	the	discharge	door			 So	in	total,	the	longest	egress	time	for	the	Environmental	Health	department	would	be:		
15	+	30	+	3	+	30	+	5	+	30	+	2	+	30	=	145	seconds		
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Community	Development	Agency:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	for	the	CDA	is	41	people.	There	are	two	exits	which	could	be	equally	beneficial.	One	option	would	be	to	enter	the	eastern	corridor	and	exit	through	the	stairwell.	The	other	option	would	be	to	travel	through	the	building	department,	out	into	the	north	end	of	the	main	lobby,	and	out	through	the	front	doors.	For	these	calculations,	it	is	assumed	that	half	the	population	exits	using	the	stairwell	and	the	other	half	uses	the	doors	in	the	main	lobby.			Eastern	Stairwell:		 (99	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	25	seconds	to	reach	the	corridor	entrance		(20.5	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	26	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	corridor		(36	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	9	seconds	to	reach	the	stairwell	entrance		(20.5people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	26	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	stairwell		(7	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	2	seconds	to	reach	the	discharge	door		(20.5	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	26	seconds	to	pass	through	the	discharge	door		The	egress	time	for	half	of	the	planning	department	occupancy	through	the	eastern	stairwell	would	be:	
25	+	26	+	9	+	26	+	2	+	26	=	114	seconds	
	Main	Doors:		 (101	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	26	seconds	to	reach	the	door	into	the	main	lobby		(20.5	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	26	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	lobby		(105	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	27	seconds	to	reach	the	front	doors		(20.5	people)	/	(240	people/min)	=	5	seconds	to	pass	through	the	front	doors		The	egress	time	for	half	of	the	planning	department	occupancy	through	the	lobby	would	be:	
26	+	26	+	27	+	5	=	84	seconds		
Building:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	building	department	is	22	people.	The	primary	exit	path	would	be	out	the	single	36”-wide	door	at	the	west	end	of	their	department	into	the	main	lobby	and	out	of	the	front	doors.	The	calculation	for	their	egress	time	is	as	follows:	(77	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	20	seconds	to	reach	the	door	into	the	main	lobby		
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(22	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	27.5	seconds	to	pass	through	the	door	into	the	lobby		(105	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	27	seconds	to	reach	the	front	doors		(22	people)	/	(240	people/min)	=	5.5	seconds	to	pass	through	the	front	doors		
20	+	27.5	+	27	+	5.5	=	80	seconds		
Child	Support	Services:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	CSS	is	38	people.	The	CSS	department	has	two	exits	at	the	south	end	of	the	department	which	open	into	the	eastern	end	of	the	western	corridor.	After	seeing	their	fire	drill	plan,	the	primary	exit	path	is	to	exit	into	the	western	corridor,	travel	west	till	they	reach	the	entrance	to	the	northern	corridor,	then	exit	through	the	discharge	door	at	the	end	of	the	north	corridor.	The	calculation	would	be	as	follows:		Time	to	reach	the	exit	doors	at	the	south	end	of	the	department:	(91.5	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	23	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	two	36”-wide	doors:	(38	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	24	seconds		Time	to	reach	the	door	to	the	north	corridor:	(40	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	11	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door	into	the	corridor:	(38	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	48	seconds		Time	to	travel	through	the	north	corridor	and	reach	the	discharge	door:	(66	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	17	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	discharge	door:	(38	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	48	seconds	
	
23	+	24	+	11	+	48	+	17	+	48	=	171	seconds	
	If	a	secondary	exit	path	is	required	(as	in	Scenario	#3	in	the	performance	based	analysis),	the	occupants	would	exit	south	out	of	the	department	into	the	western	corridor,	then	east	into	the	CDA	waiting	area,	then	out	through	the	lobby.	The	secondary	path	calculation	would	be	as	follows:		Time	to	reach	the	exit	doors	at	the	south	end	of	the	department:	(91.5	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	23	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	two	36”-wide	doors:	(38	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	24	seconds	
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	Time	to	reach	the	east	door	to	the	CDA	waiting	area:	(24	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	6	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door	into	the	waiting	area:	(38	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	48	seconds		Time	to	reach	the	double	doors	at	the	south	end	of	the	CDA	waiting	area:		(20	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	5	seconds		Like	the	main	exit	discharge	rates	calculated	above,	the	maximum	specific	flow	through	these	double	doors	is	120	people/min.		(38	people)	/	(120	people/min)	=	19	seconds		Once	in	the	lobby,	people	would	have	to	travel	the	105	feet	to	the	front	exit	doors.	Like	calculated	above,	that	would	take	27	seconds.			Total	secondary	egress	time	from	the	CSS	would	take:		
23	+	24	+6	+	48	+	5	+	19	+	27	=	152	seconds	
	
	In	reality,	this	secondary	path	would	also	be	shared	with	people	exiting	the	CDA	waiting	area,	Public	Works,	the	Building	Department,	and	possibly	the	BOS	Chambers	thereby	increasing	the	egress	time.	The	primary	path	is	shared	with	significantly	less	people	and	uses	an	exit	primarily	accessed	by	staff	only.	
	
Social	Services:	
	The	department	of	Social	Services	is	quite	wide	and	is	pretty	even	between	three	exits	therefore,	it	is	assumed	that	the	people	will	split	evenly	to	the	three	exits.	The	maximum	occupancy	is	85	people.	One	exit	is	out	through	the	DSS	Lobby	to	the	exterior	door	on	the	west	side	of	the	building.	The	other	is	out	through	the	door	into	the	western	corridor,	then	traveling	east	to	the	north	corridor	and	out	of	the	north	side	of	the	building.	The	third	is	out	through	a	second	door	into	the	western	corridor,	then	travel	west	to	the	stairwell	and	exit	out	from	the	stairwell.	The	three	calculations	are	as	follows:		Western	Corridor	to	North	Corridor:		Time	to	reach	the	exit	door:	(64	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	16	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door:	(28	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	35	seconds		Time	to	reach	the	door	to	the	north	corridor:	
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(33	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	~9	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door	into	the	corridor:	(28	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	35	seconds		Time	to	travel	through	the	north	corridor	and	reach	the	discharge	door:	(66	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	17	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	discharge	door:	(28	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	35	seconds		
19	+	35	+	9	+	35	+	17	+	35	=	147	seconds	
	Out	through	the	DSS	Lobby:		Time	to	reach	the	exit	door	into	the	DSS	lobby:	(60	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	15	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door:	(28	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	35	seconds		Time	to	reach	the	doors	to	the	discharge	door:	(29	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	~8	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	discharge	door:	(28	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	35	seconds		
15	+	35	+	8	+	35	=	93	seconds		Western	corridor	to	the	western	stairwell:		Time	to	reach	the	exit	door	into	the	west	corridor:	(36	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	9	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door:	(28	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	35	seconds		Time	to	reach	the	stairwell	door:	(56	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	14	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door	into	the	stairwell:	(28	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	35	seconds	
	Time	to	reach	the	stairwell	discharge	door:	(7	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	2	seconds	
	
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  159
Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	discharge	door:	(28	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	35	seconds		
9	+	35	+	14	+	35	+	2	+	35	=	130	seconds	
	
	
Information	&	General	Services:	
	Information	and	General	Services	has	a	maximum	occupancy	of	85	people.	With	the	Reward	room	that	makes	107	people.		There	are	three	main	exits	(36”-wide	doorways)	from	the	department	into	the	western	corridor,	and	a	fourth	from	the	Reward	room.	From	there	people	would	travel	west	into	the	stairwell	and	out	through	the	discharge	door.	The	calculation	is	as	follows:		Time	to	reach	the	exit	door	into	the	western	corridor:	(91	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	23	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	four	36”-wide	doors:	(107	people)	/	(192	people/min)	=	33	seconds		Time	to	reach	the	stairwell	door:	(47	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	12	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door	into	the	stairwell:	(107	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	134	seconds	
	Time	to	reach	the	stairwell	discharge	door:	(7	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	2	seconds	
	As	the	discharge	door	is	the	same	size	as	the	previous	door,	a	queue	would	not	be	expected	to	form:	
	
23	+	33	+	12	+	134	+	2	=	204	seconds		
Sheriff’s	Office:	
	The	Sheriff’s	offices	on	the	first	floor	have	a	maximum	occupancy	of	7	people.	There	is	one	exit	from	the	office	space	(36”-wide	door)	which	leads	into	the	western	corridor,	then	northeast	towards	the	northern	corridor,	and	then	out	through	the	north	side	of	the	building.	The	time	for	evacuation	is:		Time	to	reach	the	exit	door	into	the	west	corridor:	(29	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	8	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door:	(7	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	9	seconds	
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	Time	to	reach	the	door	to	the	northern	corridor:	(29	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	8	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door:	(7	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	9	seconds		Time	to	travel	through	the	north	corridor	and	reach	the	discharge	door:	(66	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	17	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	discharge	door:	(7	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	9	seconds		
8	+	9	+	8	+	9	+	17	+	9	=	60	seconds		
Mail	Room	&	Adjacent	Rooms	in	the	Northern	Corridor:	
	These	three	rooms	have	a	total	occupancy	of	39	people.	Their	path	of	exit	would	be	to	enter	the	northern	corridor	then	exit	through	the	north	side	of	the	building.	The	calculation	is	as	follows	assuming	the	longest	path	of	travel:	Time	to	reach	the	door	to	the	northern	corridor:	(24	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	6	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	three	36”-wide	doors:	(39	people)	/	(144	people/min)	=	16	seconds		Time	to	travel	through	the	north	corridor	and	reach	the	discharge	door:	(66	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	17	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	discharge	door:	(39	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	49	seconds		
6	+	16	+	17	+	49	=	88	seconds														
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Second	Floor	Spaces	
	There	are	only	three	exits	from	the	second	floor,	and	only	two	different	types	of	exits	(as	both	the	East	and	West	stairwell	exits	are	identical).	Therefore,	the	time	it	takes	to	go	down	the	stairs	and	reach	the	exit	door	will	be	calculated	for	each	type	of	stairwell,	then	that	value	will	be	used	in	each	occupancy’s	egress	time	calculation.			
For	the	East	or	West	exit	stairwells:		This	stairway	has	a	36”-wide	door	at	the	top	and	the	bottom	of	the	stairs.	The	stairway	is	42”-wide	and	12’	tall.			Doorways:	The	doorways	are	36	inches	wide	which	gives	an	effective	width	of:		 	 	 	 36	inches	–	12	inches	=	24	inches	(2	feet)		The	Maximum	Specific	Flow	through	each	doorway	is:		 	 	 	 FSM	=	(2	feet)	x	(24.0	persons/min/feet)		
	 	 	 	 FSM	=	48	persons/min	Stairway:	The	stairways	are	42	inches	wide	which	gives	an	effective	width	of:		 	 	 	 42	inches	–	12	inches	=	30	inches	(2.5	feet)		The	Maximum	Specific	Flow	through	each	stairway	is:		 	 	 	 FSM	=	(2.5	feet)	x	(18.5	persons/min/feet)			 	 	 	 FSM	=	46	persons/min		The	portion	of	the	egress	system	that	would	limit	the	evacuation	time	would	be	the	stairway.	The	stairway	could	allow	a	maximum	of	46	people/min	to	pass	through	the	stairway	system	and	exit.	So	to	find	out	how	quickly	people	can	exit,	their	speed	down	the	stairways	needs	to	be	calculated.	That	value	is	represented	by	the	formula:		 S	=	k	–	akD	S	=	Speed	along	the	line	of	travel	
D	=	Population	density	(persons/ft2)	*Assuming	a	value	of	D=0.175	for	ideal	flow,	from	Figure	3-13.8	from	
the	SFPE	Handbook	(4th	Edition)	
a	=	Constant	=	2.86	feet/minute	k	=	Constant	as	shown	in	Table	3-13.2	for	“7/11”	stairs	=	212		 Speed	on	the	stairs	=	(212)	–	[(2.86)	x	(212)	x	(0.175)]	
Speed	on	the	stairs	=	106	feet/minute	
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Table	3-13.3	from	the	SFPE	Handbook	(4th	Edition)	shows	conversion	factors	for	relating	line	of	travel	distance	to	vertical	travel	for	various	stair	configurations.	For	a	“7/11”	stair,	
the	conversion	factor=1.85.		 *Using	a	stairway	height	of	12	feet	from	floor-to-floor*	
Distance	traveled	=	12	feet	x	1.85	=	22.2	feet	on	the	stairs		
Distance	traveled	on	the	landings	=	4	feet	x	3	landings	=	12	feet	total		
*(over	estimation)	
	
The	distance	traveled	at	the	base	of	the	stairs	to	the	doorway	=	10.5	feet	
*I’m	assuming	this	distance	will	be	traversed	at	the	stairway	speed	of	106	ft.	/min	rather	than	
the	235	ft.	/min	on	flat	ground	because	of	a	hand-rail	that	protrudes	out	beyond	the	stairs.	
	
The	total	distance	traveled	from	floor-to-floor	on	the	stairs	is:	
22.2	feet	+	12	feet	+10.5	feet	=	44.7	feet	
	At	a	speed	of	106	feet/minute,	and	a	distance	of	44.7	feet,	it	would	take:	
Time	to	travel	floor-to-floor	=	(44.7	feet)	/	(106	feet/minute)	=	~25	seconds	
For	the	Main	Stairwell	and	exit	through	the	Lobby:		For	this	stairway,	there	is	no	door	hindering	entrance	onto	the	stairwell.	The	stairway	is	in	two	main	sections	with	a	landing	in	between.	The	centerline	of	travel	on	the	landing	is	10.5	feet.	The	top	set	of	stairs	are	67”-wide	(effective	width	of	55”),	then	below	the	landing	the	stairs	are	only	60”-wide	(48”	e.w.),	then	widen	to	72”-wide	(60”	e.w.),	then	widen	even	further	but	have	a	handrail	down	the	center.	The	handrail	in	the	center	essentially	creates	a	pinch	point	on	the	stairs	and	the	clearance	from	it	to	the	edge	of	the	stairs	is	only	35”	(23”	e.w.).	Since	that	creates	two	stairwells,	the	total	effective	width	would	be	46”,	which	is	still	the	narrowest	point	on	the	stairs.	Once	at	the	bottom	of	the	stairs,	one	would	need	to	travel	approximately	31	feet	to	reach	one	of	the	two	exits	(glass	double-doors)	that	are	72”-wide	(60”	e.w.)		Doorways:	The	doorways	at	the	base	are	72	inches	wide	which	gives	an	effective	width	of:		 	 	 	 72	inches	–	12	inches	=	60	inches	(5	feet)		The	Maximum	Specific	Flow	through	each	doorway	is:		 	 	 	 FSM	=	(5	feet)	x	(24.0	persons/min/feet)		
	 	 	 	 FSM	=	120	persons/min	Stairway:	The	stairway’s	narrowest	point	is	35	inches	wide	which	gives	an	effective	width	of:		 	 	 	 35	inches	–	12	inches	=	23	inches	(1.92	feet)		The	Maximum	Specific	Flow	through	each	stairway	is:		 	 	 	 FSM	=	(1.92	feet)	x	(18.5	persons/min/feet)			 	 	 	 FSM	=	35	persons/min	
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With	“two	stairwells”,	the	maximum	total	flow	would	be	70	persons/min.		The	area	that	would	limit	the	egress	time	would	be	the	stairway.	The	stairway	could	allow	a	maximum	of	70	people/min	to	pass	down	the	stairway	system	and	exit.	So	to	find	out	how	quickly	people	can	exit,	we	have	to	calculate	their	speed	down	the	stairways.	That	value	is	represented	by	the	formula:			 	 	 	 	 S	=	k	–	akD	S	=	Speed	along	the	line	of	travel	
D	=	Population	density	(persons/ft2)		*I’m	going	to	use	a	value	of	D=0.175	for	ideal	flow,	from	Figure	3-13.8	
from	the	SFPE	Handbook	(4th	Edition)	
a	=	Constant	=	2.86	feet/minute	k	=	Constant	as	shown	in	Table	3-13.2		 Stairway	(“7/11”	stairs)	 =	212			 Speed	on	the	stairs	=	(212)	–	[(2.86)	x	(212)	x	(0.175)]	
Speed	on	the	stairs	=	106	feet/minute	
	
Table	3-13.3	from	the	SFPE	Handbook	(4th	Edition)	shows	conversion	factors	for	relating	line	of	travel	distance	to	vertical	travel	for	various	stair	configurations.	For	a	“7/11”	stair,	
the	conversion	factor=1.85.		 *Using	a	stairway	height	of	14	feet	from	floor-to-floor*	
Distance	traveled	=	14	feet	x	1.85	=	25.9	feet	on	the	stairs		
The	centerline	distance	traveled	on	the	landing	is	10.5	feet	
	
The	total	distance	traveled	from	floor-to-floor	on	the	stairs	is:	
25.9	feet	+	10.5	feet	=	35.9	feet	
	At	a	speed	of	106	feet/minute,	and	a	distance	of	35.9	feet,	it	would	take:	
Time	to	travel	floor-to-floor	=	(35.9	feet)	/	(106	feet/minute)	=	20.3	seconds		From	the	base	of	the	stairs,	it	would	be	another	31	feet	to	reach	the	doorways.	The	maximum	speed	on	flat	ground	is	235	feet/min.	(31	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	7.9	seconds	So	in	total,	the	travel	time	from	the	top	of	the	stairs	to	the	exit	doorways	in	the	lobby	is:	
20.3	seconds	+	7.9	seconds	=	28	seconds		
Board	of	Supervisors	Offices:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	BOS	offices	is	30	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	south	into	the	west	corridor,	then	west	into	the	stairwell.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	89	feet.		
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	Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	west	corridor:	(89	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	23	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door:	(30	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	37.5	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	west	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	stairway:	(39	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	10	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	west	stairwell	=	25.3	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	25.3	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	30	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:	(0.42	minutes)	X	(FSM=46.25	people/min)	=	20	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	30	people	exiting,	and	20	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	10	people	waiting	in	
the	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	10	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	48	
people/minute,	12.5	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
23	+	37.5	+	10	+	25.3	+	12.5	=	~109	seconds	
	
County	Executive	Officer	Offices	plus	the	Northstar	Room:		
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	CEO	offices	is	34	people.	If	the	Northstar	room	is	included,	the	total	occupancy	is	50	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	south	into	the	west	corridor,	then	west	into	the	stairwell.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	107	feet.			Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	west	corridor:	(107	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	27	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	two	36”-wide	doors:	(50	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	31	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	west	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	stairway:	(100	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	25.5	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	west	stairwell	=	25.3	seconds	
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It	would	take	people	25.3	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	50	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:		 (0.42	minutes)	X	(FSM=46.25	people/min)	=	20	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	50	people	exiting,	and	20	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	30	people	waiting	in	
the	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	30	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	48	
people/minute,	37.5	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
27	+	31	+	25.5	+	25.3	+	37.5	=	~146	seconds					
Clerk	Recorder	Offices:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	Clerk	Recorder’s	offices	is	27	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	north	into	the	west	corridor,	then	west	into	the	stairwell.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	66	feet.			Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	west	corridor:	(66	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	17	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	two	36”-wide	doors:	(27	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	17	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	west	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	stairwell:	(29	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	7	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	west	stairwell	=	25.3	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	25.3	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	27	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:		 (0.42minutes)	X	(FSM=46.25	people/min)	=	20	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			
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With	27	people	exiting,	and	20	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	7	people	waiting	in	the	
queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	7	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	48	
people/minute,	8.75	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
17	+	17	+7	+	25.3	+	8.75	=	~69	seconds		
Auditor-Controller	Offices:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	Auditor-Controller’s	offices	is	26	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	north	into	the	west	corridor	through	two	exits,	then	west	into	the	stairwell.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	80	feet.			Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	west	corridor:	(80	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	20.4	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	two	36”-wide	doors:	(26	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	16.3	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	west	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	stairway:	(75	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	19.1	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	west	stairwell	=	25.3	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	25.3	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	26	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:		 (0.42	minutes)	X	(FSM=46.25	people/min)	=	20	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	26	people	exiting,	and	20	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	6	people	waiting	in	the	
queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	6	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	48	
people/minute,	7.5	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
20.4	+	16.3	+	19.1	+	25.3	+	7.5	=	89	seconds						
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Elections	Offices	&	Gold	Hill	Room:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	Elections	offices	is	25	people.	If	the	Gold	Hill	room	is	included,	the	total	occupancy	is	53	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	north	into	the	west	corridor	through	two	doorways,	then	east	into	the	open-air	walkway.	From	there,	they’d	travel	south	to	the	main	stairwell	and	out	the	front	doors.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	63.5	feet.			Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	west	corridor:	(63.5	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	16.2	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	two	36”-wide	doors:	(53	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	33.2	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	west	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	second	floor	lobby:	(72	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	18.4	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door	into	the	second	floor	lobby:	(53	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	66	seconds		Time	to	travel	south	along	the	open-air	walkway	and	reach	the	main	stairwell:	(51	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	main	stairwell	=	28	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	28	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	53	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:		 (0.47	minutes)	X	(FSM=70	people/min)	=	33	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	53	people	exiting,	and	33	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	20	people	waiting	in	
the	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	20	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	71	
people/minute,	17	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
16.2	+	33.2	+	18.4	+	66	+	13	+	28	+	17	=	192	seconds		
Human	Resources	Offices	and	Diamond	Creek	Room:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	HR	offices	is	22	people.	If	the	Diamond	Creek	room	is	included,	the	total	occupancy	is	53	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	south	into	the	
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west	corridor	through	three	doorways,	then	east	into	the	open-air	walkway.	From	there,	they’d	travel	south	to	the	main	stairwell	and	out	the	front	doors.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	80	feet.			Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	west	corridor:	(80	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	20	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	three	36”-wide	doors:	(53	people)	/	(144	people/min)	=	22	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	west	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	second	floor	lobby:	(32	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	8	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door	into	the	second	floor	lobby:	(53	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	66	seconds		Time	to	travel	south	along	the	open-air	walkway	and	reach	the	main	stairwell:	(51	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	main	stairwell	=	28	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	28	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	53	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:		 (0.47	minutes)	X	(FSM=70	people/min)	=	33	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	53	people	exiting,	and	33	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	20	people	waiting	in	
the	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	20	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	71	
people/minute,	17	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
20	+	22	+	8	+	66	+	13	+	28	+	17	=	174	seconds		
County	Counsel	Offices:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	County	Counsel	offices	is	32	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	south	into	the	west	corridor	through	two	doorways,	then	east	into	the	open-air	walkway.	From	there,	they’d	travel	south	to	the	main	stairwell	and	out	the	front	doors.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	75	feet.			Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	west	corridor:	
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(75	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	19	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	two	36”-wide	doors:	(32	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	20	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	west	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	second	floor	lobby:	(66	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	17	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door	into	the	second	floor	lobby:	(32	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	40	seconds		Time	to	travel	south	along	the	open-air	walkway	and	reach	the	main	stairwell:	(51	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	main	stairwell	=	28	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	28	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	32	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:	(0.47	minutes)	X	(FSM=70	people/min)	=	33	people	could	be	in	the	stairwell.			Therefore,	there	would	be	no	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
19	+	20	+	17	+	40	+	13	+	28	=	137	seconds		
LAFCo	Offices,	the	Grand	Jury	and	the	nearby	Conference	Rooms:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	these	offices	is	102	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	into	the	dead	end	corridor	through	four	doorways,	then	south	into	the	open-air	walkway.	From	there,	they’d	travel	south	to	the	main	stairwell	and	out	the	front	doors.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	77	feet.			Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	dead	end	corridor:	(77	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	20	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	four	36”-wide	doors:	(102	people)	/	(192	people/min)	=	32	seconds	
	Time	to	reach	the	door	to	the	second	floor	lobby:	(48	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	36”-wide	door:	(102	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	128	seconds	
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	Time	to	travel	south	along	the	open-air	walkway	and	reach	the	main	stairwell:	(51	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	main	stairwell	=	28	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	28	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	102	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:		 (0.47	minutes)	X	(FSM=70	people/min)	=	33	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	102	people	exiting,	and	33	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	69	people	waiting	in	
the	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	69	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	70	
people/minute,	59	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
20	+	32	+	13	+	128	+	13	+	28	+	59	=	293	seconds			
Office	of	Emergency	Services	and	the	Empire	Room:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	OES	offices	is	6	people.	If	the	Empire	room	is	included,	the	total	occupancy	is	70	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	north	into	the	east	corridor	through	one	doorway,	then	west	into	the	open-air	walkway.	From	there,	they’d	travel	south	to	the	main	stairwell	and	out	the	front	doors.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	75	feet.			Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	east	corridor:	(75	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	19	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	one	36”-wide	door:	(70	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	87.5	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	east	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	second	floor	lobby:	(15	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	4	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	one	36”-wide	door	into	the	second	floor	lobby:	(70	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	87.5	seconds		Time	to	travel	south	along	the	open-air	walkway	and	reach	the	main	stairwell:	(51	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds		
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	Time	to	exit	the	main	stairwell	=	28	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	28	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	70	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:		 (0.47	minutes)	X	(FSM=70	people/min)	=	33	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	70	people	exiting,	and	33	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	37	people	waiting	in	
the	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	37	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	71	
people/minute,	32	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
19	+	87.5	+	4	+	87.5	+	13	+	28	+	32	=	271	seconds	
	
	
Tax	Collector-Treasurer’s	Offices	and	Mountaineer	Room:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	Tax	Collector	&	Treasurer’s	offices	is	21	people.	If	the	Empire	room	is	included,	the	total	occupancy	is	46	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	north	into	the	east	corridor	through	two	doorways,	then	west	into	the	open-air	walkway.	From	there,	they’d	travel	south	to	the	main	stairwell	and	out	the	front	doors.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	66	feet.			Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	east	corridor:	(66	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	17	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	two	36”-wide	doors:	(46	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	29	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	east	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	second	floor-lobby:	(50	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	one	36”-wide	door	into	the	second	floor	lobby:	(46	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	58	seconds		Time	to	travel	south	along	the	open-air	walkway	and	reach	the	main	stairwell:	(51	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	main	stairwell	=	28	seconds	
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It	would	take	people	28	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	46	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:	(0.47	minutes)	X	(FSM=70	people/min)	=	33	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	46	people	exiting,	and	33	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	13	people	waiting	in	
the	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	13	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	71	
people/minute,	11	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
17	+	29	+	13	+	58	+	13	+	28	+	11	=	169	seconds	
	
Sheriff’s	Office:	
	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	Sheriff’s	offices	is	101	people.	They	would	have	two	paths	of	travel	as	the	office	space	is	so	wide.	The	first	would	be	south	into	the	east	corridor,	then	west	into	the	second	floor	lobby.	From	there,	they’d	travel	south	to	the	main	stairwell	and	out	the	front	doors.	The	other	option	would	be	to	head	south	into	the	east	corridor,	then	east	into	the	eastern	stairwell.	It	is	assumed	that	the	number	of	people	split	between	the	exits.		Exit	via	the	Main	Stairwell:		Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	east	corridor:	(102	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	26	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	two	36”-wide	doors:	(50.5	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	32	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	east	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	second	floor	lobby:	(17	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	4	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	one	36”-wide	door	into	the	second	floor	lobby:		(50.5	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	64	seconds		Time	to	travel	south	along	the	open-air	walkway	and	reach	the	main	stairwell:	(51	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	13	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	main	stairwell	=	28	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	28	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	51	people	can’t	fit	in	a	
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single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:		 (0.47	minutes)	X	(FSM=70	people/min)	=	33	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	51	people	exiting,	and	33	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	18	people	waiting	in	
the	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	18	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	71	
people/minute,	15	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
26	+	32	+	4	+	64	+	13	+	28	+	15	=	182	seconds		Exit	via	the	East	Stairwell:		Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	east	corridor:	(102	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	26	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	one	36”-wide	door	into	the	east	corridor:	(50.5	people)	/	(48	people/min)	=	64	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	east	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	eastern	stairwell:	(5	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	1	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	west	stairwell	=	25.3	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	25.3	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	50	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:		 (0.42	minutes)	X	(FSM=46.25	people/min)	=	20	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	50	people	exiting,	and	20	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	30	people	waiting	in	
the	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	30	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	48	
people/minute,	37.5	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
26	+	64	+	1	+	25.3	+	37.5	=	~154	seconds			
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Assessor’s	Offices:	The	maximum	occupancy	of	the	Assessor’s	offices	is	37	people.	Their	path	of	travel	would	be	north	into	the	east	corridor	through	two	doorways,	then	east	into	the	eastern	stairwell.	The	maximum	distance	traveled	in	the	office	is	63	feet.			Time	to	reach	the	office	door	to	the	east	corridor:	(63	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	16	seconds			Time	to	pass	through	the	one	36”-wide	door	into	the	east	corridor:		(63	people)	/	(96	people/min)	=	39	seconds		Time	to	travel	in	the	east	corridor	and	reach	the	door	to	the	eastern	stairwell:	(9	feet)	/	(235	feet/min)	=	2	seconds			Time	to	exit	the	west	stairwell	=	25.3	seconds	
	It	would	take	people	25.3	seconds	to	travel	down	the	stairs	between	floors	and	exit.	Assuming	everyone	in	the	office	was	trying	to	leave	at	one	time,	and	63	people	can’t	fit	in	a	single	floor’s	stairwell,	a	backup	or	queue	would	start	at	the	entrance	doorway	to	the	stairway.	That	queue	would	be	the	total	number	of	people	traveling	into	that	exit,	minus	how	many	people	are	already	in	the	stairwell.	So	in	the	time	it	takes	people	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	the	stairway	and	exit:		 (0.42	minutes)	X	(FSM=46.25	people/min)	=	20	people	would	be	in	the	stairwell.			With	63	people	exiting,	and	20	people	in	the	stairwell,	that	leaves	43	people	waiting	in	
the	queue	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.		
It	would	take	the	43	people	in	the	queue,	at	a	maximum	specific	flow	of	48	
people/minute,	54	seconds	to	enter	the	top	of	the	stairwell.		
16	+	39	+	2	+	25.3	+	54	=	~137	seconds													
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Close-Up	–	Floor	Plan	(Above	the	Floor)	
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Close-Up	–	Floor	Plan	(Below	the	Floor)	
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Medium	Growth		
INPUT PARAMETERS     CALCULATED PARAMETERS   
Height above fire (H) 1.68 m R/H 2.72   
Radial distance (R) 4.57 m dT(cj)/dT(pl) 0.15   
Ambient temperature (To) 25 C u(cj)/u(pl) 0.09   
Actuation temperature (Td) 32.2 C Rep. t2 coeff. k   
Response time index (RTI) 2 (m-s)1/2 Slow 0.003    
Fire growth power (n) 2 - Medium 0.012    
Fire growth coefficient (α) 0.012 kW/s^n Fast 0.047    
Time step (dt) 2 s Ultrafast 0.400    
          
 
      
      Calculation time (s) HRR Gas temp Gas velocity Det temp dT/dt 
0 0.0 20.0 0.00 20.00 0.00 
2 0.0 25.1 0.03 20.00 0.42 
4 0.2 25.4 0.04 20.84 0.46 
6 0.4 25.6 0.06 21.77 0.45 
8 0.8 25.9 0.07 22.67 0.42 
10 1.2 26.2 0.08 23.51 0.38 
12 1.7 26.6 0.09 24.27 0.34 
14 2.4 26.9 0.10 24.96 0.31 
16 3.1 27.3 0.11 25.57 0.28 
18 3.9 27.7 0.11 26.14 0.27 
20 4.8 28.1 0.12 26.67 0.25 
22 5.8 28.5 0.13 27.18 0.25 
24 6.9 29.0 0.14 27.67 0.24 
26 8.1 29.4 0.15 28.16 0.24 
28 9.4 29.9 0.15 28.64 0.24 
30 10.8 30.4 0.16 29.13 0.25 
32 12.3 30.8 0.17 29.62 0.25 
34 13.9 31.3 0.18 30.12 0.25 
36 15.6 31.8 0.18 30.63 0.26 
38 17.3 32.3 0.19 31.14 0.26 
40 19.2 32.9 0.20 31.66 0.26 									
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Fast	Growth		
INPUT PARAMETERS     CALCULATED PARAMETERS   
Height above fire (H) 1.68 m R/H 2.72   
Radial distance (R) 4.57 m dT(cj)/dT(pl) 0.15   
Ambient temperature (To) 25 C u(cj)/u(pl) 0.09   
Actuation temperature (Td) 32.2 C Rep. t2 coeff. k   
Response time index (RTI) 2 (m-s)1/2 Slow 0.003    
Fire growth power (n) 2 - Medium 0.012    
Fire growth coefficient (α) 0.047 kW/s^n Fast 0.047    
Time step (dt) 2 s Ultrafast 0.400    
          
 
      
      Calculation time (s) HRR Gas temp Gas velocity Det temp dT/dt 
0 0.0 20.0 0.00 20.00 0.00 
2 0.2 25.4 0.04 20.00 0.55 
4 0.8 25.9 0.07 21.10 0.62 
6 1.7 26.6 0.09 22.34 0.62 
8 3.0 27.3 0.11 23.58 0.60 
10 4.7 28.1 0.12 24.78 0.58 
12 6.8 28.9 0.14 25.94 0.56 
14 9.2 29.8 0.15 27.05 0.54 
16 12.0 30.8 0.17 28.13 0.54 
18 15.2 31.7 0.18 29.20 0.54 
20 18.8 32.7 0.19 30.28 0.54 
22 22.7 33.8 0.21 31.37 0.55 
24 27.1 34.9 0.22 32.47 0.56 
26 31.8 36.0 0.23 33.60 0.58 
28 36.8 37.1 0.24 34.75 0.59 
30 42.3 38.3 0.25 35.93 0.60 
32 48.1 39.5 0.27 37.13 0.61 
34 54.3 40.7 0.28 38.35 0.62 
36 60.9 42.0 0.29 39.60 0.63 
38 67.9 43.2 0.30 40.87 0.65 
40 75.2 44.5 0.31 42.16 0.66 									
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APPENDIX	G		Alarm	Zones	List																			
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APPENDIX	H		Alarm	System	Component	Data	Sheets																			
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APPENDIX	I		 Underground	Water	Supply	Drawing													
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  295
																								
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  296
															
APPENDIX	J	
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Rood	Center	–	1st	Floor	East	(1	of	5)	
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Rood	Center	–	1st	Floor	West	(2	of	5)	
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Rood	Center	–	2st	Floor	East	(3	of	5)	
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Rood	Center	–	2st	Floor	West	(4	of	5)	
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Rood	Center	–	Mansard	(5	of	5)	
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Rood	Center	–	Mansard	(Close-Up)	
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Rood	Center	–	2nd	Floor	Combined	Overview	with	water	path	highlighted	
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  304
																							
Rood	Center	–	2nd	Floor	Combined	Close-Up	with	water	path	highlighted	
Fire Protection & Life Safety Analysis – Eric W. Rood Administration Center  305
															
APPENDIX	K	
	Pump	Room	Layout													
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APPENDIX	L		Sprinkler	System	Component	Data	Sheets										
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APPENDIX	M		Manual	Hydraulic	Calculations									
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APPENDIX	N		Original	Hydraulic	Calculations									
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Original	Calculations	–	1st	Floor	
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Original	Calculations	–	2nd	Floor	
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Original	Calculations	–	Mansard	
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Major	Sprinkler	
System	
Components	
Inspections,	Testing	and	
Maintenance	
Frequency	
	
NFPA	25	
(2014)	
Reference	Fire	Department	Connections		 Connection	visible	and	accessible		Couplings	checked	for	damage		Plugs,	Caps,	Couplings	gaskets	in	place/undamaged		ID	signs	in	place		Verify	ball	drip	valve	is	free	of	leaks		Interior	is	inspected	for	obstructions		Piping	from	the	FDC	to	the	FD	Check	Valve	hydrostatically	tested	at	150	psi	for	2	hours		Check	valve	–	internal	moves	freely,	in	good	condition	
Quarterly			Quarterly		 Quarterly			Quarterly		Quarterly			Quarterly			Every	5	years		 		Every	5	years	(maintained	as	necessary)	
13.7.1				13.7.1		13.7.1			13.7.1		13.7.1			13.7.1			13.7.4			 	13.4.2.1			Backflow	Prevention	 Check	that	the	Isolation	valves	and	double	check	detector	assemblies	are	open		Inspected	internally	to	verify	all	components	operate	correctly,	move	freely	and	are	in	good	condition		Forward	flow	test	(or	internal	inspection	during	water	rationing)	
Weekly		(Monthly	if	locked)		Every	5	years					Annually	
13.6.1.1				13..1.4					13.6.2.1	
Pressure	Reducing	Valve	 In	the	open	position/not	leaking		Maintaining	downstream	pressure		
Quarterly		Quarterly			
13.5.1.1		13.5.1.1			
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In	good	condition		Full	flow	test	conducted	on	each	valve	
Quarterly		Every	5	years	 13.5.1.1		13.5.1.2	Riser		 Inspect	gauges		Gauges	tested	or	replaced		Nameplate	attached	
	Seismic	bracing	checked		Main	drain	test	
Quarterly	
	Every	5	years		Annually		Annually		Annually	
5.2.4.1		5.3.2.1		5.2.6		5.2.3		13.3.3.4	Control	Valves		 Wrenches/hand	wheel	available		Operated/Lubricated		Valve	is	free	of	damage	and	leaks				Control	Valve	supervisory	alarm	devices		In	the	correct	(open	or	closed)	position		Sealed,	locked,	or	supervised		Accessible		Has	proper	signage		Post	Indicator	Valves	opened	until	spring	or	torsion	is	felt	in	the	rod	
Monthly		Annually		Weekly	(Monthly	if	locked)		Quarterly			Monthly			Monthly		Monthly		Monthly		Every	time	the	valve	is	closed	
13.3.2.2		13.3.3.1		13.3.2.1				13.3.2.1.2			13.3.2.2			13.3.2.2		13.3.2.2		13.3.2.2		13.3.3.2	
Supervisory	Switches	 Valve	supervisory	switches	shall	be	tested	 Semi-Annually	 13.3.3.5.1	Waterflow	Alarm	Device	 Inspect	to	verify	system	is	free	of	damage		Waterflow	alarm	test		Vane-type	and	pressure	switch-type	Waterflow	alarm	devices	
Quarterly			Quarterly		Semi-Annually	
5.2.5			5.3.3.1,	13.2.6		5.3.3.2/13.2.6/2		
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	Test	the	audible	alarm	and	visual	signals	activate	within	90	seconds.	
		Annually			
		13.2.6			Alarm	Valves	 Free	of	damage		Accessible		Retard	chamber/alarm	drains,	not	leaking		Interior	checked	(strainers,	filters	and	restriction	orifice)		
Monthly		Monthly		 Monthly			Every	5	years		
13.4.1		13.4.1		13.4.1			13.4.1.2		Sprinklers	 No	damage	or	leaks		Free	of	corrosion,	foreign	materials,	paint	and	damage		Installed	in	proper	orientation		Distance	from	ceilings	and	to	storage	below		If	fast-response	sprinklers	are	20	years	old					If	sprinklers	are	50	years	old						If	sprinklers	are	75	years	old						High	temperature	sprinklers			Check	hangers	and	seismic	
Annually		Annually			Annually		Annually			Check	at	20	years,	and	every	10	years	thereafter		Check	at	50	years	and	every	10	years	thereafter		Check	at	75	years	and	every	5	years	thereafter			Every	5	years		Annually	
5.2.1.1.1		5.2.1.1.1			5.2.1.1.1		5.2.1.2			5.3.1.1.1.5						5.3.1.1.1						5.3.1.1.1.5						5.3.1.1.1.4		5.2.3	
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bracing	are	installed	and	undamaged	At	least	6	spare	sprinklers	–	proper	number	and	type.	Complete	with	wrench?	
		Annually			
		5.2.1.4,	5.4.1.5			Fittings	&	Supports		 Free	of	leaks,	corrosion	and	mechanical	damage		Verify	proper	alignment	and	free	of	external	loads		Hose	racks	inspected	per	NFPA	1962		Full	flow	test	on	each	device		OS&Y	Valves	shall	be	lubricated	annually	
Annually			Annually			Annually			Every	5	years		Annually	
5.2.2.1			5.2			13.5.3.1			13.5.3.2		13.3.4.1		Additional	Requirements	and	Frequency	data	should	follow	Table	5.1.1.2,	Table	6.1.12,	and	Table	13.1.1.2	from	NFPA	25	(2014)	seen	below.													
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